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Abstract!!
This thesis examines the formula “written on the body” arguing that we can understand such 
formulations as both literal and metaphorical.  Hence Grosz’s claim in Volatile Bodies Toward a 
Corporeal Feminism that the body is literally written on is more than a post-modern feminist 
articulation, conflation or confusion of bodies and texts.  The two most obvious questions that arise 
from such formulations are: what is writing and what is its relation to embodiment?  These 
questions are not just questions posed to feminist theorists.  They are eminently philosophical 
questions and therefore require a philosophical response. 
 
Therefore, before one can begin to understand uptakes of such formulations as “written on the 
body”, I ask: what is writing?  Providing an answer to this question is the largest concern of this 
thesis.  For all other questions are unanswerable until it is considered.   I argue that writing is a 
mimetic practice that not only exceeds all accounts of writing as a mere copy or appurtenance of 
speech, but also any accounts of representation as mimetic resemblance.  Hence we are returned to 
one of the oldest philosophical disturbances – mimesis.   For there can be no doubt that Plato is 
more than disturbed by mimesis and mimetic representation, ergo we begin with an articulation of 
this disturbance. 
 
While some of the authors engaged with in this thesis may be considered “outside” philosophy, it 
has been necessary to go beyond our sometimes disputed borders to open a dialogue about mimesis.  
This has meant inviting anthropology, psychoanalysis and semiotics into a philosophical 
conversation.  Engaging in these conversations has allowed me to propose an answer to the question 
“what is writing?”  Simply, writing is a mimetic practice able to represent anything as it resembles 
nothing.  Moreover writing is an embodied mimetic practice and as such is subject to ethics.   
 
In answering the question, “what is writing?”, I have argued that writing is a mimetic practice that 
not only exceeds all accounts of writing as a mere copy or appurtenance of speech, but also any 
accounts of representation as mimetic resemblance.  It is the idea of writing as a copy, of speech or 
anything else, that is the guiding and unexamined assumption of linguist theories, be they 
philosophical, semiotic, etc.   For any theory that claims that writing is a copy of speech overlooks 
what copying as representative is – it fails to account for or examine the workings of mimesis.   
This thesis has provided such an account. 
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Mimesis: mimesis 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the formula “written on the body” arguing that we can understand such 
formulations as both literal and metaphorical.  Hence Grosz’s claim in Volatile Bodies Toward a 
Corporeal Feminism that the body is literally written on is more than a post-modern feminist 
articulation, conflation or confusion of bodies and texts.  The two most obvious questions that arise 
from such formulations are: what is writing and what is its relation to embodiment?  These 
questions are not just questions posed to feminist theorists.  They are eminently philosophical 
questions and therefore require a philosophical response. 
 
Therefore, before one can begin to understand uptakes of such formulations as “written on the 
body”, I ask: what is writing?  Providing an answer to this question is the largest concern of this 
thesis.  For all other questions are unanswerable until it is considered.   I argue that writing is a 
mimetic practice that not only exceeds all accounts of writing as a mere copy or appurtenance of 
speech, but also any accounts of representation as mimetic resemblance.  Hence we are returned to 
one of the oldest philosophical disturbances – mimesis.   For there can be no doubt that Plato is 
more than disturbed by mimesis and mimetic representation, ergo we begin with an articulation of 
this disturbance. 
 
While some of the authors engaged with in this thesis may be considered “outside” philosophy, it 
has been necessary to go beyond our sometimes disputed borders to open a dialogue about mimesis.  
This has meant inviting anthropology, psychoanalysis and semiotics into a philosophical 
conversation.  Engaging in these conversations has allowed me to propose an answer to the question 
“what is writing?”  Simply, writing is a mimetic practice able to represent anything as it resembles 
nothing.  Moreover writing is an embodied mimetic practice and as such is subject to ethics.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Mimesis: Plato 
 
Republic 
 
Book X of the Republic introduces Plato’s theory of the Forms.  In it Plato presents his (in)famous 
argument disavowing artistic representation on the basis that it is ‘mimetic’.  However, Plato’s 
denigration of artistic representation is not distinct from his theory of the Forms – it is intricated 
with it.  This section argues that the theory of the Forms, including the elision of mimetic practice 
as artistic representation, is an argument for a mimetic preference, i.e. functional mimeticity rather 
than visual mimeticity.  Plato argues: 
 
(1) Then shall we start by following our usual procedure?  You know that we always 
postulate in each case a single form for each set of particular things, to which we apply the 
same name? ... Then let us take any set you choose, for example, there are many particular 
beds and tables. ... But there are only two forms, one of bed and one of table.  Then we 
normally say that the maker of either of these kinds of furniture has his eye on the 
appropriate form ... [f]or no craftsman could possibly make the form itself, could he? ... 
Well now, I wonder what you would call a craftsman of the following kind. ... One who can 
make all objects produced by other particular crafts. ... Do you know that there’s a sense in 
which you could create them yourself? ... It’s not difficult, ... [t]he quickest way is to take a 
mirror. ... For a painter is a craftsman of just this kind, I think. (Plato 1987, 22-3) 
 
Plato tells us that “for any set you choose”, there is only one Form.  The question that arises is how 
each set is related to the Form, given the diversity of particular tables and chairs in each set.  For 
any thing to belong to a set, then it must be like whatever is posited for the set, and also like the 
other things that are in the set. These things are also quite unlike each other in many respects.  
However, I argue that for Plato, instantiations or realizations of tables and chairs are mimetic of 
their Forms – not visually, but functionally.  
 
If the particulars are functionally mimetic, then despite their variety in design, they function in the 
same way.  For example, the function of a chair is object for sitting on.  It is like its Form, where 
the Form of chair is ‘for sitting on’.  It is like the Form in that the Form is a concept of function 
whilst the particulars are physical realizations of that function.   
 
Plato argues that it is with the Form in mind that the craftsperson will make her chair so this is a 
mimesis without “seeing”.  If the craftsperson did not bear the Form in mind, then her chair might 
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not be a chair – we might end up eating off it.  A functional notion of mimesis explains one Form 
and its relation with a multiplicity of apparently heterogeneous particulars.  For all chairs must be 
like each other if they are to belong to the set of chairs.  Yet chairs are often so different from each 
other that we cannot judge their similarity by how they are like each other visually.  Being 
functionally mimetic of their Form explains how it is possible that what appears as a diverse group 
can have something in common such that they belong to, say, the set of chairs.  That is, if function 
is the Form then each particular realization of that Form is mimetic of that Form.  Further, 
functional mimeticity allows for both the difference and the similarity between the Form and the 
particulars, and between the particulars themselves, for whilst physical realizations may differ 
visually and morphologically, they still share the functional feature that allows that they belong to a 
set for which there is only one Form. 
 
However, as we know, Plato does disapprove of mimesis.  Does this mean that if the theory of 
Forms is a functional theory of mimesis Plato is contradicting himself regarding mimesis?  Or is it 
better to see that we have competing uses of mimesis and that Plato disapproves of one in particular, 
whilst arguing for others? 
 
(2) What I mean is this.  If you look at a bed, or anything else, sideways or endways or from 
some other angle, does it make any difference to the bed?  Isn’t it merely that it looks 
different, without being different? And similarly with other things. ...Then consider -- when 
the painter makes his representation, does he do so by reference to the object as it actually is 
or to its superficial appearance?  Is his representation one of an apparition or of the truth? ... 
The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from the truth, and it is able to 
reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of a mere 
phenomenal appearance. (Plato 1987, 426) 
 
 
I argue that Plato’s rejection of mimetic art is based on his theory of the Forms.  Plato’s position on 
poetic and artistic representation is supported firstly by his idea that poetic and artistic 
representation is ‘a long way removed from the truth’ – therefore, as mere appearance, mimetic art 
is an apparition.  Secondly, Plato’s rejection is based on a distinction between visual representation, 
i.e. artistic and poetic representation, and representations of the visual, i.e. the world of phenomenal 
appearance; the particulars.  By drawing a distinction between how a thing looks and how a thing is 
Plato relegates artistic and poetic representation to ‘mere phenomenal appearance’, which is able to 
‘reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything’.   
 
It is Plato’s distinction between being and appearance, drawn in the theory of the Forms, that 
situates artistic and poetic representation as representing the world of appearances and hence a long 
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way from the truth of the Forms.  For Plato, it is not what is visible that makes the particulars 
mimetic of each other, or of the Forms, it is their functional mimeticity, which has little to do with 
their phenomenal appearance.  Artistic and poetic representations are limited to phenomenal 
appearance, and hence cannot represent what cannot be seen.  And what cannot be seen is the 
functional mimeticity of the particular to the Form.  Plato associates poetry and art because they 
represent the phenomenal appearance of the particulars. The visual arts are visually mimetic of the 
particulars. 
 
The problem is not mimesis as such.  The issue is what is seen, and by whom.   The poet and the 
visual artist see the phenomenal appearance of the particulars in a world-of-appearances.  Plato 
argues: 
 
(3)  ...For example, a painter can paint a portrait of a shoemaker or a carpenter or any other 
craftsman without understanding any of their crafts; yet if he is skillful enough, his portrait 
of a carpenter may, at a distance, deceive children or simple people into thinking it is a real 
carpenter. (Plato 1987, 426) 
 
(4)  We must go on to examine the claims of the tragedians and their chief, Homer.  We are 
told that they are masters of all forms of skill, and know all about human excellence and 
defect and about religion; for – so the argument runs – a good  poet, must, if he’s to write 
well know all about his subject, otherwise he can’t write about it. (Plato 1987, 426) 
 
From (3) and (4) we can see that Plato connects poetic and artistic representation on the basis of 
knowledge, or rather a lack of knowledge, of the things represented, for he says that the artist’s 
apparent ‘omniscience is due entirely to his own inability to distinguish knowledge, ignorance and 
representation.’   We will revisit Plato’s notion of knowledge in the final chapter.  Similarly for the 
poet, who, Plato suggests, must know all about his subject if he is to write well.   
 
“Well now, I wonder what you would call a craftsman of the following kind. ... One who 
can make all the objects produced by other particular crafts. ... It is not difficult, and can be 
done in various ways.  The quickest way is to take a mirror and turn it round in all 
directions; before long you will create sun and earth, yourself and all other animals and 
plants, and furniture and the other objects we mentioned just now.” 
 
“Yes, but they would only be reflections,” he said, “not real things.” 
 
“Quite right,” I replied, “and very much to the point.  For a painter is a craftsman of just this 
kind, I think.  Do you agree?” (Plato 1987, 423) 
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From (1) and the above, we are able to see that Plato thinks poetic and artistic representation is a 
kind of mirroring, and the quickest way to produce representations of such kind is to use a “mirror”.  
For a mirror is able to visually represent “superficial appearance” without knowledge of its object.  
Further, a mirror can visually represent any and all objects.  It is this kind of visual mimesis, i.e. 
mirroring, of any and all objects that Plato associates with artistic and poetic visual representation.  
Further, we can see that Plato considers this kind of “reflection” as unable to produce real things. 
 
This type of mimesis does not apply however, to the craftsperson or the philosopher, as I have 
argued, for they have knowledge of the functional mimeticity of the object and hence the Form.  A 
functional notion of mimesis for the theory of the Forms suggests that for Plato, the craftsman and 
the philosopher having an eye to the Forms is not meant to be taken literally.  Plato may be being 
ironic here, but the visual metaphor taken literally is quite misleading.  One does not see a function, 
or a Form of function.  Having knowledge of a function allows one access to the Form.  Yet Plato 
insists that the poet and the artist have no access to the Forms – the only knowledge they possess 
comes from the world-of-appearances.  Their art is the representation of the visual. 
 
(5)  Suppose, then, a man could produce both the original and the copy. Do you think he 
would seriously want to devote himself to the manufacture of copies and make it the highest 
object in his life? ... “My dear Homer” we shall say “if our definition of representation is 
wrong and you are not merely manufacturing copies at a third remove from reality, but are a 
stage nearer the truth about human excellence, and really capable of judging what kind of 
conduct will make the individual or the community better or worse, tell us any state whose 
constitution you have reformed, as Lycurgus did at Sparta and others have done elsewhere 
on a larger or smaller scale. ...” (Plato 1987, 427) 
 
Plato considers that poetic and artistic representations are “at a third remove from reality”.   By 
situating poetic and artistic representation at a third remove from the Forms, he makes these types 
of representation copies of copies, i.e., simulacra.  For Plato then, the difference between poetic and 
artistic representation and philosophical representation is that philosophers will devote themselves 
to the Forms – not the particulars which belong to the world-of-appearances. 
 
(6) The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from the truth, and it is able to 
reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of a mere 
phenomenal appearance. (Plato 1987, 426) 
 
Plato’s problem with poetic representation is not one of mimeticity per se, since as I have argued, 
the theory of the Forms is a mimetic theory.  Rather, it is a problem of knowledge at a triple 
distance from the truth, where poetic representation only accesses ‘phenomenal appearance’.  The 
following dialogue is between Socrates and Glaucon: 
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(7)  “What about the artist and his representations?  Has he the user’s direct experience of 
the things he paints to enable him to know whether or not his pictures are good or right?  Or 
has he the correct opinion that springs from enforced acquaintance with and obedience to 
someone who knows what he ought to paint?”   
“He has neither.”  
‘So the artist has neither knowledge nor correct opinion about the goodness or badness of 
the things he represents.’ 
“Apparently not.” 
“So the poet too, as the artist, will be beautifully ill-informed about the subjects of his 
poetry.” (Plato 1987, 430-31) 
 
 
Two things are important in this dialogue.  Firstly, in the last line of (7), Plato associates the poet 
and the visual artist.  Secondly, Plato considers poetic and artistic representation to lack direct 
experience of things.  It is this lack of “direct experience” and hence knowledge of things, that is 
part of the distinction Plato makes between philosophical representation and poetic representation.   
 
The issue of direct experience is crucial here, for Plato, whilst not arguing this exactly, seems to 
think that no-one can have direct experience of everything.  This is patently true, however, it does 
not follow that one does not have direct experience of anything.  Plato’s position though is that to 
produce a good copy, one must have experience of the thing.  But one could simply point out that 
philosophers may not have the required experience either.  Plato connects the visual artist with the 
mirror paradigm as the visual artist is the “wonderfully clever man” who can create all objects, or 
rather, reflections of them, for they are “not real things”. (Plato 1987, 423)  In our earlier discussion 
of “mirroring” as painterly mimesis, Plato suggests that the visual artist’s work is mere reflection.  I 
will discuss the issues of the mirror paradigm and mimesis in the chapter entitled “Mimesis: 
Myths”.  However, Plato’s issue here is that of good and bad mimesis, that is, mimesis without 
knowledge.  Hence, painterly mirroring mimesis belongs to “bad”, unknowledgeable mimesis. 
 
It is worthwhile briefly examining the issue of good and bad mimesis as it arises in Book III, 
Republic.  In Plato and Aristotle on poetry (Else, 1986), Else points out that not all poets would be 
excluded from the ideal city, merely those who make poor imitations.  What constitutes poor 
mimesis is misrepresenting the gods.  The exclusion is made on moral and educative grounds.   That 
is, Plato censors and censures the poet’s representation for two reasons.  Firstly, he argues that God 
is good and hence no harm can come from Him.   Therefore, any representation of God (or gods) 
causing ill, is false.  Secondly, God is unchangeably good.  So representations of God as changing 
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shape and hence becoming less than what they are, are also false.1   Once again Plato uses the 
analogy to painting to discuss what he considers these ugly fictions: 
 
(8) Misrepresenting the nature of gods and heroes, like a portrait painter whose portraits 
bear no resemblance to their originals. (Plato 1987, 132) 
 
It is on the basis of misrepresentation that poets are excluded, not merely because of their 
representations lack resemblance to the originals, but also because of the impact such stories have 
on children and those to be educated as guardians.  Namely, this kind of representation encourages 
various forms of moral weakness.  Plato then presents a number of examples of what should be 
elided from Homer if his poetry were to be admitted (see Plato 1987, 140-49).  Of course Plato 
would exclude Homer on the basis of these arguments, however, this does not exclude all poets.  
Plato argues: 
 
(9) For ourselves, we shall for our own good employ story-tellers and poets who are severe 
rather than amusing, who portray the style of the good man and in their works abide by the 
principles we laid down for them when we started out on this attempt to educate our military 
class. (Plato 1987, 157) 
 
We can see Plato is not excluding poets on the basis of mimesis per se; rather it is on the ground of 
bad mimesis, i.e., poor representation of the gods and heroes.  It is clear from the above that those 
poets who make good representations, that is portray the gods and heroes accurately, are allowed 
access to the ideal state.  The “principles” Plato lays down are based on a distinction he draws at the 
close of book III, between the form and content of poetry, that is, “the how” and “the what” of the 
text.  The first sections that we have been discussing take up the logos, that is the “what” or 
“content” of the text.  The last section of Book III discusses the lexeos, that is the “how” or “form” 
of the text.  This distinction will be discussed fully in a later section that deals with Melberg’s 
position on Platonic mimesis. 
 
We can see that one of Plato’s primary reasons for excluding the poets is a lack of knowledge.  
Book X continues and expands on this theme.  The mimetic displacements that occur in the theory 
of the Forms produce what Melberg discusses as Heidegger’s truth at a distance.  In taking up 
mimesis as “truth at a distance” in the case of poetic and artistic mimeticity, I argue that this 
“distance” is a side effect of Plato’s understanding of philosophical truth as similarity.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Else argues that Plato’s position flies in the face of Greek tradition and that this argument is about justice and 
injustice.  ‘So far as the poets are concerned, the crucial point is that they serve up the same shabby, perverted, 
externalistic moral code as the rest of society, but with greater authority: “For we have no other source of knowledge 
about the gods,” says Adeimantos, “than our laws and the poets”(365e).’ 
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Heidegger’s notion of Platonic mimesis as “truth at a distance” is covered by Melberg’s point that 
truth at a distance is produced by truth as similarity.   This can only be the case if there are 
competing notions of mimesis in Plato’s texts.  Plato’s privileged mimesis is that of a first order 
copy in opposition to the second order simulacrum.  The issue is that Plato’s philosophical truth is 
truth as similarity because of the functional mimesis of the particulars and the Forms.  Plato’s 
similarity constructs ontological difference between the forms, the particulars and representation 
and hence distance as well.  This difference or distance occurs because the theory of the Forms 
constructs distance as nearness to the truth, in relation to philosophical representation.  However, 
the side effect of the theory of the Forms is that artistic and poetic mimesis cannot achieve truth as 
similarity, distance/nearness, because it is doubly distanced from the truth of the Forms.  Poets and 
artists create a similarity of similarity.  The distance is created because poetic and artistic 
representation is doubly mimetic, doubly removed from the truth.  
 
Given my argument that the theory of the Forms is a theory of mimesis, and that Plato disparages art 
on the basis of its doubly mimetic nature, I wish to suggest that for Plato the particulars in relation 
to the Forms are more similar to the truth.  Art and poetry are less similar, because art and poetry 
are similar to that which is already similar, a copy of a copy.  Hence the artist only creates a 
similarity of a similarity of the truth of the Forms, whilst the Theory of the Forms as a mimetic 
theory creates truth as similarity, that is, truth as the particular at one remove only from the Form. 
 
 
The painter cannot know whether his pictures are good or right, for he does not have the maker’s 
direct experience of the objects he paints (see 7).  We know from the theory of the Forms that 
philosophers and craftsmen have direct experience.  They have acquaintance with the Forms and 
hence true knowledge.  What are real for Plato are the Forms, and they are origins or originals.  
Hence, philosophical representation as similarity has knowledge of the real, the original and the 
origin.  Philosophical mimesis has an origin, namely the Forms, on which it bases truth as 
similarity. 
 
Artistic and poetic representation cannot produce an origin as it is based in the world-of-
appearances, which is only a copy of a copy of the Forms.  Poetic and artistic representation can 
only ever produce a copy of a copy, from a world that is already a copy.  Hence poetic and artistic 
representation has no knowledge of the real.  We might argue that this is the reason for? Plato’s 
horror of the simulacrum – knowledge without origin, the copy without an original. 
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Whilst the Republic connects artistic and poetic representation on the basis that they are visually 
mimetic, a problem that arises with this connection is that poetry, understood as theatre, is not only 
visually mimetic, it is also linguistic.   It is to Cratylus we turn to consider Plato’s account of the 
mimetic nature of language and naming.   We will find that poetry fares no better in Cratylus than 
in Republic.   But before doing so, we will consider the distinction between visual and linguistic 
mimesis in Plato as taken up by Else. 
 
Else (Else 1986, 13) argues that both Republic and Cratylus introduce a new theme to Plato’s 
writing, that is, mimesis.  Whilst Republic and Cratylus belong to the same period of Plato’s works, 
Else considers the Cratylus to be the earlier of the dialogues.  Although Else finds much of the 
etymological work within this text absurd and unprofitable he notes the parallels of locution 
between Cratylus and Republic.  Function is what the craftsman must look toward when putting the 
Form into the object.  Else argues: 
 
He [Plato] speaks of the toolmaker as “looking toward” the Form ... with a view to rendering 
it in the appropriate material; and he uses an exactly parallel locution of the namegiver ( ..., 
lit. lawgiver) of the Kratylos: in order to make a name functional tool he must “look toward 
that which Name really is” (389d), in other words, toward the generic Idea of Name – and 
presumably beyond it to the specific form of the particular thing he wishes to name. (Else 
1986, 13-46) 
 
 
An issue to be taken up later in my discussion of Cratylus is that of “namegiver” as lawgiver.  
However, here the issue is the analogy between the visual and the verbal, which, Else argues, Plato 
repeatedly invokes and contrasts in the Cratylus and the Republic.  Whilst not discussing the 
repeated analogy in his section on Cratylus, I argue that the distinction Plato makes between the 
visual and the verbal is covered by Else’s distinguishing of usages of mimesis in his analysis of 
Republic.  Else’s definitions of the terms used by Plato are: 
 
1.  Miming: enacting a mime-like plot or acting a mime-like character.  This meaning, which 
is presumably the original one ... [a] denominative verb formed in the regular way … is 
obviously dramatic in orientation.  (It) appears occasionally in Attic, but only in mimic or 
comic contexts; it is not used in serious drama. 
 
2.  Imitating: copying another person’s actions or way of doing something, in general.  This 
broader and vaguer (less specifically dramatic) meaning is the predominant one in Attic, 
especially for the action noun... 
 
3.  Copying: making a replica of something in an inanimate material (wood, etc.).  This 
meaning is especially common with the result noun… “replica, copy.” (Else 1986, 25) 
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Else argues that for Plato poetry was an extremely personal communication and that the “poet’s 
relationship to his hearers is in fact a kind of devilish inversion of the true relationship between 
souls.” (Else 1986, 25)  In discussing the above distinctions, Else argues that it is 2, imitating, that 
Plato wishes to establish as “impersonation of dramatic characters; and he does so by presenting ... 
the sense as a particular case of ... imitation.” (Else 1986, 27) [my italics]  To do so, Else argues 
that Plato subsumes 1 and 2 as the term was not used in this way before, and further, that Plato was 
“the author of this extension”. (Else 1986, 27)  Else also argues in the same section that Plato was 
the first to proclaim Homer a dramatist and actor.  That is, with the Plato’s subsumption of 1 and 2, 
the poet becomes an impersonator.  Else argues “that Plato is not out to achieve a complete, tested 
classification of all poetry here.  He is out to show that mimesis in the sense of impersonation is the 
most dangerous mode; for the rest, he does not care where the chips may fall.” (Else 1986, 29)  
 
It can be argued that the distinctions Else makes so clear in 1 - 3, and Plato’s subsumption of 1 and 
2, allow us to consider the difference between the painting and poetry.  That is, painting is 
inanimate in the sense of 3, whilst poetry is animate in the sense used by Plato.  The least important, 
though relevant difference is that between function and action.  That is, inanimate objects are 
functionally mimetic of their Forms, whilst animate objects such as humans are actionally mimetic 
of their Form.  Certainly, “action” is the term used by Plato throughout Cratylus.  However, it is the 
instrumental analogy, or rather the function of instruments, that allows us to see that ‘action’ in 
Cratylus, is similar to the functional mimesis I have argued for in Republic.   
 
The analogy, moreover, between painting and poetry, let us say language for the moment, is still 
troublesome and Melberg considers this the spurious grounds on which Plato banishes poetry as 
mimetic.  However, as I have already argued, it is not on the basis of mimesis per se that Plato 
banishes poetry.   Both Melberg and Else agree that Plato’s “predilection for visual comparison” 
(Else 1986, 16) is problematic for his theory of poetry.  However, I argue that visual comparisons as 
such are not the problem for Plato, rather it is a problem of what can be seen, and hence represented 
visually, that is the world of appearances; and what cannot be seen or represented visually but only 
experienced, that is the world of the Forms.  That is the difference between essence and appearance, 
functional or actional mimesis and visual mimesis. 
 
In Cratylus Hermogenes poses the question, “what sort of imitation is a name?” (423d) Plato 
argues: 
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In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal, nor, 
again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in my judgement, would not be naming.  
Let me put the matter as follows.  All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour. 
... But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind. ... Again, 
is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound?  And is there not an 
essence of colour and of sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an 
essence? ... Well, and if anyone could express the essence of each thing in letters and 
syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? ... The musician and the painter 
were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators.  What will this imitator be 
called?  I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name giver, of whom we are in 
search. (Plato 1961, 458-59) 
 
This is the first occurrence in Cratylus of the comparison between kinds of imitators and imitations.  
It is clear that Plato considers painting, music and naming as mimetic.  But Plato argues naming is 
not the same kind of imitation as painting and music.  The distinction Plato makes between these 
mimetic practices is that naming deals with the essence of things, including the essence of colour 
and sound.  And it is the namer who is the imitator of this essence and nature of things.  Given that 
it is specifically that task of the name to imitate in this fashion, one can see that Plato does not 
consider it the task within the abilities of the painter and the musician.  
 
Cratylus 
 
Plato’s Cratylus has four or five imbricated arguments that discuss the conventionality or 
naturalness of language.  The three major theories presented by Plato are the essence theory of 
language, the theory of the Forms as a theory of language, and the imitation theory of names.  
Plato’s debt to mimesis in the form of the instrumental analogy throughout this text underpins his 
argument for language as not merely conventional, but natural as well.  Plato’s analogical debt 
enables his invocation of the theory of the Forms as a theory of language, where language is 
functionally or actionally mimetic of the Forms. 
 
Hermogenes:  I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot 
convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention 
and agreement.  Any name which you give in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change 
that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old – we frequently change the 
names of our slaves, and the newly imposed name is as good as the old.  For there is no 
name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users. (Plato 1961, 422) 
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Plato’s first argument against the pure conventionality of language, discussed by Hermogenes in the 
above, is that given names are a part of propositions and propositions are true or false, and names 
are a part of propositions, then names may be true or false also.  Plato argues: 
 
Socrates: But how about truth then?  Would you acknowledge that there is in words a true 
and a false? 
Hermogenes:  Certainly. 
Socrates:  And there are true and false propositions? 
Hermogenes:  To be sure. 
Socrates:  And a true proposition is that which says that which is, and a false proposition 
says that which is not? 
Hermogenes:  Yes, what other answer is possible? 
Socrates:  Then in a proposition there is a true and false? 
Hermogenes:  Certainly. 
Socrates:  But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? 
Hermogenes:  No, the parts are true as well as the whole. 
Socrates: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part? 
Hermogenes:  I should say that every part is true. 
Socrates:  Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? 
Hermogenes:  No that is the smallest. 
Socrates:  Then the name is a part of the true proposition? 
Hermogenes:  Yes. 
Socrates:  Yes, and a true part, as you say. ... 
Socrates: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false? 
Hermogenes: So we must infer.  (Plato 1961, 422) 
 
The point of the above argument is to gain assent to the position that there is truth in names.  Yet, 
having given his assent to this position, Hermogenes still maintains the conventionality of names.  
Plato has Hermogenes maintain this position to contrast with Protagoras’ relativist position, a 
position that Plato refutes by arguing that “things have a permanent essence of their own”. (Plato 
1961, 423) 
 
Socrates:  But if neither is right [Protagoras or Euthydemus], and things are not relative to 
individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they 
must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence; they are not in relation 
to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and 
maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature. 
Hermogenes:  I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. 
Socrates:  Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the 
actions which proceed from them:  Are not actions also a class of being? 
Hermogenes:  Yes the actions are real as well as the things. 
Socrates:  Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according 
to our opinion of them?  In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any 
chance instrument, but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural 
process of cutting, and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail 
and be of no use at all. (Plato 1961, 422) 
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In the above we can see Plato/Socrates’ argument that things have “their own proper and permanent 
essence”.  This “permanent essence” applies not only to the things themselves, but also to the 
“actions which proceed from them” for actions are “also a class of being”.  To clarify the point, 
Plato/Socrates uses an instrumental example, that of knives.  The argument being that the 
permanent essence of this instrument is not only what the thing is, i.e., a knife, but also what it does, 
the action which is a class of being that belongs to the knife.   And what the thing does is essential 
and natural to that thing.  The essence of the knife is the action of it cutting and that is its nature.  
That is, it is designed to fulfill that function. 
 
Socrates argues that this “holds good of all actions” and that speaking and naming are “a kind of 
action” and that “we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their 
own”. 
 
Socrates:  Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according 
to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure; in this and no 
other way will we name with success. (Plato 1961, 425) 
 
By analogy, Socrates shifts the ground of his earlier argument from the realms of language, in 
which propositions and names belong, to the realm of things; instruments and their essential 
actions.  In so doing, Plato argues that language as a thing belongs to the order of things.  What 
follows from this shift is that if other things have an essential action then so too will language.  
Essence here, is no vague abstract entity, it is function.  Just as the function of a knife is to cut, so 
too, the function of language is to name.   From this it follows that “names should be given 
according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument”.  Further, if language has an essential 
nature, then language will not be merely conventional. 
 
The argument holds of course provided we agree to the instrumental analogy. Analogy is a feature 
of the philosophic argument, an unacknowledged mimetic debt to analogy as likeness, ergo analogy 
is a form of mimesis.  Challenging the analogy would note the differences.  However, none of 
Plato/Socrates partners in dialogue ever significantly challenges his analogies; their function is to 
agree. 
 
Following immediately from this argument Plato invokes the theory of the Forms, discussed as a 
mimetic theory in the above section on the Republic.  Plato applies the theory of the Forms as a 
theory of language, on the basis of the argument whereby language is a thing belonging to the order 
of things, and the instrumental analogy: 
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Socrates:  And the same holds of other instruments.  When a man has discovered the 
instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and 
not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs.  For 
example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their 
several uses. (Plato 1961, 427) 
 
Socrates:  Then as to names, ought not our legislator also know how to put the true natural 
name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to 
the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? ... (Plato 1961, 428) 
 
Socrates:  Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light 
matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons.  And Cratylus is right in saying 
that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but only 
he who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true 
forms of things in letters and syllables. (Plato 1961, 429) 
 
 
From the first of the above we are able to see that Plato uses the instrumental analogy to introduce 
the theory of the Forms, such that in the second quote above he can argue for the notion of an “ideal 
name”.  The third of the above quotes is the final stage of the argument of the theory of the Forms, 
that is, there are those who can look “to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to 
express the true forms of things in letters and syllables.” 
 
In Cratylus Plato considers philosophers, specifically dialecticians, as best able to express language 
in its true Form.  As in Republic Plato disparages the poets.  If there is any ambivalence expressed 
by Plato in relation to Homer and the poets, it is ironic.  Plato never gives the reasons why the poets 
name as they do, except to argue that he cannot fathom the reasons.  By the close of the text, there 
is no ambivalence at all.  The opinions of the poets are to be disregarded, despite gestures to the 
worthy opponent.   
 
The reason for this is apparent in the last of the above quotes.  That is, “not every man is an artificer 
of names, but only he who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express 
the true forms of things in letters and syllables.”  This is the same reason given in the Republic, 
namely that only certain people have knowledge of the Forms, and they are not poets and artists, for 
poets and artists only have an eye to the world-of-appearances. 
 
Socrates:  But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitation of this kind.  The 
arts which have to do with them are music and drawing. 
Hermogenes:  True. ... 
Socrates:  Well, and if anyone could express the essence of each thing in letters and 
syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? (Plato 1961, 458-59) 
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The above is a clear statement by Plato of his theory of the Forms as applied to language.  There are 
kinds of imitation for Plato, and if the theory of the Forms is a mimetic theory, then Plato is 
concerned with a particular kind of imitation – one based on the Forms, and not on the world-of-
appearances. 
 
The following presents Plato’s view that the nouns “king” and “holder” have nearly the same 
meaning, that is a man who is king, is the holder over that of which he is king.  It also outlines a 
principle of naming: 
 
Socrates:  The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax – 
both are Hellenic.  And a king (anax) and a holder (ektwr) have nearly the same meaning, 
and are both descriptive of a king, for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king 
– he rules, and owns, and holds it.  But perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense, 
and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had 
found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names. 
Hermogenes:  I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the right track. 
 Socrates:  There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse 
a horse; I am speaking only to the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after 
his kind and not of extraordinary births.  ... [N]or do I call any inhuman birth a man, but 
only a natural birth.  And the same may be said of trees and other things.  Do you agree with 
me? 
Hermogenes:  Yes, I agree. 
Socrates:  Very good. ... For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king.  
And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same makes no difference 
provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any 
difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears 
in it. (Plato 1961, 431) 
 
Note that “similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature is like the parent and 
therefore has the same name.” (Plato 1961, 432)  The physician will recognize the “same drugs 
under different disguises [and] ... the etymologist is not put out by the addition of transposition or 
subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere 
with the meaning.”(Plato 1961, 432)   
 
The physician and the etymologist serve to remind us who recognizes the essential nature of things.  
For the addition of a letter or two makes no difference “so long as we introduce the meaning ... – 
the addition of h,t, a gives no offence and does not prevent the whole name from having the value 
which the legislator intended – so well did he know how to give the letters names.” (Plato 1961, 
431-32)   
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Plato’s argument is “[t]he same names, then ought  to be assigned to those who follow in the course 
of nature.”  These same names are not dependent on syllables, or different languages.  The name 
depends on a principle of ascription of meaning, where meaning is essence and essence is action 
and that action is natural. 
  
Socrates:  Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature.  Agamemnon (admirable for 
remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and 
by his virtue crowns them, and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is proof of that 
admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon.  I also think that 
Atreus is rightly called, for his murder of Chrysipus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes 
are damaging and destructive to his reputation.  The name is a little altered and disguised so 
as not to be intelligible to everyone, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty is seeing the 
meaning, for whether you think of him as ateirhz the stubborn, or as atrestz the fearless, or 
as athroz the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view.  And I 
think that Pelops is also named appropriately, for, as the name implies, he is rightly called, 
Pelops who sees what is near only o ta ttelaz orwn.( Plato 1961, 433) 
 
 
For Plato, there is agreement between the name and the thing.  It is Agamemnon’s actions that 
match the meaning ascribed by the name.  We might say Agamemnon the person is agamemnonic.  
A problem that arises here is that of the name and the thing not matching.  However, Plato tells us 
that names are often the “expression of a wish”.   
 
It may be suggested that Plato is working with some kind of etymological assumption in relation to 
names.  That is, his investigation is a historical search for the derivation of names.  However, 
Plato’s major objective is that the name and the nature match, “for as his name, also is his nature.” 
 
The issue of narrative though is more difficult to assess.  Clearly, the names used as examples by 
Plato are from narratives that describe the heroes they name.  Or, more aptly, they describe certain 
characteristics of the heroes in these narratives – characteristics not dependent on morphology.   To 
say that Agamemnon is agamemnonic is to suggest that the character possesses the characteristics 
ascribed to him in the narrative.   
 
The move that Plato makes, however, is that anyone possessing the name possesses these 
characteristics as their nature.  That is, the character of a character in a narrative is the action he or 
she performs.  Aristotle also holds this position as can be seen in Poetics, translation in Aristotle’s 
Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (Butcher, 1951).  We might even say that Aristotle’s position is 
indebted to Plato’s.  Aristotle argues: 
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Again, Tragedy is the imitation of an action: and an action implies personal agents, who 
necessarily possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it is by 
these that we qualify actions themselves  -- thought and character -- are two natural causes 
from which the actions spring, and on actions again all success or failure depends.  Hence, 
the plot is the imitation of the action: -- for by plot I mean the arrangement of incidents.  By 
Character I mean that in virtue of which we ascribe certain qualities to the agents. (Aristotle 
1984, 25) 
 
The above looks very similar to Plato’s discussion of character in which we noted that the name and 
the character Agamemnon were mimetic on the basis of ascription of essence as action.  Where 
Plato and Aristotle differ though is that Aristotle considers character as secondary to action, while 
Plato considers it as primary.   Aristotle argues: 
 
Dramatic action, therefore, is not with a view to the representation of character: character 
comes in as subsidiary to the actions.  Hence the incidents and the plot are the end of a 
tragedy; and the end is the chief thing of all. (Aristotle 1984, 27) 
 
 The difference for Aristotle is the difference between “naming” and “poetry”.  That is, for Plato it 
is the name that is mimetic of the action belonging to the character, while for Aristotle “Tragedy is 
an imitation, not of men, but of action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode 
of action, not a quality.” (Aristotle 1984, 27)  However, in both cases, action and character are 
related.  For as we saw above, Aristotle argues “action implies personal agents, who necessarily 
possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it is by these that we qualify 
actions themselves – thought and character – are two natural causes from which the actions spring, 
and on actions again all success or failure depends.”  Nonetheless on one thing both agree – it is 
action that is mimetic whether it be by Plot in Aristotle with character as secondary to the plot, or 
by naming in Plato, where the name is mimetic of the of the character’s action. 
 
Plato moves from narrative characterization to ascription of essence as nature, or essential nature of 
a person.  For the argument of Cratylus is that language is not merely conventional but natural.   
Yet the examples of heroes’ characteristics described, Plato acknowledges, often mismatches the 
nature of the people named.  That is, a person may be called Agamemnon and not be agamemnonic, 
in the sense that the nature of the person does not match the narrative description.  Plato’s answer to 
this difficulty is to point out that naming, in the case of children being called after the heroes of 
narrative, is the expression of a wish.  The wish is that the child so named acquires the 
characteristics of the hero after which it is named.   
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This kind of naming for Plato is arbitrary.  The passage provides us with an example of the kind of 
matching Plato has in mind.  That is, where “[t]he same names, then, ought to be assigned to those 
who follow in the course of nature”.(Plato 1961, 431)  Just as in the narrative, Agamemnon is 
agamemnonic, and this is based on the description of his actions within the narrative, so too, people 
should  be named according to their character, that is, their actions.  Having pointed out that these 
names can be arbitrarily assigned Plato shifts the ground of his argument to “names which witness 
of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness”.   The natural fitness of 
names depends on a principle of ascription of meaning, where meaning is essence and essence is 
action and that action is natural. 
 
Socrates:  My notion would be something of this sort.  I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, 
stars, and heaven, which are still the gods of many barbarians, were the only gods known to 
the aboriginal Hellenes.  Seeing that they were always moving and running, from their 
running nature they were called gods or runners (qeouz, qeontaz), and when men became 
acquainted with other gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. (Plato 1961, 
435) 
 
Essence here is the act of running, and this is immutable.  Further, these names are ascribed on the 
“running nature” of the gods.  So we have the kind of ascription that Plato discussed in relation to 
the characteristics of the heroes of narrative.  The naming of the gods is not arbitrary, which was the 
issue of the naming of children after heroes or ancestors.  Here, the gods are named after their 
immutable essence.  Plato provides many examples, from daemons to man, of the principle “for as 
his name, also is his nature”.  
 
Socrates:  I mean to say that the word man implies that other animals never examine, or 
consider, or look up at (anaqrei) what they see, but that man not only sees (ottwtte) but 
considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly 
called anqrwttoz, meaning anaqrwn a ottwtten. (Plato 1961, 436) 
 
Plato shifts from narrative characteristic to immutable essence and nature by moving from names 
which pick out individual characteristics to nouns that ascribe actions to a group.  This allows the 
application of the principle “as the name, so the nature”.  For, there will be no arbitrariness in 
calling a man, a man, based on the actions that constitute being a man, whereas there certainly can 
be misascription of the characteristics of Agamemnon, to a man named Agamemnon.  
Consequently, the principle applied in Plato’s analysis of Agamemnon as agamemnonic, also 
applies to man as mannish. 
 
Socrates:  That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, 
may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided -- there is no better principle 
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to which we can look for the truth of the first names.  Deprived of this, we must have 
recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting 
in the air, and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that ‘the gods gave the 
first names, and therefore they must be right.’ ... (Plato 1961, 400) 
 
Earlier Plato distinguished between kinds of imitations and imitators, arguing that a name is not a 
vocal imitation, or those who imitate “sheep” and “cocks”, would “name that which they imitate”.  
Naming is not a musical imitation “nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates ...”.  For Plato 
the issue is whether the namer “has grasped the nature of them [things] in letters and syllables in 
such a manner as to imitate the essence or not”. 
 
However, Plato is not offering us an expression theory of language as such.  Rather, Plato offers an 
imitation theory of language based on the theory of the Forms, where imitation finds its expression 
in letters and syllables. 
 
Socrates:  In the first place, the letter r appears to me to be the general instrument to? 
express all motion (kinhsiz). ... Now the letter r, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of 
names an excellent instrument for the expression of motion, and he frequently uses the letter 
for this purpose.  For example, in the actual words rein and roh represents motion by r -- 
also in the words tromoz (trembling), tracuz (rugged), and again in the words such as 
krouein (strike), qrauein (crush), erikein (bruise), qruttein(break), kermatizein (crumble), 
rumbein(whirl).  Of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the 
letter r, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at 
rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, 
just as by the letter i he expresses the subtle elements which pass through all things. ...  Thus 
did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them 
names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs.  That is my view, 
Hermogenes, of the truth of names, but I should like to hear what Cratylus has to say. (Plato 
1961, 461) [my italics] 
 
Here Plato argues for an imitation or mimetic theory of naming.  One may consider that Plato 
contradicts himself, given that he opposes imitations.  However, I argue that Plato has a preference 
for a particular kind of mimesis, that is, imitation of the Forms rather than imitation of the 
particulars.  For Plato, imitation of the Forms is imitation of essence and essence is action here.  
This kind of imitation on the basis of action is superior to imitation as visual resemblance. 
 
Socrates:  I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things, but I 
fear that this dragging of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which has to 
be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness.  For I 
believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly 
appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language, as the opposite is the most 
imperfect. ... (Plato 1961, 496) 
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Socrates:  ... Have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the 
likenesses and images of the things which they name? (Plato 1961, 473) 
 
Plato considers “resemblance” a “shabby thing”, and yet names “rightly given are the likenesses 
and images of the things which they name”.  Plato uses resemblance to evoke the visual 
connotations that are lacking in the term imitation, enabling him to draw a distinction between the 
way things are mimetic, as well as whatever they are mimetic of.  Hence Plato does not contradict 
himself by considering resemblance a shabby thing, while at the same time holding that imitation, 
the “use of likenesses”, produces “the most perfect state of language”. 
 
From our earlier discussion of the Republic Plato considers resemblance to be representations of the 
visual, not just visual representation.  This point is examined in a discussion of Melberg’s notion of 
Plato’s mimesis as primarily visual. Resemblance for Plato then is the production of simulacra, the 
representation of something that is already an imitation.  Plato’s position comes from his situating 
of visual representation in relation to artists.  But the connection between art and poetry is not 
visual in the sense that poetry produces visual representation.  The connection Plato draws with 
visual resemblance in poetry and artistic representation is based on the theory of the Forms, where 
the particulars, belonging to the world-of-appearance, are imitative of the Forms, and the world-of-
appearance is all that the poet and the artist can have access to. 
 
Plato prefers imitation of the Forms or philosophical representation, used by those who have 
knowledge of the Forms and can hence “use likenesses which are perfectly appropriate...”.  
Philosophical representation is truth as similarity once removed from the Forms, while poetic and 
artistic representation produce  simulacra, representation twice removed from that truth. 
 
From the discussion of Republic, the theory of the Forms is a mimetic theory positing a mimetic 
relationship between the Forms and the particulars, and disavowing the mimetic relationship 
between the particulars and artistic and poetic representation.   In Cratylus Plato believes in just 
such a mimetic relationship of naming to the Forms and that dialecticians have knowledge of the 
Forms that the particulars imitate, and hence dialecticians produce a better kind of imitation. 
 
Theories of Mimesis 
 
From the above, we can see that at the level of the logos, or the “what”, of these texts Plato is quite 
consistent.  Melberg argues that between the logos of these two texts, and others, there is a 
contradiction in Plato’s presentation of mimesis based on a spurious and primarily visual notion of 
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mimesis.  I have argued from Republic and Cratylus that there is no such contradiction, for Plato is 
expressing a preference between two types of mimesis and Plato’s preferred mimesis is not 
primarily visual; it is functional and actional and, we will see, performative. We turn now to Arne 
Melberg’s Theories of Mimesis, which examines Plato’s mimesis and recuperates Plato as a poet, 
rather than a philosopher, on the basis of the supposed inter-textual inconsistency of Plato’s notion 
of mimesis at the level of logos. 
 
Read conceptually/philosophically, there are at least ten divergent meanings or directions of 
mimos/mimeisthai/memetikous/mimesis in Plato.  Read literally according to Stanley Rosen, 
the Plato who emerges can scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory or philosophically 
interesting figure, whatever standards one uses. ...  Rosen recommends a reading that makes 
sense of Plato by way of irony and drama.  I will follow his advice in my own way, meaning 
that I will stick to Plato’s text as ironic, poetic and dramatic – a i.e. not only a philosophical 
text (meaning that the “old quarrel” between philosophy and literature takes place already in 
Plato’s text); I will avoid solutions according to “Platonism” and try to remember Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s very last words in his presentation of himself as a philosopher: “dab Plato 
kein Platoniker war.” (Melberg 1995, 12-13) 
 
 
In Theories of Mimesis (Melberg, 1995), the discussion opens with Plato’s rejection of the poets in 
Book X of Republic (Plato, 1987).  Melberg argues that the reason for this rejection is mimesis, 
which Plato understands in a primarily visual way, i.e. “a visual image related to imitation, re-
presentation”.  For Plato, philosophers come closest to ‘knowledge of reality’ as they can see “the 
form, or ideas or ideal form of things and can therefore disregard imitations”. (Melberg 1995, 10)  
Melberg sees Plato’s position as “hopelessly dualistic and idealistic”, and “based on a fanciful 
analogy between visual imagery and the linguistic forms of poetry and drama”. (Melberg 1995, 11)  
He concludes that for Plato “... what the words make up mimetically are images, phantasies, 
phantoms”. (Melberg 1995, 11) 
 
I have argued above that the theory of the Forms is a theory of mimesis, where the particulars copy 
the Forms.  Poetic and artistic representation is disavowed by Plato as all artists and poets have an 
eye to is the visual, the world-of-appearances, unlike philosophers and crafts-persons, who access 
the Forms directly.  This disavowal of poetry and art is not based on “a fanciful analogy between 
visual imagery and the linguistic forms of poetry and drama”.  The disavowal is based on 
representations of the visual, the particulars.   
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There are two consequences of my argument for Melberg’s position.  The first is that, given our 
previous discussions, Plato’s notion of mimesis is not primarily visual.  The second is that only 
some words, specifically poetic representation, are ‘images, phantasies, phantoms.’   
 
If we recall the discussion about the theory of the Forms in Republic and Cratylus, in the former 
mimesis was functional, whilst in the latter mimesis was actional.  In the Republic, the particulars 
copied the Forms in a functionally, i.e. the Form of chair is “for sitting on”.  However, in Cratylus, 
the nature of language is to copy the essences of the things, which are the actions they perform.   So 
far, I have used the terms functional and actional to discuss mimesis in the theory of the Forms.  
However, in both function and action, what is important is that both the terms describe what things 
do.   And it is “doing” that is at stake in functional and actional mimesis.  So for the sake of clarity 
and brevity in the remainder of text I will use the term function.   In either case though, we cannot 
say then that Plato’s mimesis is primarily visual, for both function and action are not things one 
sees, they are things are done.   
 
A further consequence of Plato’s discussion in Cratylus is that language is also functionally 
mimetic.  It is the job of language to copy, or to re-present the Forms, such that language copies the 
essence of the thing copied.  For Plato, poetry cannot do so because poets have no knowledge of the 
Forms, and hence cannot imitate those Forms.  Poetry is a linguistic phantasm because poets can 
only know visual representations or the phenomenal appearance of the Forms, that is, the 
particulars.  So poetry can only produce simulacra, consisting of, as Melberg points out, “a second-
hand imitation of an already second hand imitation”.   
 
Melberg claims that “[t]he philosopher comes closest to first-hand knowledge of real reality: he can 
see the form or ideas or ideal form of things and can therefore disregard imitations.” (Melberg 
1995, 10)  Whilst it is true for Plato that the philosopher comes closest to the true reality, what does 
not follow is Melberg’s claim that philosophers can disregard imitations.  The philosophical task is 
to have access the Forms, such that philosophical truth is as similar to the truth as possible.  I have 
argued that the theory of the Forms is a theory of mimesis and it is on the basis of this mimetic 
theory that Plato disavows poetic mimesis.   Plato’s disavowal is based on the difference between 
what a thing does and how a thing looks, a distinction discussed earlier.  Further, whilst the 
philosopher has access to the Forms and hence the functional mimeticity of the particulars, the poet 
and the artist do not.  They only have access to the particulars, and only the appearance of the 
particulars at that.  Plato’s concern with knowledge and truth underlies this distinction. One cannot 
say therefore that philosophers can disregard imitations.  Philosophical representation is very much 
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concerned with mimesis, not only as a subject of discussion, but for Plato as representing the truth 
as similar.  In fact, to create the truth as similar, one would have to not disregard imitations, but pay 
them very close attention. 
 
Melberg’s most valuable contribution to the discussion of Platonic mimesis is his narratological 
reading of the texts.  In discussing Book III of the Republic Melberg argues: 
 
One of Socrates’ exemplary listeners complains about not understanding the distinction 
between the logos and lexeos – the what and the how – of tales, and thereby gives Socrates 
the epoch-making opportunity of taking the first steps into literary theory as a kind of 
“narratology.”  Socrates shows in what way mimesis is not only image and/or representation, 
but also a way of representing.  The definition is simple: it means presenting the story in a 
mimetic way (dia mimeseos), i.e. using the voice of someone else in direct speech, rather 
than using your own voice in direct or indirect speech, something Socrates calls “, pure” or 
“simple” diegesis (392d, 394b). (Melberg 1995, 16) 
 
Melberg’s narratological reading shows that whilst he considers Plato as contradictory regarding 
mimesis at the level of the logos, the what, of the Platonic corpus, mimesis occurs at the level of 
lexeos, the how, of the text.  Melberg’s rationale for this reading is that it produces consistency 
intra-textually, which does not occur inter-textually.  That is, Melberg considers Plato conceptually 
inconsistent at the level of the logos of the Platonic corpus: 
 
In Republic, as we remember, the poet was three steps away from truth. ... In Laws, the 
poetically beautiful was equated with the politically righteous.  And in Timaeus, creation 
itself appeared mimetic and the world an image.  In Phaedrus, it is writing that is called 
image -- eidolon (276a) -- and is finally criticised as unreliable pharmakon, more suitable 
for reminders than useful as memory.   It should not be possible to extract a unified meaning 
or construct a stable Platonic conceptual monument out of these incompatible assertions – 
which has not stopped readers who cannot stand the paradoxical ambiguity from creating 
“Platonism”.  If there is no real consistency at the conceptual level, it is on the other hand to 
be found at the dialogical level of Platonic narration; here we find consistently a visual 
imagination, meaning that creation poetry and writing are considered in terms of imagery.  
Plato created his dialogues dia mimeseos, and he seems to think of his concepts as images.  
And in Phaedrus the mimetic paradox receives its most brutal formulation, when he 
imagines the source and the origin, ousia, only to declare it inaccessible to the eye. (Melberg 
1995, 35) 
 
 
If Plato’s concept of mimesis is based on the theory of the Forms, and the particulars are 
functionally mimetic of the Forms, then at the conceptual level Plato is not producing a consistently 
“visual imagination”.  Moreover, if one does not read Plato’s mimesis with a visual imagination in 
mind, then, inter-textual inconsistency disappears, including in its most “brutal formulation” in 
Phaedrus.  For one does not, indeed cannot, see the Forms.  What is visible are the particulars, and 
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poetry and art are mimetic of what is visible.  So without falling into “Platonism” it seems quite 
possible to produce conceptual consistency simply by understanding Plato’s conceptualization of 
mimesis as other than visual.   This also allows Plato to consistently critique visual mimesis, yet 
adopt functional mimesis. 
 
Further, it follows from conceptual consistency and Melberg’s analysis of consistency at the level 
of lexeos of the texts, is that Plato’s dialogues are performative, rather than ironic in the sense that 
Melberg uses it.  That is, if Plato’s preferred mimesis is functional, i.e. doing, then his texts do what 
they say.  They perform mimesis, dia mimeseos.  Plato’s texts are functionally mimetic.  This is not 
to deny that Plato is ironic.  However, I suggest that if one is conceptually and performitively 
consistent, then one is not being ironic, at least not in relation to mimesis.  Melberg’s whole 
analysis of Plato is based on the notion that Plato must be being ironic, because of the conceptual 
inconsistency in mimesis.   
 
The suggestion of Plato as performative arises from Melberg’s own understanding of Plato as a 
“narratologist”.  Melberg is puzzled by Plato’s ability to “present his investigation of mimesis, 
including the criticism of mimesis, in the very manner that he has Socrates define and criticize as 
mimetic”. (Melberg 1995, 17)  That is, Plato’s dialogues are presented dia mimeseos, and within 
these mimetic dialogues Plato critiques mimesis.  This is not a problem if one considers that a thing 
can be mimetic in other than a visual fashion.  Further, the example that Melberg presents undercuts 
his own argument about consistency arising at the levels of lexeos and logos of the text. 
 
His example is again taken from the Iliad, this time the very beginning, where Homer tells 
us how Chryses pleads for his daughter to the affronted Agamemnon, with Homer quickly 
passing into that dramatized form of narration that Socrates calls mimetic.  According to 
Socrates, Homer narrates “as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make 
us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man.  And in this manner he has 
carried on nearly all the rest of his narration” – “this manner” meaning the impersonating or 
mimetic or dramatized manner of narrating (393b). In order to be even more pedagogically 
explicit, Socrates then narrates the same episode “diegetically”: he retells the story without 
direct speech from the characters.  Socrates thereby corrects and improves not only Homer, 
but also indirectly Plato himself, who after all presents his investigations of mimesis, 
including the criticism of mimesis, in the very manner that he has Socrates define and 
criticize as mimetic. (Melberg 1995, 16-17) 
 
Given that Plato is the author, perhaps the critique is of Socrates using diegesis, rather than Socrates 
critiquing Plato.  For, given Plato’s position on poetic representation, its lack of knowledge of what 
it represents, his improvement of Homeric poetry to diegesis, makes sense.  In lacking the 
knowledge of the functionality of mimesis, Homer should not be presenting poetry dia mimeseos.  
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Whilst the logos of this speech is diegesis, that is retelling “the story without direct speech from the 
characters”, the lexeos remains dia mimeseos; for it is still Plato who is having Socrates present the 
argument.  Regardless of what Socrates says Plato still does mimesis.  Hence Socrates does not 
“indirectly” critique Plato.  Plato uses dia mimeseos to critique Socrates’ diegesis.  However, given 
Melberg’s argument about consistency at the levels of lexeos and logos of the text, this example is 
not consistent if one takes Socrates’ diegetic presentation as critique of Plato.  The appropriate form 
of narration would be diegesis, not mimesis.  Plato would have to tell the story “without direct 
speech” from Socrates. 
 
The only alternative to regarding Plato (and/or Socrates) as a poor and inconsistent thinker 
seems to be to follow the advice of Stanley Rosen, mentioned earlier, and to try to make 
sense of Plato by way of irony and drama: take him as a poet. (Melberg 1995, 30) 
 
From the above, we can see that for Melberg and Rosen, Plato should be taken as a “poet”, because 
otherwise he must be “regarded as a poor and inconsistent thinker”.  That is, we should not regard 
Plato as a philosopher.  The rationale for Melberg’s whole argument is the inconsistency in Plato’s 
mimesis, which I have been at pains to argue against.  Further, does Melberg and Rosen’s position 
mean that poor and inconsistent thinkers should be regarded as poets?  This seems to be an 
inappropriate understanding of poets and poetry.  Further, this could be seen as one of Plato’s own 
arguments against poetry.  And does it follow that consistent thinkers cannot be read by way of 
irony and drama?   Or is Plato to be considered a special case?   
 
And should we “take him as a poet”, we ignore not just what appears to be the occasional 
contradiction, which I have been arguing comes from misreading Plato’s mimesis as primarily 
visual, we ignore his consistently repeated position on poetic representation, and his disavowal of 
poetic representation as simulacrum, a “shabby thing”.   A position, moreover, Plato holds because 
poetic representation represents the visual, and has no knowledge of the Forms.  Reading Plato as a 
poet, and not a philosopher, adopts that old argument, which Plato is well aware of.  My own 
position is that we take Plato as a poet philosopher, whose texts perform the kind of mimesis that he 
privileges, a performance in which saying and doing are mimetic, where language expresses the 
functional and actional essence of the thing.   By not adopting Melberg’s and Rosen’s position, we 
are able to read Plato as a consistent thinker who makes use of drama and irony, that is a poet 
philosopher who does not adopt “that old argument”. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Mimesis: Metaphor 
 
 
In The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in Language (2003) 
[La métaphore vive (1975)] setting aside questions of authenticity,2 consider whether Ricoeur’s 
critique of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics supports his position firstly that metaphor is predicative 
and secondly that resemblance, a visual metaphor, is the rule of metaphor.  In the preceding chapter 
I argued that Plato considers visual mimesis, resemblance as being at a third remove from the 
‘truth’ of the forms.  The particulars do not resemble the Forms, rather they are functionally 
mimetic of their Forms.  In dealing with the function of metaphor, Aristotle, I argue, uses the term 
resemblance and the notion ‘to see the similar’ metaphorically.  Aristotle finds that metaphors 
function by similarity; that is by the rule of mimesis, which is not only visual.  Clearly stated, for 
Aristotle metaphor functions by mimetic intuition, that is, the ability to notice the similar.  
Ricoeur’s privileging resemblance, i.e. visual mimesis, is at odds with Aristotle’s position. Yet 
Ricoeur attempts to use Aristotle’s position to support his argument for ressemblance as the rule of 
metaphor.   
 
Ricoeur’s claim that metaphors are predicative involves two arguments.  Firstly Ricoeur argues that 
metaphorical predication is “unusual attribution” and secondly, that metaphors are discursive at the 
sentential level.   I argue that whatever else metaphors may be, they are not predicates.  Rather 
metaphors are invitations to thought involving mimetic intuition about an unnamed or unknown 
attribute between the two things.3 Resolving the unnamed attribute requires mimetic intuition.  
Aristotle’s “perception of the similar”, the genius of metaphorical mastery, is just such a mimetic 
intuition.4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!McKeon!doubts!the!authenticity!of!Aristotle’s!Book!3!of!Rhetoric,!particularly!of!chapters!2.12!which!he!omits!from!his!1941!edition.!!It!is!these!omitted!sections!of!Rhetoric!which!Ricoeur!compares!to!the!work!of!resemblance!in!Poetics.!The!eleven!volumes!of!the!Oxford!translation!can!be!reduced!to!a!single!volume,!once!the!clearly!inauthentic!works!have!been!excluded!from!consideration,!without!too!serious!loss!of!portions!that!bear!on!problems!of!general!philosophic!interest.!…![S]imilarly!three!of!the!six!books!of!the!Organon!and!one!of!the!three!books!of!the!Rhetoric!are!in!part!omitted;!the!Constitution"of"Athens!is!not!included.!!(McKeon!p!viii,!1941)!
 
3 Of course there can be more than two things involved in metaphor, but for brevity’s and clarity’s sake I work with the 
simplest metaphors which present two objects. 
4 Once the unnamed or unknown attribute is discovered metaphor becomes simile.  That is to say that X and Yare like 
(mimetic) each other in a particular way. 
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Ricoeur considers Aristotle’s perception of the similar or mimetic intuition, as resemblance –  “to 
see the similar”.  Two problems arise from this formulation.  Firstly, Ricoeur uses a metaphor to 
explain how metaphor works.  Resemblance, a metaphor itself, leads Ricoeur to the strange 
conclusion that one can only discuss metaphors metaphorically.  Secondly, Ricoeur’s resemblance 
as metaphor’s functioning, opens him to the kinds of confusions Rorty critiques.  In Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty argues that we must dispense with visual metaphors altogether.  
My own position is similar in many respects, yet it is necessarily less trenchant.  Adopting Rorty’s 
disavowal of visual metaphors entirely elides an important aspect of mimesis.  Nonetheless, visual 
metaphors pervade philosophical thought – they limit and delimit our thinking.  I argue that 
Ricoeur’s ‘resemblance’ (ressemblance) occludes the mimetic intuition, i.e. Aristotle’s perception 
of the similar. 
   
Signs and Sentential Discursivity 
 
Ricoeur argues that to understand metaphor we need to adopt a semantic rather than a semiotic 
position.  Ricoeur’s stake in privileging semantics over semiotics is the level at which discursivity 
occurs.  Discursivity for all intents and purposes is reference.  However, the problems of 
discursivity are held in abeyance until later.  For Ricoeur, semantic discursivity occurs at the level 
of the sentence.  Discursivity refers.  It is essential that Ricoeur adopt this position as it founds his 
claim that metaphors are predicative.  And predicates, metaphorical or not, are sentential.   
Unfortunately, if discursivity does not occur at the level of the sign, as a single word or other object, 
then it will not occur at the level of the sentence.  Hence my argument begins with an examination 
of signs, semiotics and semantics. 
 
Ricoeur defines semiotics in a particularly narrow fashion; namely, that the sign is to be considered 
as a single word. (Ricoeur 2003, 101)  Given that Ricoeur is familiar with the Peircean notion of 
semiotics, where anything interpretable is a sign, this seems an odd constraint.  Ricoeur adopts 
Benveniste’s dichotomy, semantic/semiotic.5    This move allows Ricoeur to invest metaphor’s 
meaning and function at the level of the sentence.  Semantics, as defined by Ricoeur, takes the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The semiotic monism that Ricoeur finds problematic is Saussurean.   While Saussure does ignore semantics, a lack 
compensated for by Ricoeur’s project, there is more than one semiotic school.    Consider the Peircean maxim that 
anything that is interpretable is a sign.  This shifts the focus from monadic word based semiotics. And Ricoeur is 
familiar with Peirce’s semiotics.  See page 189 where Ricoeur looks to Peirce’s theory of the icon. 
 34 
sentence as the primary linguistic unit.6  Ricoeur focuses on the sentence as the minimal semantic 
unit because predication occurs sententially.  
 
But we must go beyond the simple opposition between the semiotic and the semantic 
viewpoint, and clearly subordinate the former to the latter. (Ricoeur 2003, 217) 
 
 
Limiting the notion of the sign to a single word, Ricoeur constructs a semiotic/semantic binary, 
where he privileges the semantic over the semiotic.  However, this dichotomy is highly problematic. 
Ricoeur’s semantic/semiotic dichotomy questions reference.7    The problem becomes precisely 
which linguistic unit does actually refer?  Does reference properly belong to the sign, as word, 
name, noun, or larger units – the sentence, the paragraph, the chapter, or the text?8   
 
By considering semiotics to be focused on the sign as a single word, rather than as “the science of 
signs”, Ricoeur captures their intra-systemic construction with other words/signs and elides their 
inter-systemic relation to things.  However, in adopting this position, the sign becomes a purely 
linguistic entity.  The sign no longer signifies.  The sign’s operation as a signifier and a signified9 is 
reduced to a lexical mark, i.e. Benveniste’s signifier.  
Benveniste argues: 
 
We can, for the purposes of analysis, consider separately the two surfaces of the sign, but 
with respect to its signification it is a unit; it remains a unit.  The only question to which a 
sign gives rise, if it is to be recognized as such, is that of its existence, and the latter is 
answered by yes or no: tree – song – to wash – nerve – yellow – on, and not *tro – *rong – 
*dawsh – *lerve – *sallow – *ton.    (Innis 1985, 242) 
 
In fact Ricoeur’s understanding of “what semiotics calls the signified … is nothing but the 
counterpart of the signifier within the language code”. (Ricoeur 2003, 216)  This gesture divests the 
signifier of its difference from, and relationship to, the signified.  The difference between the 
signified and the signifier is that the signified is extra-linguistic.  What is signified is beyond the 
language code.  What is signified is denoted or referred.  What is signified is referred.  What is 
signified is discursive. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ricoeur adopts Benveniste’s position dedicating Study 4, ‘Metaphor and the semantics of the word’ to him. (Ricoeur p 
101ff, 2003)  Benveniste theory of language, Ricoeur argues, is that language rests on “two kinds of units – those of 
discourse or ‘sentences’, and ‘signs,’ the units of language.” (Ricoeur 2003, 102)  
7 Benveniste’s discursivity where and how words relate to things. [This is too terse. Add a sentence or omit it.] 
8 The debate about which linguistic unit refers begins to look like result of a territorial dispute between disciplines. 
9 See Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, 1972.  
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Whereas the sign points back only to other signs within the system, discourse is about 
things.  Sign differs from sign, discourse refers to the world.  Difference is semiotic, 
reference is semantic … (Ricoeur 2003, 216) 
 
Ricoeur quotes Benveniste “[o]ne is never concerned in semiotics with the sign and the things 
denoted, nor with relationships between language and the world”.  (Ricoeur 2003, 216-17)  
Certainly, Benveniste is correct in arguing that signs differ from each other.   For example, “cat” 
differs from “bat” or “can”, etc. ad infinitum.  However, there is a profound problem with 
evacuating reference from the sign considered as a single word, that is, making it non-discursive in 
Benveniste’s terminology.  Benveniste’s ‘pointing back within the system’ is intra-systemic 
reference.  But how in the world can we construct even a simple sentence, let alone metaphorize if 
single word signs, are only intra-systemically referential?  Given the arbitrary nature of the sign an 
intra-systemic difference is meaningless. 
 
Ricoeur is aware of this difficulty and hopes to overcome it by combining Benveniste’s non-
discursive sign with Frege’s work on what can only be called the discursive sign.  Ricoeur argues 
that Benveniste and Frege’s positions are complementary.  Frege argues that what is essential to a 
sign is “the regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference”. (Ricoeur 2003, 217)   
Accordingly, Frege’s conceptualization of the sign as having sense and reference would not be 
semiotic but semantic, where semantics is discursivity.  Clearly if the single word sign is discursive, 
it refers in precisely the same way as Benveniste’s sentential sign.  Frege’s sign “refers to the 
world”.  Hence Frege’s sign is also a unit of semantics.  The discursivity of signs means that the 
sign is semantic and semiotic.  Frege’s referential, and therefore discursive, sign highlights an 
inadequacy in Benveniste’s linguistic theory.  That is, if the single word sign does not refer, neither 
does the sentence.   
 
Words and sentences are complementary and reciprocal whether one rises by synthetic 
composition from the proper name toward the proposition, or whether one descends by 
analytic dissociation from the sentence down to the semantic unit of the word. (Ricoeur 
2003, 218) 
 
Discursivity is not a matter of semantics versus semiotics where semantics takes the sentence as the 
primary linguistic unit and semiotics takes the word as its primary linguistic unit.  Nor is it a matter 
of “raising” synthetic composition from the name to the proposition or “descending” by analytic 
association from the sentence to the word.   Discursivity is reference.  Plainly, signs refer.   
Semiotics does not preclude the sentence from being a sign.  Linguistically the sign is a word or a 
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sentence, a paragraph or a text, a proposition or an argument. How big one’s linguistic unit is and 
whether one goes up and down or down and up is another question entirely.   
 
Further, semiotics does not limit itself to language alone, but to other sign systems, say fashion, 
film, cars, art, bodies, ad infinitum.  In so doing semiotics treats with the ‘signs’ of these systems 
opening the way for inter-systemic analysis.  I argue in a Chapter 6 that it is precisely inter-systemic 
semiosis that explains the ‘literality’ of Grosz’s writing on the body.  
 
Predication and unusual attribution  
 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some 
respect or capacity. … The sign stands for something, its object. C. S. Peirce (Innis 1985, 4) 
 
Ricoeur’s stake in this debate is, as mentioned above, the sentential structure of metaphor as 
predicate, where referential discursivity occurs at the sentential level.  Referential discursivity is 
Peirce’s “standing for” and Aristotle’s “representation” and Frege’s “reference”. Before considering 
the referentiality of metaphorical predicates it is necessary to consider the referential relation of 
literal predicates.  Literal predicates are less referentially complex. 
 
Predicates are sentences that attribute one thing to another thing.  The predicative sentence has the 
form “x is y”.  In the form “x is y”, y is the predicate of x; y is an attribute of x.  The form says 
there is an x and it is a y as well as being an x.  Hence in predication x is both x and y.  This 
attribution is asymmetrical in that while y may be an attribute of x, x is not necessarily an attribute 
of y. The asymmetry is clear when considering the predicative sentence “The horse is brown”.10  It 
is clear that brownness can be an attribute of horses.  However it is not necessary that horseness be 
an attribute of brown. 
  
Further, predicates are not the only sentences to have this form.  X is y can be categorical or 
nominal, where x picks out the category y, or x names y.  The sentential form x is y is discursively 
vacuous.  Being discursively vacuous means that we cannot tell what kind of sentence x is y is, a 
predicate, a nominal sentence or a categorical sentence.  “Jumpy is a horse” can be both nominal 
and categorical, as it both names the horse Jumpy and assigns Jumpy to the category of horses.  For 
“Jumpy is a horse” to be nominal and categorical it must be true.  For it to be true it must be 
discursive, that is, refer to some animal that is a horse and whose name is Jumpy.  “Jumpy is a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Oddly enough all metaphors must be true for them to apply.  When metaphors are false one is often being ironic. 
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horse” is not metaphorical; nor is it predicative.  Yet “Jumpy is a horse” has the sentential form x is 
y.  The form x is y is not a sign.  X is y is merely a signifier without a signified.  In Frege’s terms, it 
has sense but no reference.11  So predication is not merely, or only, a matter of being formally a 
sentence; nor is nomination or categorization.  To tell what kind of sentence x is y is, we need 
reference.  And moreover, reference at the level of the sign, where the sign is a word that refers to a 
thing. 
 
Reference at the level of the sign, where the sign is a word, does not preclude reference at the 
sentential level.  Benveniste’s position precludes reference at this level.  Unfortunately, precluding 
reference at the level of the sign as words referring to things means that reference fails at the level 
of the sentence. One cannot imagine what “The cat sat on the mat” refers to, if cat did not refer to 
an animal, and mat a floor covering.  The sentence is propositional.   Whether it is true or false as 
such is not relevant.  Nor is the ontological status of cats and mats pertinent.  What is pertinent is 
that “cat” and “mat” are necessarily more than signifiers.  They are discursive by Benveniste’s 
definition of discursivity.   “Cat” refers to an object in the world therefore it is discursive. “Mat’ 
refers to an object in the world hence it is discursive.  And “sat”, the “act of sitting”, refers to the 
world, hence it is discursive.  If “cat”, “sat”, and “mat” did not refer, were not discursive, the 
sentence would not only not make sense, it would not have Frege’s sense.    
 
Given this is so, Ricoeur cannot comfortably hold to both Benveniste’s position and Frege’s 
position despite his assertion that they are complimentary. (Ricoeur 2003, 218)  It is not merely a 
matter of one moving from the sign to the sentence or its inverse, from the sentence to the sign.  
Certainly with Frege, signification can move from the sign to the sentence.  However, Benveniste’s 
position cannot make the move from the sentence to the sign.  Hence Benveniste’s position means 
that not only is the sign non-discursive, but also because the sign is non-discursive, so is the 
sentence.  As Benveniste’s linguistic unit fails in reference, it fails in discursivity.  Ricoeur cannot 
adopt Benveniste’s position and maintain the sentence as the primary unit of meaning.   
 
Ricoeur desires to adopt this position because he sees metaphor as predicative sentence, where 
metaphor’s working is due to predication within the sentence. 
Ricoeur shifts his emphasis from “the word”, as noun or name in which metaphor is constructed by 
epiphora, a borrowing or transference of meaning, to “the sentence as the primary unit of meaning.” 
(Ricoeur 2003, 44)   Focusing on the working of metaphor at the sentential level allows Ricoeur to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The sentential form x is y may also fail Peircean interpretability; for at the formal level, we can only interpret x is y 
as x is y.  X is y is self-referential; having the form of predicate is semantically vacuous.    
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treat metaphoricity’s predication as “unusual attribution”. (Ricoeur 2003, 44)  But predication does 
not occur because the linguistic unit is a sentence. Predication as attribution, unusual or otherwise is 
a matter of reference at the level of the sign.   
 
The question that arises then is how does the “unusual attribution” of predication differ from the 
“borrowing: of epiphora?  And further, does the shift from the epiphora of names to sentential 
predication really make the gains Ricoeur thinks it does? 
 
Predication and Reference (X is Y) and attribution  
 
What does the metaphorical statement say about reality? (Ricoeur 2003, 216) 
Metaphor, and above all newly invented metaphor, is a phenomenon of discourse, an 
unusual attribution. (Ricoeur 2003, 180) 
 
 
Predicates, as we have seen, are sentences that attribute qualities of one thing to another.  X is y 
where “is y” is the predicate and object of the subject x.  In this example the predicate “is y” 
indicates that it is x but not vice versa.  Metaphors have the form x is y but they are not predicates 
in the usual manner. The difference between predicates and predicative metaphor is not Ricoeur’s 
unusual attribution but Aristotle’s perception of the similar.  Metaphor is shared attribution, that is, 
noticing that two things share an attribute.   
 
Formally predicative metaphors appear to be a case of “x is y”.  However, metaphor situates the two 
terms x and y under an attribute.  Metaphor makes a new category.12   Hence formally metaphor is 
really x and y are both z.  This means that metaphor is not predicative in the simple sense used by 
Ricoeur.  The difference between metaphor and simile is that metaphor does not nominate z, while 
the simile does.13 
 
Ricoeur uses two versions of his predicative attribution to highlight analogy as “the common 
ground of metaphor, symbol, and simile …” (Ricoeur 2003, 186) His examples are the simile “Jim 
is as stubborn as a mule,” and the metaphor “Jim is an ass”. (Ricoeur 2003, 186) I will use the term 
mule rather than ass throughout this discussion. Ricoeur’s concern with these examples is ‘transfer 
of meaning’ between terms and increase in “intellectualization” in passing from the metaphor to 
symbol and symbol to simile. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 I am reminded here of the Borges’s ‘list’ of things with which Foucault opens The Order of Things. 
13 In fact once the unknown z becomes known metaphor devolves into simile. 
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In the simile “Jim is as stubborn as a mule” Ricoeur argues that no transfer of meaning takes place.  
The “words retain their meaning” and the “representations themselves remain distinct and coexist 
with fairly equal degrees of intensity.” (Ricoeur 2003, 186)  By words retaining their meaning, 
Ricoeur can only mean that the words “Jim”, “stubborn” and “mule” refer, that they are discursive.  
Jim is a person, stubborn is a character trait, and mule is a grey quadruped with big ears. What is 
not clear is what the “representations themselves” refer to such that they are distinct from the words 
and therefore require no further “semic abstraction.” (Ricoeur 2003, 186) What is clear is that the 
similarity between Jim and the mule, the named attribute, is stubbornness.  That is, Jim and mules 
are stubborn.  Ricoeur’s simile is a complex subject with a simple predicate; x and y are z.   
 
When is a predicate not a predicate?  When it’s a metaphor. 
 
Metaphors are obviously metaphors, i.e. non-literal.  Obviousness is not to be under-rated here as 
metaphorical obviousness offers us the invitation to thought of the similar.  For example ‘Jane is a 
willow wand’ is obviously a metaphor; Jane is obviously a person and not a willow wand.  Hence 
we know the sentence is a metaphor. 
 
Remaining with Ricoeur’s example, the metaphor “Jim is a mule” is formally a simple predicate; x 
is y.  It is a metaphor because Jim is not literally a mule.  Jim is a person, not a mule.  “Jim is a 
person” is nominal and yet has the form of a predicate; x is y.   ‘Jim is a mule’ has the form of a 
predicate and seems to be asserting something false or something contradictory at the level of 
formal predication.  But “Jim is a mule” is not “Jim is a person and not a person” where being a 
mule is being not a person.  That is “Jim is a mule” is not “x is ~ x” where “ ~x is equivalent to 
y”.   It seems to be belabouring the point but this simply means that metaphors are not simple 
predicates, although they have the form of a simple predicate.    X is y is referentially vacuous.  
Hence the form of the sentence is referentially vacuous.  Metaphors are complex nomination and 
predication of the order of similes, x and y are z.  However the genius of metaphor is that the 
attribute is hidden.  Metaphors ask a question about similarity.  X and y are…? 
  
The metaphor “Jim is a mule” is based on identical, yet unstated, temperament.  These two quite 
different animals possess an identical trait.  It is the point of noticing this similarity between two 
different things that allows for the construction of the metaphor.  “Jim” already possesses the 
characteristic of stubbornness that is also the characteristic of the mule.  It is a moment of noticing 
and is not merely a “mutation of meaning” that is at stake in the predicative metaphor.  Curiously, 
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once the unnamed attribute is named, metaphor collapses into simile.  Perhaps the unnamed but 
known attribute is what makes a metaphor “dead” as much as its overuse.   
 
The moment of noticing similarity is extra-linguistic.  It is discursive. As argued earlier it is 
Peirce’s something “standing for”. It is Aristotle “words represent things”.   (Aristotle 1984, 20-21)  
It is Frege’s reference.  The metaphor invites us to think about a shared unnamed attribute, not an 
unusual attribute.  Metaphorical representation is at minimum reference to two things with a shared 
attribute to be discovered.  For Ricoeur metaphors are predicates.  However, Ricoeur’s predicative 
sentences fail to capture the operation of the similar, that is, mimesis as it focuses on the form of the 
sentence, x is y.   
 
Aristotle – Representation and Reference 
 
The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or 
some other physical sense. (Aristotle 1984, 1405b) 
 
To explain metaphor, Aristotle creates a metaphor, one borrowed from the realm of 
movement; phora, as we know is a kind of change, namely change with respect to location. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 17) 
 
Ricoeur argues “it is impossible to talk about metaphor non-metaphorically (in the sense implied by 
borrowing); in short, that the definition of metaphor returns on itself”. (Ricoeur 2003, 18)14  This 
seems to be a confusion on Ricoeur’s part.  Aristotle’s coining the term “metaphor” is not 
metaphorical, it is nominal; naming a group of things in which “a kind of change” occurs; but not 
change as metamorphosis.  Certainly all metaphors are predicates.  However, it does not follow that 
all predicates are metaphors.  When used to designate a group of words that are metaphors, 
metaphor is nominal and predicative, it de/sign/ates a category.  Therefore the claim that 
“resemblance is a metaphor” is not metaphorical.  It is a simple nominal or categorical predicate.  It 
is formally x is y.  It is either true or false based on whether “resemblance” is an instance or a group 
of words that are metaphors.   
 
Understanding the function of metaphors, the metaphoricity of metaphor, is more difficult, but still 
not metaphoric.  In asking “how do metaphors function?” or “what do metaphors do?” it is not 
necessary to talk in metaphors.  The claims “metaphors are mimetic”, or metaphor functions by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Ricoeur reiterates this position a little further on. “There is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which one could 
look upon metaphor, and all the other figures for that matter, as if they were a game played before one’s eyes. (Ricoeur 
2003, 18) 
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bringing “together things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related” 
1412a (Aristotle 1984, 2224) are not metaphorical.    It is by making metaphor the trope of 
resemblance, or metaphor the trope of a visual metaphor, that Ricoeur forces the return of metaphor 
upon itself. 
 
Ricoeur’s study of the function of metaphor begins with Aristotle’s position in Rhetoric and 
Poetics. (Ricoeur 2003, 9)  Ricoeur argues that the Aristotelian metaphor has three characteristics.  
Firstly “metaphor is something that happens to the noun”. (Ricoeur 2003, 16)  Secondly, “metaphor 
is defined in terms of movement”. (Ricoeur 2003, 17)  Thirdly, “metaphor is the transposition of a 
name … that belongs to something else”. (Ricoeur 2003, 18)   
 
In characterizing Aristotelian metaphor as “something that happens to a noun”, Ricoeur argues, 
Aristotle’s definition “contains in nuce the theory of tropes, or figures of speech that focus on the 
word.” (Ricoeur 2003, 16)  However, in defining Aristotelian metaphor as word focused Ricoeur 
misses a step in Aristotle’s conceptualization. 
 
It was naturally the poets who first set the movement going; for words represent things, and 
they had also the human voice at their disposal, which of all our organs can best represent 
other things. 1404a 20 – 22 (Aristotle 1984, 2219) 
 
Before “something happens to the noun” Aristotle highlights the representative function of words, 
their discursivity.  Further, for Aristotle, metaphors must correspond to the thing(s) signified.  A 
failure of “correspondence” between metaphor and the things signified will show a “conspicuous 
inappropriateness”. 
 
Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to 
the thing signified; failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of 
harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side. … Further, in 
using metaphors to give names to nameless things, we must draw them not from remote but 
from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words 
are said. 1405a 10 – 17 (Aristotle 1984, 2240-41) 
 
Here Aristotle is certainly discussing nouns as naming words.  Naming nameless things is, for 
Aristotle, a process of metaphorization.  Hence, whatever happens to nouns in metaphorization also 
happens to the thing the words represent.  Aristotle conceptualizes this “happening” as 
juxtaposition; a drawing together of similar things so that the “kinship is clearly perceived”.  What 
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is at stake in metaphorization and nomination (in the case of developing new names) is a process of 
the perception of the similar and the bringing together or juxtaposing those similar things.  It is not, 
as Ricoeur suggests, that for Aristotle “metaphor is something that happens to the noun”.  Rather 
for Aristotle the process of “perceiving the similar”, occurs in the juxtaposition of not only similar, 
but also dissimilar things. 
 
But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor.  It is the one thing that cannot be 
learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars.  1459 5 – 8 (Aristotle 1984, 2334-35) [my italics] 
 
 
The metaphorical intuition of the similar in the dissimilar is nothing other than the mimetic 
intuition, which will be taken up in the last section of this chapter.   
 
Ricoeur’s second and third characteristics, metaphor “defined in terms of movement” and metaphor 
as the “transposition of a name”, are not distinct characteristics.  Certainly movement is 
characteristic of Aristotelian metaphor.  But how does transposition differ from movement?    
 
The epiphora of a word is described as a displacement, a movement ‘from … to …’ 
(Ricoeur 2003, 17) 
 
The movement of epiphora “from… to…” is equivalent with nominal transposition.  For to 
transpose something is to shift it, “from… to…” Indeed Ricoeur treats with epiphora as 
transposition arguing that for Aristotle “metaphor applies to every transposition of terms”. (Ricoeur 
2003, 17)15  Necessarily then, metaphor would be the “transposition of a name”.  However, by 
characterizing Aristotelian metaphor as epiphora, Ricoeur occludes other characteristic functioning, 
i.e., correspondence, the relation of likeness, whether it is visual likeness, the double relation of the 
proportional metaphor, or the perception of similarity.   
 
Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the 
original thing, and yet not obviously so related -- just as in philosophy also an acute mind 
will perceive resemblances even in things far apart.  1412a (Aristotle 1984, 2224) 
Successful similes also, as has been said above, are in a sense metaphors, since they always 
involve two relations like the proportional metaphor. … A simile succeeds best when it is a 
converted metaphor, for it is possible to say that a shield is like the drinking-bowl of 
Ares…[.]  It is in these respects that poets fail worst when they fail, and succeed best when 
they succeed, i.e. when they give the resemblance pat, as in  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 In his endnote 19 Ricoeur notes that the “generic notion of transposition is assumed by the use of the term metaphora 
and metapherein in diverse contexts in Aristotle’s work.” (Ricoeur 2003, 325) 
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Those legs of his curl just like parsley leaves 1413a (Aristotle 1984, 2224)  
 
 
Aristotle uses the term “resemblance” metaphorically in the first instance, where distance is 
attributed to visual likeness.  
 
 In the second instance, the similes of, the likeness of the shield to the drinking bowl of Ares and 
legs curling like parsley leaves, Aristotle illuminates the notion of giving the “resemblance pat”.   
However, in the first simile, the likeness between “shields” and “drinking-bowls”, the likeness is 
not visual, necessarily not a matter of resemblance.  The “likeness” in this simile is “likeness” of 
consumption. Bacchus, the god of wine and dis-inhibition, consumes large amounts of wine, a red 
liquid, and Ares also consumes a large amount of red liquid, blood.  Further, the drinking-bowl is 
symbolic of Bacchus, while the shield symbolizes Ares.  In constructing this simile Aristotle 
displays the construction of similes as proportional metaphors; a is to c as b is to d.   The shield is 
to Ares, as the drinking-bowl is to Bacchus.  There is a correspondence between the symbols of the 
gods and the gods themselves.   
 
 
The second simile is less complex.  It is directly stated that the likeness between legs and parsley 
leaves, is their curliness.  Curliness may in fact be a visual likeness but the stakes in constructing 
similes and metaphors is not about bringing together things that are visually similar.  Rather the 
stakes are about constructing metaphors “from things that are related to the original thing, and yet 
not obviously so related …”  
 
The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in 
poetry the story, as an imitation of action must represent an action, a complete whole 1451a 
30 – 33 (Aristotle 1984, 2232) 
 
 
Aristotle claims that “the whole business of rhetoric [is] concerned with appearances …” 1401a 37 
(Aristotle 1984, 2238).  As metaphor is part of both rhetorical and poetic language, it too, will be 
concerned with appearances, the realm of the visual.  It is not clear though just what Aristotle 
means by “rhetoric belong[ing] to the order of appearances” unless it is the claim that rhetoric is an 
imitative art and as such belongs to the order of appearances. While painting and acting may belong 
to the visual realm it is not clear how rhetoric and poetry, that is writing and speaking, belong to 
this order.  The only way for rhetoric and poetry to belong to the realm of the visual is to claim all 
imitative arts belong to this realm.  This leaves us with the two assumptions; that language, rhetoric 
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and poetry, are both imitative and visual.  So the notion of poetry and rhetoric belonging to the 
realm of appearances only follows from our agreement that they are imitative and that all imitation 
is visual.   
 
It has already been mentioned that liveliness is got by using the proportional type of 
metaphor and by making your hearers see things. … By ‘making them see things’ I mean 
using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity. 1411b 25 – 29 (Aristotle 
1984, 2252-53)  
 
Aristotle’s claim that rhetorical and poetic language belongs to the realm of the visual allows him to 
further claim that metaphor is seeing as action, specifically action as movement or activity.  
Certainly some movements are seen.  But some are not, e.g. air currents.  And it is not clear 
however that movement can be applied to metaphor as a linguistic thing.  Certainly there is 
transference between terms in a metaphorical statement. And transference implies movement but to 
claim we can see this movement is rather odd.  In the above Aristotle claims that “[b]y ‘making 
them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity”.  One of the 
difficulties here is whether Aristotle is taking the term see literally or metaphorically.   For, if 
language belongs to the order of appearances, then, metaphor belongs to the order of appearances 
and metaphor literally implies resemblance; that is metaphors literally look like the actions they 
represent.  This is an absurd claim.  However, if seeing is action as movement, then the term seeing 
must be metaphorical.  If resemblance is metaphorical then resemblance is a metaphor of metaphor, 
which is an infinitely less problematic claim as we can say that resemblance denotes likeness 
without worrying about a visual correspondence of metaphor to action.  Although some actions are 
things that can be seen, the capacity to see them is not linguistic.  The capacity to represent them 
rhetorically and poetically is linguistic. 
 
Aristotle argues that language represents things.  In arguing “[b]y ‘making them see things’ I mean 
using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity”, Aristotle appears to maintain a 
distinction between words and things while at the same time collapsing that distinction.  Aristotle 
argues that “[m]etaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly 
correspond to the thing signified …”  (1405a 10) (Aristotle 1984, 2240-41) 
 
It is with the “correspondence” of resemblance as action that Aristotle performs the double gesture 
of metaphor itself, i.e. the distinguishing and collapsing of the difference between words, linguistic 
things, and things, non-linguistic objects.  Correspondence retains the identity and difference 
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between different types of things.  Aristotle’s “correspondence” closely resembles the paradox of 
mimesis, that is, the likeness of identity and difference.  Aristotle’s “correspondence” is discursivity 
as metaphorical reference. 
 
Metaphor and Discursivity 
 
In Study 6, ‘The work of resemblance’ (Ricoeur 2003, 173-215), Ricoeur argues that metaphor is 
discursive.  Discourse, Ricoeur suggests, is extra-linguistic, it is “about things”, while signs are 
linguistically intra-systemic. (Ricoeur 2003, 216)   That is, discourse refers to things, “to the 
world”, and signs “differ from” other signs.16   In developing a discursive theory of metaphor 
Ricoeur opens metaphoricity to theories of reference which he examines in Study 7 ‘Metaphor and 
Reference’. (Ricoeur 2003, 216-56)   
 
How would we know that a sign stands for … if its use in discourse did not invest it with the 
scope that relates it to that very thing for which it stands?  (Ricoeur 2003, 217) 
 
To argue that signs stand for the “very thing for which it stands” is what it is to be a sign.  This 
claim is certainly tautologous and like all tautologies, it is true but gets us nowhere.  However, 
Ricoeur’s claim that discourse invests the sign with the scope that relates it to the thing is peculiar.  
How is discourse, an eminently discursive thing, able to invest a sign with a non-discursive trait?  A 
sign is a sign because of reference, precisely representation.  Reference to the thing, representation 
of the thing and standing for the thing, are the extra-discursive moments in the signification of the 
sign.  Take away the thing (even imaginary things) and there is no reference, representation or 
standing for.   
 
Integrating this new viewpoint with those we have already accepted, I would suggest that 
the iconic moment involves a verbal aspect, in that it constitutes the grasping of identity 
within differences and in spite of differences, but based on a preconceptual pattern.  
Aristotelian seeing – ‘to see the similar’ – does not appear to be different from the iconic 
moment, when clarified in this way by the Kantian schema: for to teach the genus to grasp 
the relatedness of terms that are far apart, is to set before the eyes.  (Ricoeur 2003, 199) 
 
Ricoeur uses Aristotle’s seeing, but he does not retain Aristotle’s double gesture of retention and 
collapse of the verbal and non-verbal.  Teaching genus requires more than grasping the ‘relatedness 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Ricoeur’s quotes and adopts Benveniste’s position on semiotics.  “One is never concerned in semiotics with the 
relation between the sign and the things denoted, nor with the relationship between language and the world.” 
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of terms’.   It requires that we do not ‘bracket off this non-verbal kernel’.   Aristotelian seeing is a 
metaphor for metaphorization.   
By ‘making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of 
activity.1411b 25 – 29 (Aristotle 1984, 2225-33)   
Aristotelian ‘seeing’ is using expressions that represent things.   
 
Rorty: The problem of visual metaphors 
 
 
We must get the visual, and in particular the mirroring, metaphors out of our speech 
altogether. (Rorty 1979, 371) 
 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Rorty, 1979) Rorty outlines the problematic nature of 
visual metaphors.  While this thesis supports a similar conclusion at least on this point, our projects 
differ significantly.  Rorty’s hermeneutics is a “conversational” linguistic turn, whilst my own 
project is a semiotic one.  For my purposes, language, including Rorty’s hermeneutics, is only one 
of many semiotic systems.  Ricoeur’s work is devoted to metaphor, as is Rorty’s, though both are 
arguing in strict opposition to each other vis à vis visual metaphor.  Rorty would have us dispense 
with visual metaphors entirely, while Ricoeur adjures us to see resemblance as the trope of 
metaphor. 
 
Metaphor is the trope of resemblance par excellence. (Ricoeur 2003, 173)17 
 
Rorty is particularly concerned with philosophical notions of the mind as a mirror of representation, 
or our glassy essence (hence the titles of his first sections, ‘Our Glassy Essence’ and ‘Mirroring’).18  
Rorty’s focus is epistemology and Ricoeur’s is semantics.  However, Rorty’s critique is readily 
applicable to Ricoeur’s resemblance.19   
 
It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine 
most of our philosophical convictions.  The picture which holds traditional philosophy 
captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations – some 
accurate, some not – and capable of being studied by pure, non-empirical methods.  Without 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 La métaphore est, par excellence, le trope par ressemblance. (Ricoeur 1975, 221) 
18 In a footnote Rorty attributes ‘our Glassy Essence’ first philosophical usage to C. S. Peirce. 19!I!will!revisit!Ricoeur’s!perplexing!quote!in!the!next!section.!
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the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation 
would not have suggested itself. (Rorty 1979, 12) 
 
Certainly Ricoeur’s theoretical conviction is determined by adopting visual metaphor with the very 
consequences Rorty is concerned about.  Rorty warns that visual metaphors mislead us into 
considering that “what is mental may merely be our readiness to fall in with a specifically 
philosophical language game… which has no use outside of philosophy books and which links up 
with no issues in daily life, empirical science, morals or religion”. (Rorty 1979, 23)   
In the language of Descartes and Kant, the construction of the metaphors of mind as “our glassy 
essence”, and language as “the mirror of nature”, Rorty argues, have allowed philosophy to tout 
itself as a neutral foundational epistemology, able to pass judgement on other discourses. 
 
The eventual demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible by the notion that 
philosophy’s core was “theory of knowledge,” a theory distinct from the sciences because it 
was their foundation.  … Once Kant had written, historians of philosophy were able to make 
the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fall into place as attempting to 
answer the question “How is our knowledge possible?” and even to project this question 
back to the ancients. (Rorty 1979, 132) 
 
Rorty de-historicizes (or re-historicizes) the advent of philosophy as epistemology. Beginning with 
Kant, Rorty argues that the questions of philosophy as epistemology today would not have been the 
same for, or even understood by, “the ancients”.  Hence epistemology falls into anachronism.   
 
As seen in the preceding section Ricoeur is not immune to Kantian schematization in his 
clarification of the iconic moment of metaphor. 
 
Aristotelian seeing – ‘to see the similar’ – does not appear to be different from the iconic 
moment, when clarified in this way by the Kantian schema: for to teach the genius to grasp 
the relatedness of terms that are far apart, is to set before the eyes.  (Ricoeur 2003, 199) 
 
Whilst Aristotle’s “to see the similar” does not appear different to Ricoeur his Kantian schema of 
grasping relatedness as setting before the eyes has been shown to be inadequate.  As Rorty would 
say, Ricoeur has fallen prey to a Kantian disposition that has occluded his understanding of how 
representation works. 
 
In part three of his work, Rorty takes up the “peculiarly philosophical project of picking out which 
entities are persons, and therefore possess moral dignity, on the basis of some ‘objective criterion’ – 
for example the possession of a glassy essence – [as] a confusion between, roughly science and 
ethics”. (Rorty 1979, 127)   
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In taking up the works of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey, Rorty considers that philosophy 
should be “edifying” rather than foundational.  To this end his project critiques the visual metaphors 
of ‘our glassy essence’ and representation as more or less accurately shown in “the mirror” of the 
mind.  Rorty suggests that in the end we would gain more by adopting a hermeneutic position. 
 
 
Resemblance: Visual Metaphor 
 
 
Metaphor is the trope of resemblance par excellence. (Ricoeur 2003, 173)20 
 
The major argument in Ricoeur’s Rule of Metaphor is that metaphor must be considered as 
predicative and that resemblance is the term best able to capture this notion. (Ricoeur 2003, 173)  
The above quote encapsulates Ricoeur’s position.  It also illuminates the oddity of that position.  
Ricoeur’s formula situates resemblance meta-discursively such that metaphor becomes an instance 
of resemblance; metaphor is the trope of resemblance.   This literally means that metaphor is the 
turning away from the literality of resemblance.   Ricoeur’s formulation is semantically absurd.  
The inverse of this formula – resemblance as a trope of metaphor, has been adopted by linguists and 
philosophers since Aristotle.  Ricoeur’s confrontation with Aristotle shows how problematic 
resemblance is as a theoretical device.  Aristotle’s use of resemblance to discuss the working of 
metaphor is itself metaphorical.  Resemblance for Aristotle is one instance of metaphor’s perception 
of the similar.  This metaphorical perception is well beyond Ricoeur’s suggestion that for Aristotle, 
“metaphor is something that happens to the noun.”(Ricoeur 2003, 16)    
  
In Study 6, section 4 ‘In Defense of Resemblance’ Ricoeur’s aim is to reinstate resemblance to 
theories of metaphor such that resemblance is both predicative and productive.  Ricoeur claims that 
“[m]etaphor is the trope of resemblance par excellence”. (Ricoeur 2003, 173)   However, as argued 
in the preceding sections, the inverse of this claim is true?; namely, resemblance is the trope of 
metaphor, or more accurately a trope of metaphor.   
 
Ricoeur argues that the paradox of resemblance is identity and difference.  However, this paradox 
that is the heart of Ricoeur’s argument for resemblance is the paradox at the heart of mimesis as 
similarity, similarity beyond visual metaphors and their connotations.   It is remarkable that 
throughout Ricoeur’s work “resemblance” and “similarity” are used interchangeably. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!La!métaphore!est,!par!excellence,!le!trope!par!ressemblance.!!(Ricoeur!1975,!221)
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All these operations are related profoundly to the capacity of words to receive additional, 
displaced, and associated meanings on the basis of their resembling the fundamental 
meaning.  The same characteristic resides in the construction of paradigmatic series, of 
inflection or of tenses, in that the same semantic content is presented here from different 
points of view associated by their similarity. (Ricoeur 2003, 177) 
 
In this ‘transference of feelings,’ the similarity between feelings in induced by the 
resemblance of situations.  (Ricoeur 2003, 190) 
 
Does the notion of resemblance have the power to encompass proportion, comparison or 
simile, the bond of similarity (or sameness), and iconicity, without destroying itself?  Or 
must one rather admit that it just hides the initial embarrassment of a definition and an 
explanation that can produce nothing but a metaphor of metaphor … (Ricoeur 2003, 193) 
 
 
The final quote asks the pertinent question.  To rephrase Ricoeur, does the notion of resemblance 
have the power to encompass the bond of similarity without destroying itself?  Ricoeur’s response 
is in the affirmative, so we must consider his arguments in favour of holding that resemblance is 
more than a metaphor of metaphor.  ‘In Defense of Resemblance’ argues the following: 
 
(a) that the factor of resemblance is of even greater necessity in a tension   theory than in a 
substitution theory; 
(b) that resemblance is not only what the metaphorical statement fashions, but also what 
guides and produces this statement; 
(c) that resemblance can accommodate a logical status capable of overcoming the 
equivocity criticized above; and 
(d) that the iconic character of resemblance must be reformulated such that imagination 
becomes itself a properly semantic moment of the metaphorical statement.  (Ricoeur 
2003, 193) 
 
In (a) Ricoeur argues that it is a mistake to consider resemblance as “superfluous” in the tension and 
interactive theories.  Observing the linguistic strategies of the oxymorons, “living death” and 
“obscure clarity”, Ricoeur notes it is not merely tension and contradiction, Jean Cohen’s “semantic 
impertinence”, that resolves the enigma.  Rather, Ricoeur suggests, it is a new semantic pertinence 
that resolves the issue.   Rephrasing it in Beardsley’s terms, “the metaphor is what forms a 
meaningful self-contradictory statement from the self-destructive self-contradictory statement”. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 194)  It is in the “mutation of meaning that resemblance plays its part.”  Ricoeur 
argues that when one shifts from the semiotic character to the semantic character of the oxymoron 
that resemblance as the mutation of meaning in its discursive constitution becomes apparent. 
Resemblance is an “attribution of predicates not a substitution of names.”    
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Turning to Aristotle for support Ricoeur suggests that the notion of ‘generic relatedness’ points 
towards the “idea of ‘family resemblance’ to which the logical status of resemblance in the 
metaphorical process could be linked”. (Ricoeur 2003, 194) Notice that as yet there is no argument 
on Ricoeur’s part for resemblance resolving the contradictory nature of the oxymorons.  Rather, 
Ricoeur claims that resemblance is involved in the mutation of meaning of the self-contradictory 
statement, the attribution of predicates and the idea of family resemblance.  He suggests that two 
points have been made; namely, that “that tension, contradiction, and controversion are nothing but 
the opposite side of reconciliation in which metaphor ‘makes sense’” and “that resemblance is itself 
a fact of predication, which operates between the same terms that contradiction sets in tension”.  
These points may have been “made” but there is no argument for them.  And what is it to claim that 
resemblance is generic relatedness pointing towards family resemblance in the metaphorical 
process?  Perhaps (b) will give us our answer. 
 
In (b) Ricoeur argues – “that resemblance is not only what the metaphorical statement fashions, but 
also what guides and produces this statement”.   Addressing the objection that resemblance is “not a 
good candidate to serve as reason or cause of the new pertinence, because it is what results from the 
statement and from the rapprochement of its effects”. (Ricoeur 2003, 195), Ricoeur argues that it is 
the paradox arising from this kind of “objection” that sheds light on his theory of metaphor.  
Ricoeur suggests that the “unitive process” described in (b) “arises from an apperception – an 
insight – that belongs to the order of seeing.”(Ricoeur 2003, 195)  To clarify, the unitive process in 
(b) is resemblance’s ability to fashion, guide and produce the statement.   
 
Ricoeur argues that the Aristotelian term epiphora is “transference, transference as such, that is the 
unitive process, the sort of assimilation that occurs between alien ideas … [T]his unitive process 
arises from an apperception – an insight that belongs to the order of seeing”.  According to 
Aristotle, “[t]o metaphorize well is to see – to contemplate, to have the right eye for – the similar”. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 195)  Yet the notions of epiphora as transference, and diaphora as construction, are 
not necessarily of the order of seeing.  “Indeed, the intuitive process, bringing together what is 
disparate, contains an irreducibly discursive moment”. (Ricoeur 2003, 195) Here Ricoeur is 
claiming a couple of things.  Firstly, that the intuitive process is what brings things together and 
secondly, that bringing things together is discursive.  It is not at all clear that holding the first 
justifies the second.  
 
Ricoeur’s justification for this claim is that it is “[t]he same Aristotle who ‘contemplates the 
similar’ is also the theoretician of that proportional metaphor in which resemblance is more 
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constructed that seen (even though the similar is at work there in some fashion … to behave in a 
similar way)”. (Ricoeur 2003, 195)   However, what is being said here is that intuition contains a 
discursive moment because Aristotle was the theoretician of the proportional metaphor and that the 
proportional metaphor is more constructed than seen.  How does intuition become discursive?  
Ricoeur does not tell us. While one might say that the proportional metaphor is more constructed 
than seen, how does this equate to resemblance and the contemplation of the similar?  An 
implication of Ricoeur’s discussion is that there may be metaphors that do not belong to the realm 
of the visual.  That similarity may be “to behave in a similar way”.   
 
There seems to be a hint in Rhetoric 3 that ‘similar’ is ‘same’, that is, generic identity: 
‘Metaphors should be drawn … from objects closely related [apo oϊkeϊôn] but not obvious 
to every one at first sight [mê phanerôn]; just as in philosophy also, to observe the 
resemblance [to homoϊon] in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious 
penetrating intellect: like Archytas’ saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing 
[tauton]; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged’ (1412a 11-14).  How is this 
universal role of resemblance to be squared with the specific reasoning of analogy or simile?  
And how are ‘similar’ and ‘same’ to be reconciled at the level of this universal role? 
The focus of a fourth argument is a more serious equivocation that affects if not 
resemblance itself, then one term that is most often associated with it.  To resemble is, in a 
sense, to be in the image of. (Ricoeur 2003, 192) 
 
However, Aristotle is not taking resemblance literally.  We cannot infer that similar” is the “same”, 
that is generic identity.  Examining the example of the arbitrator and the altar, the question is not 
how resemblance is squared with analogy or simile, but rather: how does Ricoeur imagine that the 
analogy of the arbitrator and the altar squares with resemblance?  Further how are arbitrator and 
altar analogous or similar such that they are visually like, that is resemble, “to be in the image of” 
each other?   
 
Aristotle supposes that metaphor belongs to the order of seeing because metaphor is a part of 
rhetoric and poetics, which along with the other imitative arts belong to the realm of the visual.  
Plato argued just such a position as shown in Chapter 1. It is the conflation of all imitative arts as 
visual that grants Aristotle’s metaphor its visual connotation of action as resemblance.  And 
Ricoeur, accepting the conflation, repeats that gesture with the epiphora and diaphora of metaphor.  
As we know, “to have the right eye – for the similar” is not always visual, that is, literally to see it.  
Hence I will use the term notice for noticing is not necessarily or only visual, nor does it open itself 
to only visual connotations. To notice the similar may be just what is at stake in Ricoeur’s 
predicative understanding of metaphoric function.  And if it is “noticing of the similar”, then while 
metaphor may be predicative its meaning is extra-linguistic, not verbal, or belonging to purely 
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“semantic fields”, as Ricoeur argues; which is, of course, not claiming that metaphor is non-
discursive. 
 
 
As a postulate of semantics, the requirement of reference takes as given the distinction 
between semiotics and semantics, which the preceding Studies have already introduced. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 216) 
 
Metaphorical meaning, as we saw, is not the enigma itself, the semantic clash pure and 
simple, but the solution of the enigma, the inauguration of the new semantic pertinence. … 
If this is how things really stand, then ‘seeing as’ designates the non-verbal mediation of the 
metaphorical statement. (Ricoeur 2003, 214) 
 
Throughout The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur maintains that semiotics is single word focused, 
semantics is minimally sentential and predicates are sentential. 
Indeed arguing this position in Study 3, ‘Metaphor and the semantics of discourse’, dedicated to 
Emile Benveniste and his work Problems in General Linguistics, allows Ricoeur to adopt his 
position of Study 6.   
 
This study may, however, seem to sanction such a choice, for we shall continually contrast a 
discursive theory of metaphor with a reduction of metaphor to an accident of naming. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 65-66) 
 
A sentence constitutes a whole which is not reducible to the sum of its parts; the meaning 
inherent in this whole is distributed over the ensemble of the constituents.21(Ricoeur 2003, 
67) 
 
Benveniste puts ‘being a predicate’ (109) at the forefront of the characteristics belonging to 
this level.  It is in his eyes, ‘distinctive beyond all others and inherent in the sentence’. The 
presence of even a grammatical subject is optional; a single sign suffices to constitute a 
predicate. (Ricoeur 2003, 68) 
 
 
Ricoeur’s uptake of Benveniste’s work with predication is that even “a single sign suffices to 
constitute a predicate”.   Doesn’t this mean that semiotics, which Ricoeur defines as single word 
focused, might also belong in certain cases to semantics?  Ricoeur’s semiotic/semantic binary 
would collapse around the sign that was a single word as well as a predicate.  A further problem 
with Ricoeur’s definition of semiotics as a single word is that it ignores the works of C. S. Peirce 
and Eco who consider that anything that is interpretable is a sign.  The very notion of 
interpretability undoes Ricoeur’s hard and fast distinction between word and discourse, allowing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ricoeur cites this from page 105 in Problems in General Linguistics. 
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that discourse (among other things) as well as words, sentences, texts, and metaphors, are all signs 
and therefore fall within the purview of semiotics.  However, Ricoeur remains firmly fixed on the 
semantic moment of metaphor, to the exclusion of the semiotic moment that is also part of the 
generation of meaning. Problematically enough, in maintaining the semiotic/semantic dichotomy 
Ricoeur weakens his own analysis by closing off extra-linguistic semiotic systems.   
 
In remaining wedded to the trope of resemblance to encapsulate the mimetic paradox, Ricoeur asks 
that it perform tasks that it is incapable of, for example presenting “an image depicting an abstract 
relationship.”(Ricoeur 2003, 198)  It is notable that we are not offered an example of what an image 
of an abstract relation might be.  Nor is this claim sensible given we are considering metaphor, 
unless “image” is metaphorical as well. This is precisely the difficulty.  Rather than clarification, an 
endless series of visual metaphors arise to shore up the initial visual metaphor.  Ricoeur’s adoption 
of resemblance opens the doors to those familiar and until recently unchallenged scopophilic 
metaphors: the image, imagination, apperception, iconicity, insight, etc.  Ricoeur’s desire that 
resemblance embrace all possible forms of the mimetic paradox closes off the chance of “seeing” 
other possibilities for metaphorization.  Ricoeur requires too much of resemblance.    
 
In point (c) Ricoeur states that “resemblance can accommodate a logical status capable of 
overcoming the equivocity criticized” in points (a) and (b).  Point (a) states “that the factor of 
resemblance is of even greater necessity in a tension theory than in a substitution theory”, while (b) 
states “that resemblance is not only what the metaphorical statement fashions, but also what guides 
and produces this statement”. Ricoeur hopes to “reply to the objection concerning the logical status 
of resemblance”. (Ricoeur 2003, 196)  Clarifying the equivocation that resemblance’s logical status 
overcomes, Ricoeur suggests  “what holds for the operation of assimilation can hold for the relation 
of similarity, but only if it can be shown that the relation of similarity is another name for the 
operation of assimilation described earlier”. (Ricoeur 2003, 196)   
 
Ricoeur reformulates this problem as an issue of logical weakness such that it becomes “anything 
resembles anything else … except for a certain difference.” (Ricoeur 2003, 196)  Ricoeur proceeds 
to analyze this logical weakness under the auspices of the paradox of resemblance as identity and 
difference.  His analysis claims that ressemblance does not suffer from the logical “weakness” of 
what it fails to resemble.  Ressemblance, being an instance of mimesis is the heart of all things 
similar; namely identity and difference, (dis)similarity.  The paradox of identity and difference is 
only a logical weakness in a binarist system that operates on the laws of non-contradiction and 
excluded middle.  Binary systems are unable to deal with any paradoxes whatsoever, including, and 
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in this case especially, the paradox of mimesis as ressemblance “conceived of as the unity of 
identity and difference”. (Ricoeur 2003, 208)   
 
Ricoeur argues that in “the logical structure of the metaphorical statement ‘the similar’ is perceived 
despite difference, in spite of contradiction”. (Ricoeur 2003, 196)  In ressemblance, Ricoeur 
continues, it is “the predicative operation in which ‘approximation’ (bringing close) meets the 
resistance of ‘being distant’.  … [W]ithin the metaphorical statement; “same” and “different” are 
not just mixed together they also remain opposed. …  In metaphor, “the same” operates in spite of 
“the different.” (Ricoeur 2003, 196)  Ricoeur uses the ‘clash’ between “sameness and difference” as 
the model for understanding not just how metaphor works but also to account for the variety of 
metaphorical statements.  Considering Gilbert Ryle’s “category mistake”, Ricoeur suggests that the 
function of metaphor is similar; namely presenting the facts “belonging to one category in the 
idioms appropriate to another.  Indeed, the definition of metaphor does not differ radically from 
this; metaphor consists in speaking of one thing in terms of another that resembles it”. (Ricoeur 
2003, 197)   
 
In critiquing Aristotle’s conception of metaphor, Ricoeur implies that metaphor is more than 
“something that happens to the noun”. (Ricoeur 2003, 16)  It is this consideration of metaphor as 
“noun”, ergo sign focused, that drives Ricoeur to adopt a position where metaphors function 
sententially.  
 
 
The earlier example “Jim is a mule”, showed that this metaphorical statement works because it is 
noticed that both Jim and the mule possess the quality of “stubbornness”.  The metaphor says a 
shared quality is the same in two things that are distinctly different species.  There is no paradox or 
contradiction here. To say that “Jim” and “mules” belong to two different categories or species and 
yet are similar is neither contradictory nor paradoxical.  It is the same as saying that a specific table 
and some chairs are similar because they are made of wood.  It is not contradictory or paradoxical 
to say that two different things share a quality.  Noticing that two different things share the same 
quality, and to bring those things together because of that shared quality is Aristotle’s “genius” 
stroke of metaphor.  It follows then that predicative metaphors are neither contradictory nor 
paradoxical.   
 
To tease this out, consider what would have to hold for predicative metaphors to be contradictory or 
paradoxical.  Contradictions and paradoxes are statements that at the same time are both true and 
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false.   In the predicative metaphor “Jim is a mule” contradiction does not occur even if the 
statement is taken literally.  If “Jim is a mule” is taken literally the statement is simply false.  It is 
not the case that taking “Jim is a mule” as a metaphor makes this statement both true and false.  The 
analysis of “Jim is a mule” showed the metaphor to be true.  True statements are not contradictions 
or paradoxes.  If examined as a statement of resemblance then “Jim is a mule” is false.  For “Jim” 
does not resemble, look like, “a mule”.  False statements are not contradictory or paradoxical.  In 
fact, “Jim is a mule” cannot be made to be contradictory or paradoxical.  “Jim is a mule” must be 
true for the predicative metaphor to function as a metaphor in this instance.  It is also true that “Jim” 
must be similar to a mule in one but not all respects.  Or, more correctly, Jim and the mule must be 
identical in at least one respect for the metaphor to function.  If “Jim” and “the mule” were identical 
in all respects, then “Jim” would be “a mule”; which is not contradictory or paradoxical either.  
“Jim” in this case designates or names a mule.  Jim’s being a mule under these conditions means 
that the statement is not a predicative metaphor; it is a nominal statement.  Therefore, there are no 
conditions under which the predicative metaphor, “Jim is a mule”, can remain a metaphor and not 
be true, nor are there circumstances under which “Jim is a mule” can be made contradictory or false 
and remain metaphorical.     
 
Ricoeur suggests that metaphorical predication is idiomatic.  It is not clear what the “idiom” of 
these distinct species might be such that one talks in terms of the other.  To talk about one thing in 
the idiom of another would constitute an act of translation.  Certainly translation requires 
transposition and translations may suffer constraints of adequacy.  But translations are not 
essentially paradoxical or contradictory.  Perhaps Ricoeur sees the issue of linguistic transposition 
as similar to that which occurs in metaphor.  Certainly he desires there to be semantic transposition.   
 
Metaphor is formally predicative, i.e. “this is that”, ‘x is y”, “Jim is a mule”, as Ricoeur shows. 
However, the semantics of predication is extra-linguistic.  The first two examples are predicative 
statements and the last is a predicative metaphor.  In “this is that” and “x is y”, there is no idiomatic 
transposition nor is there any information.  “This and that” and “x and y” are nominally non-
specific, i.e. they don’t give us any way to muleness which is a statement beyond their being 
predicates.  Nor is there idiomatic transposition in the metaphor/predicate ‘Jim is a mule’, but it 
does supply us with information.  The issue is not talking about one thing in the idiom of another; 
rather it is that one thing is spoken about as another thing within the same idiom.  In the metaphor 
the categories are nominated specifically.  That is “Jim” the subject, as a member of the species 
homo sapiens, is nominated and a ‘mule’, of the species equus asinus, the object, is nominated.  The 
 56 
nomination selects two different but specific categories, in this case different species of mammals, 
which give us information.   
 
The predicative metaphor does not tell us is how these categories are related to each other.  What it 
does tell us is to seek out that relationship.  Seeking out the relationship is not semantic or 
idiomatic, i.e. an issue of meaning, linguistics, not differing idiom.  Ricoeur’s predicative metaphor 
does not consist “in obliterating the logical and established frontiers of language, in order to bring 
to light new resemblances the previous classification kept us from seeing”.  Nor can we agree with 
the claim that “metaphor would be able to break an old categorization, in order to establish new 
logical frontiers on the ruination of their forerunners.”  What we can say is that the ability to notice 
the same trait in two different things allows us to construct predicative metaphors.  The ability to 
construct predicative metaphors does not lead us into issues of contra-diction or the paradox of 
resemblance.  Nor can we say that the ability to ‘notice the same trait’ is a linguistic one.  This 
ability is discriminatory and sensorial; which leads us to Ricoeur’s final point (d) “that the iconic 
character of resemblance must be reformulated such that imagination becomes itself a properly 
semantic moment of the metaphorical statement.” 
 
(d) The same paradox of vision and discursiveness that served as a model in constructing the 
relation of resemblance can now serve as a guide in answering the fourth objection.   This 
concerns the status of resemblance as a figurative presentation, as an image depicting 
abstract relationships.  The issue, we remember, comes from a remark by Aristotle 
concerning the power of metaphor to ‘set before the eyes’; and it is posed in its full scope by 
the iconic theory of Paul Henle and by the notion of associated image of Michel Le Guern. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 198-99) 
 
 
Ricoeur argues that “the iconic moment involves a verbal aspect, in that it constitutes the grasping 
of identity within differences and in spite of differences, but based on a preconceptual pattern”. 
(Ricoeur 2003, 199)  It has been shown that there is no paradox or contradiction in grasping 
“identity within differences”.   But is it the case that this ability to grasp identity within difference is 
preconceptual?  Perhaps we could grant it is so.  However, does ‘preconceptual grasping’ become 
an issue of setting before the eyes?  Is preconceptual grasping Aristotelian resemblance, as Ricoeur 
claims?  It has been shown that in remaining wedded to resemblance, Ricoeur falls prey to Rorty’s 
“philosophical language game” and Coleridge’s “despotism of the eye”.   A final examination of 
how “despotic” the rule of the eye is comes from Ricoeur’s overlooking his own work on mimesis 
to adopt ressemblance as the trope of metaphor.   
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Mimesis 
 
If it is true to say that the point of metaphor is to clarify and educate, as both Aristotle and Ricoeur 
claim, then ressemblance, as the metaphor of metaphor, is not or is no longer useful in this regard.  
Rorty’s arguments are applicable to Ricoeur.  Neither Aristotle nor Ricoeur questions the use of the 
term, although Aristotle certainly is aware that resemblance is a metaphor and has been shown to 
use it as such. By neglecting the limitations of visual reference, Ricoeur elevates ressemblance to 
the status of a technical term.   
 
Aristotle is at least aware that resemblance requires clarification; resemblance is not visual likeness 
but action. “By ‘making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state 
of activity.” 1411b 27/8 (Aristotle 1984, 2253-53) Aristotle uses the term ‘resemblance’ 
metaphorically, Ricoeur never questions the adequacy of the term, nor does he note that 
resemblance is a visual metaphor for metaphor.   
 
Further, if one substituted the term mimesis, or even similarity,22 for the term ressemblance in 
Ricoeur’s theory, one would not lose any sense or power of his argument.  Indeed the term mimesis 
clarifies Ricoeur’s argument, precisely because it has no visual connotation.  A non-visual term is 
exactly what is required to comprehend the predicative nature of metaphor.   
 
What metaphor brings to both poetics and rhetoric is mimesis.  Hence Ricoeur’s neat triads of 
poiêsis-mimêsis-catharsis and rhetoric-proof-persuasion are not quite adequate.  The rhetorical 
triad should be expanded to include mimesis.  It is at the point of metaphorical correspondence “to 
the thing signified” in rhetorical strategy that mimesis is pertinent. 
 
 
In the latter pages of Study 1 ‘Between rhetoric and poetics: Aristotle’, Ricoeur investigates 
Aristotle’s mimesis.  Ricoeur argues that Aristotle’s mimesis is rigorously defined and not subject 
to a ‘plethora of meanings’; nor is imitation (mimesis) merely a copy.  Ricoeur argues that mimesis 
is the process ‘forming each of the six parts of tragedy’.   
 
There is mimêsis only where there is a ‘making [faire].’ (Ricoeur 2003, 38) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Throughout La Métaphore Vive Ricoeur uses versions of similarity extensively.  ‘Similitude’ and ‘similarité’ are used 
fifteen times in Section 1 and once in Section 2, four times in Section 3 and 4.  Versions of  ‘semblable’ appear less 
frequently, being used six times in Sections 3 and 4 with ‘semblait’ occurring only once.  ‘Semble’ and ‘la semblablé’ 
occur only once in Section 5. 
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More precisely, it is the ‘structure’ of plot that constitutes mimêsis. (Ricoeur 2003, 39) 
 
Relocated on the foundations provided by mimêsis, metaphor ceases to be arbitrary and 
trivial. (Ricoeur 2003, 40) 
 
According to Ricoeur, mimesis is a “making” and a structuring.  Ricoeur also considers mimesis to 
have an ordering function.  It is these activities of mimesis, making, structuring, and ordering that, 
unlike Ricoeur’s resemblance, clarify the working of metaphor.   
 
It has been argued in this chapter that predicative metaphors are not contradictory.  One of the 
reasons for this is that in constructing, i.e. making the predicative metaphor, it is mimesis not 
resemblance that is at play.  The selection of the terms used in constructing the predicative 
metaphor requires that they share one feature.  This shared feature reorders the objects in the 
metaphor.  Mimetic metaphorization constitutes a new order.   
 
In the example “Jim is a mule”, the two different animals were reordered or re-categorized on the 
basis of the shared quality of “stubbornness”.  So rather than the difference of species, mimesis 
restructures the ‘categories’ such that what becomes pertinent is their similarity.  Stubbornness 
becomes the ordering quality, not animality.  In constructing the predicative metaphor, mimesis re-
orders, or in a retake of Ryle’s terminology, creates a new category.  The only way to create the 
new category is to have “an initial reference to reality…” 23 (Ricoeur 2003, 39).  Mimesis has this 
reference to reality.  Mimesis allows that the signs within the metaphor are individually discursive.  
In privileging the sententially semantic moment of the predicative metaphor over the semiotic, 
Ricoeur loses this reference to reality and hence to mimesis as well.    
 
Forgoing Aristotelian mimesis, which Ricoeur acknowledges founds metaphor; his theory adopts 
ressemblance, which fails to capture the very essence of the metaphor.  This peculiar oversight is 
one instance of the despotism of the eye – the all pervasive sway of visual metaphors. 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Ricoeur continues “this reference signifies nothing other than the very rule of nature over all production.”  Including 
the production of metaphor, one supposes. 
 59 
Chapter 3 
 
Mimesis: Magic 
 
 
The problem of Sympathy 
 
The notion of sympathy is fundamental to the anthropological concept of magic.  The problem with 
the anthropological concept of sympathy is that to date no one has defined it.  I will show that 
sympathy between objects can be understood as a mimetic relationship. 
 
Sympathy 
 
Frazer’s canonical text The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1923) undertakes an 
analysis of Sympathetic Magic.  Frazer contends that Sympathetic Magic divides into two fields – 
Homeopathic Magic and Contagious Magic.  Three laws of thought govern these types of Magic.  
Sympathetic Magic is governed by the Law of Sympathy, Homeopathic Magic, by the Law of 
Similarity and Contagious magic by the Law of Contact. 
 
Frazer contends that Homeopathic and Contagious Magic belong to Sympathetic Magic as they 
share the principle of sympathy.   
 
Both branches of magic, the homeopathic and the contagious, may be comprehended under 
the general name of Sympathetic Magic, since both assume that things act on each other at a 
distance through a secret sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from one to the other by 
means of what we may conceive as a kind of invisible ether, not unlike that which is 
postulated by modern science for a precisely similar purpose, namely to explain how things 
can physically affect each other through a space which appears to be empty. (Frazer 1923, 
12)  
 
Frazer’s definition of Sympathetic Magic is circular.  Sympathetic Magic operates because “things 
act on each other at a distance through means of a secret sympathy”.   There are two points in 
Frazer’s definition of sympathy.  First, things act on each other at a distance.  Second, things share a 
secret sympathy.  In the first instance, things acting on each other at a distance, Frazer suggests that 
the impulse is transmitted by a kind of invisible ether.  Notably, this merely puts something in the 
space across which the impulse jumps; it does not tell us anything about the impulse.  In the second, 
these things act on each other through a secret sympathy.  The problem is that the sympathetic 
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impulse remains a secret.  Frazer does not explain what sympathy is, or what it does, or what 
relationship these objects share, such that they can act on each other across distance.   
 
As the principle or law of sympathy is undefined, perhaps the spirit of sympathy can be found in the 
two types of Magic that fall under its rubric: Homeopathic Magic and Contagious Magic. 
 
The Principles of Magic – If we analyze the principles of thought on which magic is based, 
they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or 
that the effect resembles the cause; and, second that things which have once been in contact 
with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the contact has been severed.  
The former principle may be called the Law of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or 
Contagion. (Frazer 1923, 11) 
 
From the Law of Similarity, Frazer suggests that the “magician infers that he can produce any effect 
he desires merely by imitating it”. (Frazer 1923, 11)  From the Law of Contact or Contagion, the 
magician infers that “whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with 
whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not”.  I will return to the 
magician’s inferences and the association of ideas after discussing the elements of Magic.  
 
 
Distinguishing Homeopathic and Contagious Magic: Representation 
 
Magical Practices are not entirely without sense.  They correspond to representations which 
are often very rich and which constitute the third element of magic.  As we have seen, all 
ritual is a kind of language; it therefore translates ideas. (Mauss 1972, 60) 
 
While Homeopathic and Contagious Magic share the secret property of sympathy, they are 
distinguished from each other not only by the laws of similarity and contagion as Frazer contends 
but also by their representations.  Working with Mauss’ notion of the “poorly executed ideogram” 
we shall see that it is magical representations which are subject to these laws and these laws are 
distinguished from each other by the type of representation used.   To begin I examine Mauss’ 
understanding of the constitution or “elements” of magic. 
 
 
In A General Theory of Magic (1972), Mauss proposes three elements to constitute Sympathetic 
Magic: the magician, the actions and the representations.  Following this formula I will add a fourth 
rather obvious but necessary element; the recipient of the magic action.  Mauss defines the first 
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element, the magician, as “any practitioner of magic, whether or not he considers himself a 
professional”. (Mauss 1972, 25)    
 
The second element, the actions, Mauss defines as rites which are subject to specific conditions.  
The “conditions of the rite” is divided into three subsections.  The first, although called the 
conditions of the rite, is rather the context of the rite. The second is the division of rites into non-
verbal and verbal.  This distinction, however, is not accurate as Mauss argues that all rites are 
verbal; the distinction is actually based on gestures or lack thereof.  The final element is 
representation, which for Mauss will become problematic, as not everything considered under this 
heading is a representation. 
 
In section 1 ‘The conditions of the rites’, Mauss observes that the “time and place of a rite is strictly 
prescribed”. (Mauss 1972, 45)  That is, certain ceremonies may only take place at a specific time of 
day or night, time of the week or particular times of the month or year.  The time is dependent on 
the ceremony.  Further, Mauss points out that magic is not “performed just anywhere, but in 
specially qualified places”. (Mauss 1972, 46)   Even the tools and implements are subject to 
“special conditions of time and place” and “while they may not be consecrated in the religious 
sense, are medicated, and this provides them with a kind of magical consecration”.  The rite proper 
often includes preliminary rites and exit rites.  So far then what seems to be described by Mauss 
cannot be seen as actions as such, but rather the constructing of the context within which the action 
is to occur. 
 
Section 2 ‘The nature of rites’ divides rites into two types: the verbal and the non-verbal. (Mauss 
1972, 50)  Mauss argues that non-verbal rites are known as sympathetic or symbolic magic. 
 
We should like to add that, while sympathetic procedures are employed generally in all 
magical systems throughout the world, and while genuine sympathetic ritual does exist, 
magicians on the whole have shown no inclination to speculate on the nature of this 
sympathy. … 
 
The variations played on the sympathetic theme are so great that the subject has become 
obscure. (Mauss 1972, 51) 
 
While Mauss spends some time describing and listing various objects and ingredients involved in 
the ritual, sympathy once again remains “obscure”.  In moving on to explain verbal rites, Mauss 
happily subsumes spells under the auspices of ‘sympathetic magical rites.’ 
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Some even act sympathetically.  It is only a matter of naming the actions or things in order 
to bring about the sympathetic reaction.  In a medical spell or in a rite of exorcization, play 
is made on words for the illness or the demon responsible for the evil.  Puns and 
onomatopoeic phrases are among the many ways of combating sickness verbally through 
sympathetic magic. … Apparently it was often believed that the description of the rite, or 
even the mention of its name, was enough to conjure it up and produce effect.  (Mauss 1972, 
53-54) 
 
Here we have some chance of gleaning the sympathetic process.  The notion of onomatopoeia 
evokes the idea of similarity, where words sound like the things they represent.  Further, Mauss 
suggests that even “description” or “mention” of the name is enough to produce the effect desired.  
So sympathy, at least as far as spells are concerned, is a matter of similarity, that is, mimesis.   
 
Returning to non-verbal rites Mauss suggests that the spoken rite or spell may render the 
“mechanical rite more complete, more precise, and it may on occasion supplant it”.  (Mauss 1972, 
57)  
 
Words and actions become absolutely equivalent and that is why we find descriptions of the 
non-verbal rites presented to us as spells. (Mauss 1972, 57) 
 
Mauss argues that there no such thing as a ‘wordless ritual’, as the incantations may be occurring 
within the magicians mind.  Leaving aside the difficulty of how internal incantations are being 
ascertained by Mauss, it seems that there may be rites that have no actions, but that all rites are 
verbal. 
 
From this point of view, the mechanical rite is but a translation of the unspoken incantation: 
a gesture is a sign, and also a language. (Mauss 1972, 57) 
 
While Mauss hastens to add that although spells are formulas, and that rituals and actions are also 
formulaic and hence all rituals are formal yet the effectiveness of any of these magical rites is sui 
generis, which is neither here nor there when discussing belief systems.  So in examining rites so 
far Mauss has shown that they are spatial and temporally contextual and that there are no non-
verbal rites, but that there are rites without actions.  However, in making the connection between 
words and actions, Mauss argues that “all ritual is a kind of language; it therefore translates the 
ideas”.  (Mauss 1972, 60)  
 
Mauss’ third element of magic is representation.  However, the difficulty with this section of the 
text is that not everything Mauss considers a representation is in fact a representation.  Magical 
representations, no matter how rudimentary, are as Mauss points out, extremely complex and 
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multileveled.  Hence it is worth clarifying what is and what is not a representation.  The first of 
Mauss’ magical representations is the display of effect.   Mauss notes “magic is the art of 
changing”.  That is, magical representation displays the effect of a change of state within the 
recipient of the rite.  The second representation is “a concrete, material object; a spell or a rune is 
thrown down, a charm is washed, drowned or burnt”. (Mauss 1972, 62)  The third is the belief in “a 
relationship between the persons and things involved in the ritual”.   
 
Before continuing to examine Mauss’ understanding of abstract, impersonal representations, it is 
necessary to note that in the preceding list, only the second representation, the spell, charm or rune, 
is a representation.  In the first instance, display of the effect is not a representation.   A 
representation at minimum presents something again in another way.  The effect is the result or 
consequence of the ritual.  Anecdotal evidence may count as representation of magical efficacy. 
Mauss may be suggesting that showing others the changed state of the recipient of magic is a 
representation.  But this seems a peculiar assertion, as the cured recipient is an instance of efficacy, 
whereas the uncured recipient is an instance of failed efficacy.  It is somewhat like saying that if a 
fever is cured by antibiotics, then the cured person represents antibiotics.  It is a confusion of 
signified with signifier.   
 
Mauss’ third representation is belief in a relationship between persons and things within the ritual.  
In the first instance, belief as such is not a representation.  Nor is belief in a relationship the 
relationship per se.  Throughout Mauss’ subsequent examples, there is an instance that could be 
considered as ‘representation’.  Mauss relates that an “Assyro-Babylonian spell creates a kind of a 
marriage between the demons and the images meant to represent them …” (Mauss 1972, 62).  
Certainly, the spell counts as a representation and so do the images of the demons.  However, this 
instance is covered by Mauss’ second account of representation and it does explain how belief or 
the relationship between things is a representation.  This “relationship”, Mauss continues, is 
conceived in thousands of ways.  But conceptualization is not representation, at least not as 
understood here.  Mauss claims that “[i]t may be represented as something which is shared between 
the magician and their victims”. (Mauss 1972, 62)  The “it” here is the relationship – the 
relationship represented as something which is shared between the magician and his victims.  It 
seems a peculiar way of saying that there is some relationship, albeit a shared but ineffable one, 
between the magician and his victim.  That there is a relationship is clear, but not that there is 
representation.  The relationship between the magician and his victim is analogous to the 
relationship between a doctor and her patient – a relationship that is not considered as a 
representation.   
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There is a distinct idea that there is a kind of continuity between the agents, the patients, the 
materials, the spirits and the end-object of a magical rite. … Magic involves a terrific 
confusion of images, without which, to our way of thinking, the rite itself would be 
inconceivable. (Mauss 1972, 62) 
 
Mauss argues that the confusion may be the object of the representation. The confusion seems to be 
Mauss’.  For the notion of continuity between things is precisely the idea of the laws of contact and 
imitation, namely sympathetic magic.  There is no confusion here except ethnocentric desire to 
disparage a particular society’s belief in magic rather than say a belief in a Judeo-Christian religion.   
 
From the tangle of changing images it is possible to extract three principle laws.  They could 
in fact all come under the heading of laws of sympathy, if antipathy is also covered by the 
notion of sympathy.  These are the laws of contiguity, similarity and opposition: things in 
contact are and remain the same – like produces like – opposites work on opposites. (Mauss 
1972, 64) 
 
With the exception of the inclusion of “antipathy”, Mauss’ description of the laws of magic 
resonates with Frazer’s.  Continuing to echo Frazer, Tylor and his predecessors, Mauss notes that 
these laws are based on the association of ideas.  This association of ideas leads, Frazer and Mauss 
argue, to the mistaken conclusion that there is an association of facts. (Frazer 1923, 12)  However 
before returning to these laws, note that Mauss considers that these laws are in themselves 
representations.   The peculiarity of considering the laws of magic as representations is that it 
conflates the signified with the signifier, the thing with the representation of it.  Curiously, this is 
precisely the move the magician makes.  He believes that by affecting a representation of a person 
so the person is affected.  As Benjamin suggests in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, he gets “hold of something at very close range by means of its likeness”.  However, 
although Mauss seems to hold these laws as representations, he in fact treats them as laws and sets 
about discussing them as such.  Leaving aside the issues of representation and signification, to 
which I shall return shortly, I consider Frazer and Mauss’ work on the Laws of Magic as such and 
propose that the ‘secret’ of sympathy is mimesis and the concept of similitude.  
 
Similitude: The Laws of Magic, Mimesis  
 
In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Knowledge (1970), Foucault examines the 
constructive role of resemblance in Western culture up until the end of the sixteenth century. 
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It was resemblance that largely guided exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it was 
resemblance that organized the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible 
and invisible, and controlled the art of representing them. (Foucault 1970, 17) 
 
Foucault is not discussing resemblance as visual likeness, but rather resemblance as similitude: 
mimesis.  These four similitudes, according to Foucault, are convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and 
the dyad sympathy/antipathy. (Foucault 1970, 18-23)  Foucault points out that the 
sympathy/antipathy dyad gives rise to all the others. (Foucault 1970, 24)  These sixteenth century 
similitudes neatly map the process of mimesis at play in the laws of Sympathetic Magic as 
understood by Frazer and Mauss.   Convenientia explains the law of Contact or Contagion; 
aemulatio highlights the workings of Homeopathic or Imitative Magic; analogy accounts for the 
complicated example where magic is both Homeopathic and Contagious; and Sympathy/Antipathy 
is the ruling principle in the similitudes, as it is in Sympathetic Magic. 
 
Convenientia and the Law of Contact 
 
Convenientia is spatial to the extent that it requires contact between things. Foucault argues that 
convenientia denotes adjacency – juxtaposition of things such that their edges mingle—“the end of 
one denotes the beginning of the other”. (Foucault 1970, 18)  “Convenientia is a resemblance 
connected with space in the form of a graduated scale of proximity”. (Foucault 1970, 18)  Foucault 
continues that “by linking of resemblance with space, this ‘convenience’ that brings like things 
together and makes adjacent things similar, the world is linked together like a chain”. (Foucault 
1970, 19) 
 
Frazer contends that the Law of Contact or Contagion “proceeds upon the notion that things which 
have once been conjoined must remain ever afterwards, even when quite dissevered from each 
other, in such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done to the one must similarly affect the 
other”. (Frazer 1970, 37)  Mauss’ definition echoes Frazer’s in that “[e]very thing that comes into 
close contact with the person …” is subject to the law of contiguity. (Mauss 1970, 65)  However, 
Mauss expands this law such that the “simplest expression of the notion of sympathetic contiguity 
is the identification of the part with the whole.  The part stands for the complete object”. (Mauss 
1970, 64)  Hence, the part is a representation of the whole.  The relationship is metonymic. 
 
Setting aside for the moment the sympathetic relation of similar effects, continuity and contiguity 
are neatly explained by convenientia.   For, in convenientia, similitude is a matter of things being 
juxtaposed.   This side by sidedness is contact, and the contact makes things similar.  These objects 
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include roads, footprints, clothes, toys, and fingernails, the remains of meals and members of the 
family.  The law of contiguity also includes the relationship between such things as “a wound and 
the weapon that caused it …” (Mauss 1970, 65) Foucault points out that, in convenientia, place and 
similitude become entangled. “Resemblance imposes adjacencies that in their turn guarantee further 
resemblances”. (Foucault 1970, 18)   
 
 
Aemulatio severs convenientia’s connection between things. Foucault argues that the “relation of 
emulation enables things to imitate one another from one end of the universe to the other without 
connection or proximity…” (Foucault 1970, 19)  Emulation, Foucault points out, is a form of 
reflection that crosses space without annulling it.  Emulation does “not form a chain but rather a 
series of concentric circles reflecting and rivaling one another”. (Foucault 1970, 21) 
 
Frazer argues that the principle of Homeopathic or Imitative Magic is “like produces like”. (Frazer 
1923, 12)  The application of this principle Frazer shows as the belief by many cultures that to 
affect the image of a person, is to affect the person or thing. (Frazer 1923, 12-13)  
 
Frazer argues that the Law of Similarity is “that like produces like, or that the effect resembles the 
cause …” (Frazer 1923, 11) 
 
Homeopathic or Imitative Magic. – Perhaps the most familiar application of the principle 
that like produces like is the attempt which has been made by many peoples in many ages to 
injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or destroying an image of him, in the belief that just 
as the image suffers, so does the man, and that when it perishes he must die. (Frazer 1923, 
12-13) 
 
Mauss echoes Frazer’s position. 
 
This Law of Similarity has two principal formulas which it is important to distinguish: like 
produces like, similia similibus evocantur; and like acts upon like, and, in particular, cures 
like, similia similibus curantur. (Mauss  1970, 68) 
 
Both Frazer and Mauss formulate two moments in the Law of Similarity.  Frazer’s “like produces 
like” is Mauss’ similia similibus evocantur, while “the effect resembles the cause” is similia 
similibus curantur. 
 
Mauss argues that Frazer reserved “the term sympathy proper for phenomena including contagion, 
and called this other category, which we shall now deal with mimetic sympathy”. (Mauss 1970, 68)  
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The problem is that although these authors may situate the Law of Similarity under mimetic 
sympathy, neither argues what the difference between mimetic sympathy and sympathy proper is.  
Mauss subsumes the Law of Similarity to the Law of Contiguity.  I shall return to Mauss’ 
subsumption of these Laws in the section on Magical Representation, for it is conflating the 
representations of contagion and similarity that allows Mauss to argue that “the image is to the 
object as the part is to the whole”. (Mauss 1970, 68) 
 
Both Frazer’s and Mauss’ account of the Law of Similarity fits Foucault’s formulation of 
aemulatio. For the Law of Similarity does not require contact or convenientia as Frazer’s example 
shows.  The image of the person (or thing) affects that person or thing irrespective of the distance 
between them.   The spatiality of convenientia is not annulled, as Foucault points out; rather it 
simply has no relevance.  If the image is affected then so too is the person.  For the purposes of 
magic, the image evokes the person or thing.  In magic the image calls up the object, or as Foucault 
suggests, “it is the means whereby things scattered through the universe can answer one another”. 
(Foucault 1970, 19) Hence aemulatio certainly accounts for like producing like – similia similibus 
evocantur.   
 
What is a little more demanding is ‘the effect resembling the cause’, similia similibus curantur.  
Foucault argues that in emulation, “things imitate one another” there is a kind of mirroring. “There 
is something in emulation of the reflection and the mirror”. (Foucault 1970, 19) Foucault’s 
emulation provides the answer, if the notion of the reflection and the mirror are not taken literally.   
For sound can be emulated, movement can be emulated and, for the purposes of understanding the 
function of the Law of Similarity’s second principle, so too can action.  In Frazer’s example, it is 
the effect resembling the cause.  That is, the harm done to the image of the person, the cause, is 
emulated in the harm done to the person, the effect – similia similibus curantur.   However, this 
type of emulation belongs to both similarity and contact; therefore it is the aspect of sympathy 
proper.  Both the Law of Contact and the Law of Similarity depend for their outcome on the effect 
resembling the cause.   
 
Further, similia similibus curantur, Mauss suggests, bring us face to face with the law of 
opposition.  Mauss contends that when like cures like “what we have in fact is the opposite”. 
(Mauss 1970, 71)   
 
The sterilizing knife produces fertility; water produces the absence of dropsy, etc.  A 
complete formula for these rites would be: like drives out like to produce its opposite.  
Conversely, as far as the first series of facts involving mimetic sympathy is concerned, when 
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like evokes like it drives away the opposite: when I cause rain to fall by pouring water on 
the ground I am causing the disappearance of drought.  In this way the abstract notion of 
similarity is inseparable from the abstract notion of contrariety.  The two forms of similarity 
could thus be brought together in one formula, opposite drives away opposite or in other 
words could be included in the law of opposition. (Mauss 1970, 71) 
 
This ‘law of opposition’ is precisely one of the stakes in sympathy proper.  Mimesis as sympathy is 
identity and difference, which is taken up shortly. 
 
Analogy is convenientia and aemulatio superimposed. (Foucault 1970, 21) Analogy therefore 
functions with spatial contact of convenientia and the reflective dissolution of space of emulation.  
Foucault argues that analogy is able to deal not only with the substantive and visible similitudes, but 
also the similitude of an endless number of relations.  Analogy’s space is the space of radiation with 
man as the fulcrum. (Foucault 1970, 23)  By considering two examples of magic that use both 
similarity and contact, it can be seen that the third similitude, analogy, neatly accounts for their 
complicated functioning. 
 
Frazer, as more recently Michael Taussig, presents examples of sympathetic magic that operate 
with both the laws of contagion and similarity.   Frazer acknowledges that contagion and similarity 
often function together. 
 
But in practice the two branches are often combined; or, to be more exact, while 
homoeopathic or imitative magic may be practiced by itself, contagious magic will generally 
be found to involve an application of the homeopathic or imitative principle. (Frazer 1923, 
12) 
 
In Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses, Taussig argues that the Law of Contact 
is complicated by the Law of Similarity.  However, Taussig also claims that Frazer’s dual system 
cannot cope with such magical representations.  
However, Frazer recognizes that sympathetic magic often operates with both the principles 
underlying the Laws of Similarity and Contact, so Frazer’s system does not operate under the law of 
excluded middle (either/or but not both).  Hence contrary to Taussig’s opinion, Frazer’s system can 
operate with instances of magic that are both homeopathic and contagious. 
 
The example Taussig presents as an instance of both homeopathic and contagious magic is that of a 
misfired spell, wherein the hoof-print of a horse is used to affect the rider.  The spell misfired 
because the magician backed the wrong horse. So someone other than the intended victim was 
harmed. (Taussig p 53, 1993) The hoof-print, Taussig argues, is an example of both similarity and 
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contact.  That is, the hoof-print is an image of the horse, hence falling into the category of the 
similar, but also it is something that is “virtually part of the horse”. (Taussig 1993, 53)  
 
Now certainly the law of Contact comes into play in that the horse’s hoof has contacted the soil and 
created the print.  One may even suggest that the man, the intended victim, was in contact with the 
horse that contacted the ground and produced the hoof-print.  This certainly expands the 
sympathetic chain. But why claim more than that?  For the hoof-print is not virtually, or actually, 
part of the horse.  What is at stake is the point that “[t]he hoof-print is virtually part of the horse and 
at the same time it is an image of (part of) the horse …” (Taussig 1993, 53).  Then one can say that 
the hoof-print is an instance of both contiguity and similarity.  However, Taussig’s aim is to show 
that Frazer’s two Laws cannot abide, nor even be aware of magic that is neither one thing nor the 
other, but an instance of both.    
 
It is also an illustration of the sort of magic that eluded Frazer’s eye, as well as the eye of the 
anthropology that followed and spurned him from the beginning of the twentieth century… 
(Taussig 1993, 54) 
 
So what are we to conclude when Frazer provides the following example? 
 
But though the footprint is the most obvious it is not the only impression made by the body 
through which magic may be wrought on man. (Frazer 1993, 45) 
 
We can see from Frazer’s example of the footprint above, that Taussig’s claim is false.  Taussig’s 
example of the hoof-print and Frazer’s example of the footprint seem to be equivalent.  Both are 
cases of Contact and “images” as well.  Further, in closing his section on Contagious Magic, Frazer 
elaborates that it was a maxim with the “Pythagoreans that in rising from bed you should smooth 
away the impression left by your body on the bed-clothes”. (Frazer 1993, 45)  Frazer’s “eye” is 
quite keen as the examples show, as is Mauss’.  Mauss argues for the subsumption of both types of 
magic under the rubric of Contagious magic.  Hence, it is misleading to contend that anthropologist 
have “spurned” these complicating instances of magic. 
 
The examples of the hoof-print, the footprint and the bodily impression show the intimate co-
mingling of convenientia and aemulatio in analogy.  In the case of the footprint and the bodily 
impression, convenientia operates as both the print and the impression have been in contact with the 
person.  The hoof-print is contiguous in that it is in contact with the horse in contact with the man, 
so it is one move down the chain of contact.   All three examples share aemulatio in that they are 
 70 
signs of the person. They stand for the person, and hence are representations of the person, similia 
similibus evocantur. 
 
Taussig’s example of the hoof-print highlights a strangeness not immediately obvious in the first 
two.  Analogy highlights the “subtle resemblances of relations”. (Foucault 1970, 21)  The subtle 
resemblance of relation here is the relation of ownership – Foucault’s resemblance as “radiation” 
with man as the central point.  As the horse belongs to the man it is a resemblance of him.  
Similarly, members of a person’s family are in this radiated mimetic relation.  Examples of this 
kind of analogy abound in taboo.  Although Frazer considers taboos as belonging to homeopathic 
magic, analogy casts a light on why the members of someone’s family must engage in the taboo 
rather than the person themselves. 
 
The reader may have observed that in some of the foregoing examples of taboos the magical 
influence is supposed to operate at considerable distances; thus among the Blackfoot Indians 
the wives and the children of an eagle hunter are forbidden to use an awl in his absence, lest 
the eagles should scratch the husband and father (Frazer 1923, 22) 
 
Whilst Frazer considers this and other examples as the “essence of magic” operating at a distance it 
is also an example of the analogous relationship between the person and their family: otherwise the 
actions of wife and child could have no bearing on the hunter.  The taboo highlights this subtle 
resemblance.  What is done by one member of the family affects the other.  Likewise Mauss notes 
the ‘relationship of identity’ between a person and their family. 
 
A similar relationship of identity exists between a man and his family.  It is through his 
relatives that he can be harmed most effectively and it is always deemed a useful practice to 
name them in spells or to write their names on magical objects designed to bring him harm. 
(Mauss 1972, 65) 
 
Finally, even a person’s friends, because of their relationship to the person, can assist with 
destroying his enemy.  Discussing the “curious application of contagious magic” said to exist 
between a wounded man and the weapon that wounded him, Frazer notes: 
 
Meantime the enemy who shot the arrow is hard at work to aggravate the wound by all the 
means in his power.  For this purpose he and his friends drink hot and burning juices and 
chew irritating leaves, for this will clearly inflame and irritate the wound. (Frazer 1923, 41) 
 
So the relationship of friendship is also a radiated resemblance, hence one’s friends can aid in the 
incapacitation or destruction of an enemy. 
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“Sympathy24 plays through the depths of the universe in a free state”.  Sympathy, Foucault notes, 
can spring from contact, but it is also a principle of mobility.   
 
Sympathy is an instance of the Same so strong and so insistent that it will not rest content to 
be merely one of the forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of assimilating, of 
rendering things identical to one another, of mingling them, of causing their individuality to 
disappear – and thus of rendering them foreign to what they were before.  Sympathy 
transforms. (Foucault 1970, 23-24) 
 
This is why sympathy is compensated for by its twin, antipathy.  Antipathy maintains the 
isolation of things and prevents their assimilation  (Foucault 1970, 24) 
 
Because of the movement and the dispersion created by its laws, the sovereignty of the 
sympathy-antipathy pair gives rise to all the forms of resemblance. (Foucault 1970, 25) 
 
Sympathy as the parent of the similitudes always operates with the mimetic principle of identity and 
difference.  In the introduction of Magic, Divination and Demonology among the Hebrews and 
their Neighbours (1969), Davies defines sympathetic magic as based on the assumption “that to 
produce any result you have but to imitate it”. (Davies 1969, 17)  This is certainly the principle 
underlying Frazer and Mauss’ accounts of the Laws of Contact and Similarity.  After all, the whole 
point of magic is to achieve a specific result, an effect which resembles a cause, similia similibus 
curantur.   
 
Foucault points out that if sympathy were not counter-balanced by antipathy, then it would reduce 
the world to a homogeneous mass as sympathy tends toward identity; that is toward the same, 
assimilation. (Foucault 1970, 24)  Antipathy allows the space between things.  Antipathy allows the 
difference between things. (Foucault 1970, 24)  Mimesis as the duality of identity and difference is 
therefore the duality of sympathy and antipathy.  The history of studies of magic has nominated 
magic as sympathetic because of its focus on what is the same.  However, sympathetic magic would 
not function unless difference was also in play.  Hence, Sympathetic Magic is properly Mimetic 
Magic. 
 
Mimesis in Convenientia: The Law of Contact 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life Durkheim argues that there are “sympathetic rites, but they are not 
peculiar to magic”. (Durkheim 1915, 362)  Durkheim considers the application of the term sympathy to magic alone as 
misleading given his argument that magic evolves from religion; an argument which inverts previous understandings 
that religion evolved from magic.  In either case, for Durkheim, the term ‘sympathy’ would be applicable to religion 
and magic. 
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Mimesis as similitude, identity/difference, in the Law of Contact or Contagion operates in two 
ways.  The principle of contact requires that things that were once in contact with each other always 
act on each other, even at a distance.  Convenientia showed that the principle of contact was an 
instance of similitude wherein the “the extremity of one also denotes the beginning of the other”. 
(Foucault 1970, 18)  However, the two must remain two for contact to remain similitude, rather 
than identity.   Difference must be maintained; the one cannot assimilate the other.   Foucault argues 
that resemblance doubles at the point of this ‘hinge’; it is a resemblance of place or situation.  
“Resemblance imposes adjacencies that in their turn guarantee further resemblances”. (Foucault 
1970, 18)  This ‘hinged’ resemblance of place generates new resemblances by exchange; exchange 
is contagion.  
 
In contagion, mimesis operates with convenientia as the site of similarity.  Mimetic situatedness 
generates the dual principle of motion/stasis; the site remains stable such that the transference of 
properties can occur between things that were once conjoined.  Mimesis operating as the 
sympathy/antipathy pairing always ensures that assimilation of the two objects either spatially or by 
complete identification through exchange or contagion of other properties does not occur.   The 
spatial resemblance of bringing together and holding apart is the first mimetic principle operating in 
the Law of Contact, namely that once an object has been in contact with a person or thing it remains 
so even at a distance.  Because of this spatial mimesis contagion between things occurs, an 
exchange of properties that generates new similitudes. (Foucault 1970, 18)   
 
The generation of a new similitude is the purpose of the Law of Contact.  The magician operating 
on the object of contact hopes to generate the property that he has added to that object and to 
transfer that new property to the person.  Hence the magician desires to generate a new similitude.  
Both mimetic moments are required; the spatiality of contact and the movement of contagion.  The 
generation of new similitude – mimesis – is the basis and teleology of all magic. 
 
Mimesis and the Law of Similarity 
 
While generation of a new similitude is at stake in the Law of Similarity, mimesis operates in this 
law as identity and difference in the image/original dyad.    Mimesis as image/original abolishes the 
motion/stasis of convenientia.  No contact is required for contagion, so there is no distance to be 
accounted for.  In the Law of Contact, the mimetic objects existed as such.  In the Law of 
Similarity, the magician not only generates the similitude of outcome, but also creates the object of 
similitude.  In creating the mimetic object, the magician accesses the power of aemulatio.   
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Foucault notes that there is something of the reflection and the mirror working in emulation. 
(Foucault 1970, 19)   
 
The relation of emulation enables things to imitate one another from one end of the universe 
to the other without connection or proximity: by duplicating itself in a mirror the world 
abolishes the distance proper to it; in this way it overcomes the place allotted to each thing.  
But which of these reflections coursing through space are the original images? Which is the 
reality and which the projection? (Foucault 1970, 19) 
 
In Homeopathic magic, the magician is not concerned by the confusion of copy and original that 
troubled knowledge up until the ‘end of the sixteenth century’. (Foucault 1970, 17)  In aemulatio, 
the world generates its own duplications.  In homeopathic magic, the magician manipulates the 
confusion of image/original operating in aemulatio.  Having made the image, the magician knows 
the difference between the image/object, or to continue Foucault’s metaphor, mirror and the object 
reflected in it.  In the mirror/reflection of homeopathic magic, mimesis as the sympathy/antipathy of 
image/original operates so the person and the image become one while at the same time they remain 
differentiated.  Sympathy allows the agreement of image to object and the dissolution of the priority 
of the object over the image.  Frazer argues that the sympathetic function in Homoeopathic magic is 
“the mistake of assuming that things which resemble each other are the same …” (Frazer 1922, 12) 
Antipathy ensures that the image and the object maintain their difference.  Difference here could be 
accounted for as spatial in that the image and the object are spatially distinct from each other.  Yet 
this spatial difference is occluded for the purpose of manipulation.  Hence the magician uses 
aemulatio to the extent that whatever is visited upon the image is also visited upon the person.  This 
is the inverse of the usual understanding of how the mirror and its reflection work.   If one wishes to 
manipulate the reflection of an object, usually the object is manipulated and the reflection follows 
suit.  In homeopathic magic, mimesis as aemulatio allows that the obverse obtains – manipulate the 
reflection and the object is likewise manipulated. 
 
Mimesis (sympathy/antipathy) in aemulatio operates by maintaining the difference between the 
object and the image while at the same time insisting that they are the same. 
 
However, it is not simply the idea of an image which is a work here.  The similitude which 
comes into play is, in fact, quite conventional; there is nothing resembling a portrait.  The 
only thing the image and the victim have in common is the convention which associates the 
two.  The image, the doll or the drawing is a very schematic representation, a poorly 
executed ideogram. (Mauss 1972, 68) 
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Mauss’ elaboration of the image in the Law of Similarity shows that similitude is not resemblance.  
Hence the “something” Foucault refers to in the mirror and the reflection of aemulatio is also not 
resemblance, or at least not only or even primarily visual likeness. (Foucault 1972, 19)  The 
similitude that Mauss argues is operating in the Law of Similarity is the conventionality of 
representation.  Taussig, however, frames the notion of the ‘poorly executed ideogram’ as a 
paradox. 
 
Citing the work of Mauss, Taussig points out the lack of realism in “magically effective mimetic 
images”. (Taussig 1993, 51-52)  The privileging of visual realism leads Taussig into a confusion 
regarding the mimetic nature of magical imagery. 
 
With this we are plunged, so I believe, into a paradox – namely that the copy, magically 
effective as it is, with the point-for-point correspondences of body part to body part, for 
instance, with all this implies for the transformation of the imagized, is not a copy, that is in 
the sense of being what we mean when we say a “faithful” copy. (Taussig 1993, 52) 
 
Taussig argues that for the copy to be magically effective it must be a faithful copy so that Frazer’s 
Law of Similarity will apply.  There are two things to consider about Taussig’s claim.  The first is 
whether, or even how, “the copy that is not a copy” is paradoxical, apart from being framed in this 
manner; and the second is whether an “unfaithful” copy would fail to meet Frazer’s Law of 
Similarity.   
 
Taussig’s phraseology, “the copy that is not a copy”, suggests that magical imagery is paradoxical.  
In fact though, the phrase “the copy that is not a copy” is contradictory rather than paradoxical, for 
it implies that the magical image both is and is not something at the same time.  Further it is the 
application of this phrase to magical imagery that causes Taussig’s confusion.  Or more accurately, 
Taussig’s desire that the imagery meet his “realist” requirement causes both confusion and 
paradoxicality.  This realist requirement can only be for visual realism.  However, Taussig’s own 
work, noted in the preceding section, has shown that the “poorly executed ideogram” does not 
require visual realism for magical imagery to be an effective copy, particularly given the 
importance he places on “breaking away from the tyranny of the visual notion of the image”. 
(Taussig 1993, 57)    Certainly neither Frazer nor Mauss seem to find non-visually realistic imagery 
a problem when formulating the principles of similitude.  On the other hand, by formulating 
magical imagery in such a way, Taussig unnecessarily confounds and confuses the issues of 
mimesis.   
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Representation: The Poorly Executed Ideogram 
 
 
The image is to the object as the part is to the whole. (Mauss 1972, 68) 
 
In formulating similia similibus evocantur, like produces like by means of the proportional 
metaphor above, Mauss contends “similarity equals contiguity”. (Mauss 1972, 68)  Durkheim 
echoes Mauss’ position. (Durkheim 1915, 356)  Mauss’ ability to equate similarity and contiguity 
does not rest on the operation of magic, that is the Laws of Similarity and Contiguity which use the 
sympathetic mechanisms of aemulatio and convenientia.  The equation depends on the relationship 
of “image” to “part” and “object” to “whole”.  This relationship is, I argue, that of the 
representation to the object represented. 
 
Mauss describes how in contagion “a fusion of images is produced …” and “it is the image of the 
thing to be displaced that runs along the sympathetic chain”.25 (Mauss 1972, 66)   Mauss’ considers 
that the “part” is imagized such that it is its image that is transferred along the sympathetic chain.   
That is, the object of contact is represented by the image and the representation is then transferred.   
 
Thus in all cases where the abstract notion of magical contiguity functions, the association 
of ideas is accompanied by transfer of sentiments, by the phenomena of abstraction and 
exclusive attention, and by direction of intent (Mauss 1972, 67-68) 
 
The phenomenon of “abstraction” and “attention”, Mauss argues, also operates in the law of 
similarity.  
 
The mere mention of a name – even thinking it, the slightest rudiment of mental assimilation 
– is sufficient for the arbitrarily chosen substance – bird, animal, branch, cord, bow, needle, 
ring – to represent the victim.  The image is, therefore, defined only through its function 
which is simply to produce the person.  The basic thing is that the function of representation 
should be fulfilled. (Mauss 1972, 68) 
 
Here Mauss emphasizes that the function of the image is representation.  In so doing, “image” of 
similarity can be equated not only to the transferred “images” of contiguity but also to the 
contiguous object, the “part”.  Hence Mauss’ equation of similarity to contiguity is based on the 
function of representation.  The proportional metaphor can also be resolved by representation.  For 
“the image” and “the part” both serve to represent the person.    
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 It is noteworthy that Frazer and Mauss to describe the operation of contagion, use the ‘chain’ metaphor; the same 
metaphor is used by Foucault to describe the operation of convenientia.   
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Finally representation is similitude. 
 
The similitude which comes in play is, in fact quite conventional; there is nothing 
resembling a portrait.  The only thing the image and the victim have in common is the 
convention which associates the two.  The image, the doll or the drawing is a very schematic 
representation, a poorly executed ideogram.  (Mauss 1972, 68) 
 
The notion of “the poorly executed ideogram” will be taken up in Chapters 5 and 6, for I contend 
that writing is ideogrammatic in precisely the same way.  Simply, the only relationship between 
writing as a signifier and that which is signified is convention.  Writing is in fact a poorly executed 
ideogram in the sense understood by Mauss – writing is point for point similitude between the 
object and its representation. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Mimesis: Myths 
 
 
In this chapter I examine two usages of myths of mimesis, in which ‘a mirror that is not a mirror’ is 
taken up as a theoretical device.  The first myth of mimesis is Perseus and the second is Echo and 
Narcissus.  These tales are constituted as myths of mimesis as they highlight the power of the 
mimetically capacious objects and characters within the narrative.  These myths have been taken 
and used by contemporary theory in philosophy and psychoanalysis.  
 
The first instance of mimetic mythology is Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Perseus’ (Athena’s) 
mirror/shield in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1989).  The gesture 
is Lacoue-Labarthe’s acknowledged repetition of Plato’s installation of a mirror in ‘Book X’ of the 
Republic.  This repetition, designed to catch Plato as a “mimetician”, may not have succeeded as 
well as Lacoue-Labarthe hopes, as I shall show shortly.   
 
The second instance of mimetic mythology discussed in this chapter is the myth of Echo and 
Narcissus, Freud’s usage of Narcissus’ pool and elision of Echo from psychoanalytic theory, and in 
particular Kristeva’s uptake of that usage and elision.  The notion of narcissism, pathological or 
otherwise, is somewhat familiar.  However, what is unexpected is who is reflected in that 
mirror/pool of psychoanalytic narcissism. Unsurprisingly enough the narcissistic subject is 
reflected, but it is surprising that ‘the mother’, who is notably absent from the myth, should also be 
reflected.26    
 
Seeing the mother reflected in the Freudian account leads us to Kristeva’s work on primary 
narcissism, specifically the relationship between the mother and her son. It is clear in Kristeva’s 
work on narcissism and abjection that the speaking subject, or more aptly a certain writing subject, 
remains inherently narcissistic, although indebted to the relationship with the maternal body which 
that writing subject abjects.   
 
In tracing Narcissus and the mother through Kristeva we discover that the abject is not as Kristeva 
argues “the mother” nor the abjected relationship to the mother.  This relationship to “the mother” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Narcissus’ mother Liriope only makes an appearance at the outset of the myth to take Narcissus to have his future 
foretold when he was a baby.  
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in patriarchal and psychoanalytic discourse is more adequately accounted for as a return of the 
repressed.  However, what/who is abjected, understood in Kristevan terms as radically excluded is 
Echo.  For Echo’s morphology is pre-maternal, an incomprehensible body and site of the 
writing/speaking subject. 1  
 
In fact the bodies that are abjected in psychoanalytic discourses are the matriarchal archetypes of 
the maiden and the crone.  We might see the maiden as Echo, namely the pre-maternal. The crone is 
post-maternal in that she is no longer fecund and is usually associated with death.  I look at the 
myth of Echo as mimesis beside the visual and situate women’s speaking position within patriarchal 
discourses as Echoistic. 
 
Mimesis: Mirror 
 
This section investigates Lacoue-Labarthe’s use of the fable of Perseus.  I argue that it is the 
installation of this fable that allows Lacoue-Labarthe to capture Plato as a mimetician.  We can 
situate Lacoue-Labarthe as Perseus and, of course, this situates Plato as Medusa.  The first instance 
of mimetic mythology is Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Perseus’ (Athena’s) mirror/shield in 
‘Typography’.   
 
The mirror of representation 
 
The fable of Perseus appears in the ‘Typography’, the first essay in Typography: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1989).  Lacoue-Labarthe’s overall project is an 
investigation of mimesis and subjectivity, or as more adequately discussed in the introduction by 
Derrida, the ineluctable désistance of the subject.  Throughout ‘Typography’, Lacoue-Labarthe 
traces the “typological” permutations of stele in Heidegger’s translation of Nietzsche’s Plato.  
Lacoue-Labarthe’s tracing (tracking) stele27 gives us an account of aletheia as unveiling or 
unconcealment and the idea as the ‘fictioning’ essence of reason.  
 
Something like an onto-stelology sustains, stays or shores up [etançonne], throughout its 
unfolding, the history of metaphysics – and delimits this metaphysics as the space (this 
would nearly pass today for a “novelty”) of “theoretical fiction”.  (Metaphysical) thought, 
theory, is, in its fictioning essence, installing. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 71)  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Lacoue-Labarthe’s ‘stele’ is sourced to the German Stellung  - position. (German Concise Dictionary, Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1993)  So the question of stele is a question of not only of installation, but also positioning. 
 79 
It is precisely Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of mimetic means to catch the mimetician that is of 
interest.  By miming Plato’s gesture of installing a mirror, and the use of a mimetic fable (Perseus), 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s project attempts to show the abyssal nature of philosophical theories, and 
theories of re-presentation.  
 
The three mirrors (which are not mirrors) in Lacoue-Labarthe’s ‘Typography’ are Plato’s mirror 
analogy, from Book X of Republic, Hegel’s mirror (i.e., “speculation: absolute reflection and theory 
of theory”) and Perseus’ mirror/shield.  It is the deflections and reflections of these “mirrors” that 
are being examined in this section.  The placement of Lacoue-Labarthe’s “mirrors”, face to face, 
generates the speculative abyss while the deflected gaze perhaps catches Plato as a mimetician.  
Rather than the mise-en-abyme or abyss that Lacoue-Labarthe desires to generate with his 
installations; the effect is kaleidoscopic, fragments of representations endlessly reflecting 
themselves. 
 
In Book X, Plato “installs” a “mirror” as analogous to representation, at least representation of the 
poetic kind.  Lacoue-Labarthe mimes Plato’s gesture by installing a mirror as well.  However, this 
is no ordinary mirror, but Hegel’s “mirror of speculation”.  We need to understand this gesture of 
installation as repetition as well.  
 
Mimesis, inasmuch as it is for Plato, for all of metaphysics, the essence of poiêsis 
(including, no doubt, “natural” poiêsis), is a mode of installation in general.  For this reason, 
Darstellen means fundamentally “to install”, “to Statute”. And thus it is better to say 
Herstellen. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 78)  
 
Mimesis as installation allows Lacoue-Labarthe to analogize not only Perseus with Plato, but also 
Hegel with Plato, as well as Lacoue-Labarthe with Plato and, I suggest, Perseus.  Metaphysicians 
become mimeticians through installation.  Thus we can say that Lacoue-Labarthe analogizes Plato 
as Perseus.  Hegel’s “mirror” of theory in its specificity sets up the mirror paradigm as the 
theoretical paradigm.  Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Hegel’s mirror asks us to view 
philosophical theory as “representation as mirror”.  For Lacoue-Labarthe, the consequence is that 
theory as representation is a mirror and Plato as theoretician is reflected in this mirror as a 
mimetician.  Is Lacoue-Labarthe’s “Perseus’” mirror analogous to Plato’s “mirror” in discussing the 
efficacy of mirrors?   The chain of repetition is set up such that installation is a mimetic means for 
repeating mirroring, a mimetic means, analogous to theorizing, itself a mimetic means. 
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The peculiarity of the installation of Perseus in ‘Typography’ is that it appears almost as an 
afterthought, somehow superfluous.  Lacoue-Labarthe’s analysis of the “paradigm of the mirror” 
has already occurred; Plato is reflected in his (whose, Hegel’s? “Plato’s?” Socrates’?) mirror, and 
thus we see Plato as a mimetician.   
 
So, why is Perseus here?   Why place yet another mirror in this text?    Perhaps the trick with this 
mirror is to show not only the efficacy of mirrors, but also the trickster as trickster (are we surprised 
to find Hermes as well as Athena instructing Perseus over his shoulder?).   
 
We shall examine the use of Perseus’ “mirror”, prior to looking into Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation 
of Hegel’s “mirror”.  We discover the true efficacy of mirrors and their installation, but also 
something “tricky” going on with the installation of Hegel’s mirror. 
 
Who are the mimeticians? 
 
 
It is worth noting that the installer of the mirror always stands behind the mirror and so does not 
appear in the reflection.  This means that a mirror facing a mirror produces a mise-en-abyme of 
mirrors.  The mirrors only show someone body who is standing in front of, or in between, the 
mirrors. 
 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Plato becomes a mimetician at the point he shifts the question of 
mimesis from “what is mimesis?” to “who is the mimetician?”   Plato makes this move, Lacoue-
Labarthe argues, when he installs the mirror analogy in Book X, Republic.  It remains to be seen 
whether the use of a mimetic means, in this instance the “mirror” analogy, is enough to show us 
Plato as a mimetician.  Or does Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Hegel’s mirror give us this view?  
Perhaps it is the use of the myth of Perseus’ shield/mirror?   
 
Mimetic Means and Mirrors 
 
In the myth of Perseus we discover the mirror’s power as mimetic means.  It is the shield’s 
mirroring capacity, its ability to produce representations that allows Perseus to overcome the 
Medusa.  Does this use of a mimetic means make Perseus a mimetician? 
 
In the mirror of the bright shield he could see them clearly, creatures with great wings and 
bodies covered with golden scales and hair a mass of twisting snakes.  Athena was beside 
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him now as well as Hermes.  They told him which one was Medusa and that was important, 
for she alone of the three could be killed; the other two were immortal.  Perseus on his 
winged sandals hovered above them, looking, however, only at the shield.  Then he aimed a 
stroke down at Medusa’s throat and Athena guided his hand.  With a single sweep of his 
sword he cut through her neck and, his eyes still fixed on the shield with never a glance at 
her, he swooped low enough to seize the head.  He dropped it into the wallet which closed 
around it.  He had nothing to fear from it now.  But the other Gorgons had awakened and, 
horrified at the sight of their sister slain, tried to pursue the slayer.  Perseus was safe; he had 
on the cap of darkness and they could not find him. (Hamilton 1942, 145-46) 
 
 
Above is the climactic scene of the fable of Perseus.  Perseus uses Athena’s shield to look at 
Medusa so that he can behead her and avoid being turned to stone in the process.  Medusa’s 
capacity to turn people into stone, namely representational likeness of themselves, makes her a 
mimetician.  The shield is used in two ways to overcome Medusa.  It is used to reflect Medusa and 
deflect Perseus’ gaze.  So the shield is both weapon and protection.  Reflection, the ability to 
produce images or represent or make likenesses, shows the shield as a mirror.  The mimetically 
capacious mirror/shield is used as a weapon.  Further, the mirror/shield is used to deflect Perseus’ 
gaze.  Perseus is unable to look at Medusa or he will become a likeness of himself, however he is 
able to look at the reflection/representation of Medusa.  By gazing at this likeness, rather than 
directly at Medusa, Perseus overcomes her, while at the same time protecting himself from 
Medusa’s mimetic capabilities.  So mimesis is used to overcome mimesis. Or more accurately a 
mimetically capacious object is used to overcome a mimetician.  Why does Perseus not merely 
show Medusa her own reflection rather than beheading her? Perhaps one cannot kill a mimetician 
directly by a mimetic means.  That is in this instance the mimetician, Medusa, cannot be overcome 
by her own representation in the mirror.  Can other mimeticians be overcome by reflection as 
Lacoue-Labarthe seems to think? 
 
The use of a mimetically capacious object does not make Perseus a mimetician.  Perseus does not 
make the representation, nor does he make the mirror.  He merely uses (or installs as Lacoue-
Labarthe would suggest) a mirror provided by Athena.  Moreover, he is further instructed on its 
usage by Athena and Hermes.  What is clear is that the mirror is powerful here.  So, one does not 
have to be a mimetician per se to use the power of mimesis.  The mirror makes the reflection.  
There is nothing to suggest that Perseus has this ability.  If Perseus possessed this ability, there 
would be no need to use the mirror.  And not having this ability means simply that Perseus is not a 
mimetician.  The oddity of this discovery is that Lacoue-Labarthe’s analogy of Perseus to Plato fails 
while the mirror analogy holds.  As Lacoue-Labarthe shows us Plato as a mimetician, we discover 
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that Plato cannot be Perseus.  However, the mirror’s ability to reflect the mimetician still functions 
regardless of whether the mirror is installed by a mimetician or not.  Plato might suggest that 
Perseus is a Poet but definitely not a Philosopher. 
 
There are, however, mimeticians in this fable.  They are the Gorgons, Medusa and her immortal 
sisters.  Medusa and her sisters are able to turn human beings to stone; the living become statues of 
themselves, non-living likenesses.  The Gorgons produce representations of the living, out of the 
living.   
 
Classic myth made Medusa the terrible Gorgon whose look turned men to stone. ... Actually, 
Medusa was the serpent-goddess of the Libyan Amazons, representing “female wisdom” 
(Sanskrit medha, Greek metis, Egyptian met or Maat). ... She said: “No mortal has yet been 
able to lift the veil that covers me,” because she was Death, and to see her face was to die – 
that is, to be “turned to stone” as funerary statue. ... The Perseus story was invented to 
account for the appearance of Medusa’s face on Athene’s aegis, inherited from the pre-
Hellenic period when Athene was actually the same Goddess (also mythologized as Metis, 
her alleged Mother). (Walker 1983, 629) 
 
It is the ‘“turned to stone” as funerary statue’ in Walker’s account that suggested to me thinking 
through the Gorgons as mimeticians.  I recall seeing an old Hollywood film as a child wherein the 
Gorgons turned the men into statues of themselves.  The Gorgons had the Midas touch in stone 
rather than gold.   
 
In the case of Medusa, the mirror, the mimetically capacious object, enables the victory.  However, 
the battle is not between two mimeticians.  Mimesis as mirroring is used to overcome a mimetician, 
but it does not overcome all the mimeticians.  We are left with two Gorgons who are also 
mimeticians.  Further, I suggest that the gorgonizing ability that Lacoue-Labarthe argues belongs to 
the mirror simply does not.  That is, the mirror does not gorgonize Medusa (Lacoue-Labarthe, p 92, 
1989).  Medusa is obviously able to look at her sisters and not be turned to stone and vice versa.   It 
is the deflection of the direct gaze that allows the victory.  The mirror’s reflected deflection allows 
Medusa to be beheaded.   By using the mirror’s mimetic capacity, i.e., looking at the representation, 
Perseus overcomes Medusa.  But we must be careful to recall this type of deflection does not 
overcome her immortal sisters, the remaining Gorgons. 
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In Book X, Plato argues that Poets produce mirror-like representations.  As I argued in Chapter 1, 
Plato is saying that Poets are not as good mimeticians as Philosophers because their representations 
are only mirror like, that is, at a third remove from the truth of the forms; poetic mimesis produces 
the simulacra. This is where Lacoue-Labarthe comes undone, for from my discussion of privileging 
a certain type of mimesis in my first chapter, we can see that Plato is not arguing that he is not a 
mimetician, rather that as a dialectician, he is a better mimetician.  Therefore, Plato does not need to 
install a mirror to become a mimetician.  And as we can see with Perseus, installation of a 
mimetically capacious object does not automatically make one a mimetician. 
 
The Mirror of Theory 
 
Perhaps it is Hermes, as the god of letters and prankster, who instructs Lacoue-Labarthe to install 
Hegel’s mirror.  For Lacoue-Labarthe turns Plato’s mirror analogy of poetic representation around 
so that we see Plato’s theorizing, the use of the mirror analogy, as literally the mirror of theory, or 
Hegel’s speculative mirror.  By installing Hegel’s mirror of speculation, we are able to see Plato as 
a mimetician and philosophical theory as “representation as mirror”, thus creating the mise en 
abyme/abyss Lacoue-Labarthe argues is Plato’s “real” trick with the mirror.  However, Lacoue-
Labarthe is not immune to the effects of mimetic repetition either, for if Plato is caught in using the 
mirror, why not Lacoue-Labarthe as well?  
 
 
I will take it as read that everything, with perhaps the exception of Perseus, is in quotation here, i.e., 
“Lacoue-Labarthe”, “Plato” and “Hegel”.  Whether or not Lacoue-Labarthe is correct in his 
interpretation of Hegelian speculative philosophy as a “mirror that is not a mirror” is not important 
here28.  What is important is the installation, in ‘Typography’, of Hegelian speculation as “theory” 
as a mirror; a repetition of the mirror paradigm as analogy, not to poetic representation as in Plato, 
but to theory.   The difficulty with this installation, perhaps the point of this installation, is that we 
are left trapped within the representation of mimesis as mirror.  We cannot go beyond the 
abyss/abyme of the mirror within the mirror or the mirror facing the mirror.  Mimesis as 
representation and theory is trapped in the paradigm of the mirror.  Mimesis remains specular.  As 
argued in Chapter 1, Plato shows that there are other mimetic paradigms, beyond the visible, 
specular mirror. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 It has been suggested to me by George Markhus that using Hegel in this way is somewhat idiosyncratic.  What is 
even more difficult is that there is no argument on Lacoue-Labarthe’s part to support the usage.  Perhaps this is a ruse 
on Lacoue-Labarthe’s part, namely we are somewhat in Glaucon’s position. In our ignorance, we just agree. 
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Lacoue-Labarthe argues that by the installation of the trope of the mirror, Plato can be seen as a 
mimetician, as the installation of the trope of the mirror occurs within something that Lacoue-
Labarthe is arguing is already a mirror, namely theory.  It is the installation of Hegel’s speculative 
mirror that Lacoue-Labarthe believes gives us Plato as a mimetician.  It is with Hegel’s mirror that 
Lacoue-Labarthe constructs theory as a mirror by analogy.  Further, the installation of Hegel’s 
mirror is Lacoue-Labarthe’s turn of the trope/mirror.   It is this installation that, in fact, produces the 
deflected gaze necessary to see Plato, over “Socrates shoulder”, as a mimetician.  We discover the 
astonishing “efficacy” of mirrors, and analogies. 
 
So we will begin with our discovery of Hegel’s speculation as mirror, which comes, perhaps, as 
somewhat of surprise.  The mirror appears just prior to the fable of Perseus and at the end of the 
discussion of the ‘“paradigm of the mirror”’, just after our introduction to the abyme.  Lacoue-
Labarthe argues: 
 
It is, strictly speaking – that is, in Hegelian terms – speculation: absolute reflection and 
theory of theory. 
 
But this mirror is not a mirror – or a false mirror, or a two-way mirror.  It is there for the 
mimetician.  It is only a certain means, a trope, for (re)presenting (darstellen) the 
mimetician.  (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 92)  
 
 
From the above passage, it is clear that we are to understand “speculation” in two ways, that is as 
“absolute reflection and theory of theory” and as a “mirror that is not a mirror”, that is, it is an 
analogy to mimesis.  To make this mirror work, however, we have to make the following moves.  
We have to see speculation as belonging to the “realm” of the visible, and reflection as mirroring, 
as belonging to the realm of the visible.  That is, we have to re-perform Plato’s trick with the 
mirror.  We have to place ourselves in Glaucon’s position, and be overcome with wonder at 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s performance/repetition of Plato’s trick.  The placement of the mirror here re-
frames all that has preceded it.  It reflects us back.  We can look over our shoulder and see 
who/what stands behind us.  And who/what is behind us is Lacoue-Labarthe’s Plato.  Further, the 
repetitious installation of the mirror saves Lacoue-Labarthe from having to argue that theory is 
mimetic, which is one of the main claims.  We are to draw that conclusion from the mirror analogy. 
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Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Plato’s trick with the mirror is the re-framing of the question “Who is 
the mimetician?” as “What is mimesis?” which places us in the realm of the visible.  Having done 
so, Plato gets us to do theory.  Lacoue-Labarthe argues: 
 
For, this allows a return to the old established habits, to sure ground where we know how to go 
about things, where to pass, what “path” to follow.  In other words, this opens up “the eidetic”.  
One can then speak of what is seen and of what is not seen, of what appears and of what does not 
appear (or not so clearly), of what shows itself (upright, erect) and what dissimulates itself, of 
what gives itself to be seen as this or that, just as it is or not, etc.  In short we can be installed 
within the visible realm: we do theory. (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 91) 
 
One can suppose from the above that Lacoue-Labarthe is reading Plato platonically, where 
traditionally “platonic” readings have situated Plato’s work within the realm of the visible. It is that 
reading that traps Plato and theory in the realm of the visible.   The flaw in Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
argument is that it relies on the binaries seen/unseen, visible/invisible, appearance/non-appearance, 
etc.  Consequently, “theory”, and we can only suppose Lacoue-Labarthe means philosophical rather 
than “all” theory, or even Plato’s theorizing mimesis, belongs to the realm of the visible.  However, 
as I have argued in chapter 1, Plato’s mimesis is functional not visible and he is in fact arguing 
specifically against this type of mimesis: mimesis as mirroring.  Is this after all not the problem 
Plato sees with poetic mimesis?  Further, if we open up the “eidetic” we might understand 
something beyond this visual bind and binary. 
 
Leaving aside the problem of translation (a mimetic issue if ever there was one), the term eidos, 
philosophically speaking, is usually translated in two ways, i.e., idea or form.  So the eidetic in the 
above is the opening up, entrance to, or theory of the idea or the form.  It is the latter translation of 
the term that I am familiar with in Plato’s argument.  However, neither ‘idea’ nor ‘form’ connote 
anything visual. Hence, it is not obvious that the Forms belong to the realm of the visible—quite the 
opposite.  It seems problematic to say that as one cannot see the forms, they belong to the realm of 
the visible.  It is much the same as suggesting that as one cannot see a smell that it too, belongs to 
the realm of the visible.   
 
Further, as I have argued in Chapter 1, Plato’s theory of the Forms is an argument intricated with 
the exclusion of the poets.  Plato’s reason for the expulsion of the poets is that their representations 
are like mirroring, painting, etc., i.e., visual mimesis/representation of the realm of the visible.  
Plato excludes the poets because their representations belong to the ‘realm of the visible’ and hence 
cannot access anything beyond this realm; specifically, the Forms.  Further, it seems that we are 
also to overlook Platonic irony in reading Lacoue-Labarthe’s Plato, although there are strong 
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indications from the discussion below that Plato is being ironic in using terms such as ‘eye’ to 
discuss the Forms.29 
 
The discussion which Lacoue-Labarthe refers to as opening up the eidetic occurs just after the 
opening of Book X and Plato’s announcement of the exclusion of ‘dramatic representation’ and 
those who produce dramatic representation.  Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the basis for this 
exclusion.  Socrates asks: 
 
‘Can you tell me in general terms what representation is?  I’m not sure that I know, myself, 
exactly how to describe its purpose.’ 
‘Then it’s not very likely I shall!’ 
‘Oh, I don’t know,’ I said, ‘It isn’t always the sharpest eyes that see things first.’  
‘Then shall we start by following our usual procedure? You know that we always postulate 
in each case a single form for each set of particular things, to which we apply the same 
name?’ 
‘Yes, I know.’ 
‘Then let us take any set you choose.  For example, there are many particular beds and 
tables.’ 
‘Yes’ 
‘But there are only two forms, one of bed and one of table.’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘Then we normally say that the maker of either of these kinds of furniture has his eye on the 
appropriate form when he makes the beds and tables we use; and similarly with other things.  
For no craftsman could possibly make the form itself, could he?’ 
‘No.’ 
‘Well now, I wonder what you would call a craftsman of the following kind.’ 
‘Describe him.’ 
‘One who can make all the objects produced by the other particular crafts.’ 
‘He would be a wonderfully clever man.’ 
‘Just a minute, and you’ll be more surprised still.  For this same craftsman can not only 
make all artificial objects, by also create all plants and animals, himself included, and, in 
addition, earth and sky and gods, the heavenly bodies and everything in the underworld.’ 
‘An astonishing display of skill!’ he exclaimed. 
‘You don’t believe me?’ I asked.  ‘Tell me, do you think that a craftsman of this sort 
couldn’t exist, or (in one sense if not another) create all these things?  Do you know that 
there’s a sense in which you could create them yourself?’ 
‘What sense?’ 
‘It is not difficult, and can be done in various ways quite quickly.  The quickest way is to 
take a mirror and turn it round in all directions; before long you will create sun and stars and 
earth, yourself and all other animals and plants, and furniture and other objects we 
mentioned just now.’ 
‘Yes, but they would only be reflections,’ he said, ‘not real things.’ 
‘Quite right,’ I replied, ‘and very much to the point.  For a painter is a craftsman of just this 
kind, I think.  Do you agree?’ 
‘Yes.’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 See Arne Melberg’s discussion of Platonic irony in Theories of Mimesis, and my own analysis of this in Chapter 1. 
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‘You may perhaps object that the things he creates are not real; and yet there is a sense in 
which the painter creates a bed, isn’t there?’ 
‘Yes,’ he agreed, ‘he produces an appearance of one.’ 
‘And what about the carpenter? Didn’t you agree that what he produces is not the form of 
bed which according to us is what a bed really is, but a particular bed?’ 
‘I did.’ 
‘If then, what he makes is not “what a bed really is”, his product is not “what is” but 
something which resembles “what is” without being it.  And anyone who says that the 
products of the carpenter or any other craftsman are ultimately real can hardly be telling the 
truth, can he?’  
‘So we shan’t be surprised if the bed the carpenter makes is a shadowy thing compared to 
reality?’(595c – 597b) (Plato, 1987) 
 
 
I have quoted at length because we can see that in some but not all respects “Plato” does precisely 
what Lacoue-Labarthe argues.  Plato does displace the question, or one very like it, “Who is the 
mimetician?” with “What is mimesis?”   However, we already know “who”, the tragic poet, what 
we need to know is “why”.   As Lacoue-Labarthe also points out, it is a matter of “production”.  
Who produces what. Yet this turn, this displacement, is not the “real” turn.  Lacoue-Labarthe argues 
the following: 
 
Then, once installed in this way in the theoretical realm, an additional turn can be played out 
– and as a matter of fact, this is the real turn: the theoretical itself is placed “en abyme”.  A 
mirror is installed, right in the middle where everything comes to be reflected without 
exception, “theorized” and “theorizing”: the whole of the theoretical realm (the totality of 
what is) in which we have been installed – indeed, ever since the episode of the cavern.  
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 92) [my italics] 
 
 
No doubt the mirror is “right in the middle”.  However, the above passage assumes the theoretical 
realm is not only the realm of the visible, but also a mirror. Certainly in theorizing poetic 
representation, Plato has placed us in the realm of the visible.  This is true to the extent that while 
theorizing poetic representation, Plato is arguing about the realm of the visible, the realm of 
appearance.  And it is certainly also true that in this theorizing, Plato installs a mirror.  
 
However, this does not give us the abyme that Lacoue-Labarthe argues is the “real” turn here, no 
matter what direction we turn Plato’s “mirror”.   What we need is precisely what we have we have 
never seen ‘[e]xcept (empirically) by being two face to face.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 87)  We need 
“strictly speaking” two mirrors and their positioning here is everything.  For it is not enough to 
install a mirror in the realm of the visible and “turn it in all directions” to create a mise en abyme.  
Nor is it enough to install a mirror within a mirror for both mirrors will still only reflect what is in 
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front of them.  To create the mise en abyme we need Hegel’s mirror, and Hegel’s mirror must face 
Plato’s mirror.   And just as Plato uses the mirror paradigm to show the mimetician, Lacoue-
Labarthe uses Hegel’s mirror to show us Plato’s theorization as speculation: absolute reflection and 
theory of theory.  Once again, the installation of a mirror has proved efficacious. 
 
Yet nothing is less clear than whether “Plato” is Hegelian (an anachronism surely), and speculation 
as philosophical theory is a mirror.   That is, whether the mirror analogy of mimetic representation 
holds for Plato regarding the poets or Lacoue-Labarthe regarding theory.  In closing “the Stele”, 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues the following: 
 
If one must become more of a mimetician that the mimetician “himself” (who?) how can we 
ever be done?  Specularization (‘the trick of the mirror”) has precisely this function: it 
assigns to mimesis its means.  It makes of mimesis a “theoretical” practice that organizes 
itself within the visible.  It delimits mimesis as (re)presentation/reproduction, as “imitation,” 
as installation with a character of veri-similitude (the true here being determined in terms of 
the idea and aletheia).  And from the point of view of posterity at least, we know to what 
extent this trick has succeeded: we are far from having gotten over it.  But as regards 
“Plato,” what exactly happens here:  Is the infinitization of the mise-en-abyme, its 
“hyperbolic” character, enough to compensate for the appropriation of mimesis, for its onto-
ideo-logical reduction.  Is the use of a mimetic means enough to conjure mimesis?  Can this 
be the means of all means?  Is it essentially a question, in mimesis, of reflection? (Lacoue-
Labarthe 1989, 95) 
 
We can see from this closing paragraph that for Lacoue-Labarthe Plato’s installation of the mirror 
does a number of things.  Firstly, it makes Plato a mimetician, or more of a mimetician than the 
mimetician himself.  In fact, and in reverse, which is also a repetition, Lacoue-Labarthe displaces 
the Plato’s question “What is mimesis?” with “Who is the mimetician?” by installing Hegel’s 
mirror.  The difference being that in Plato, we already know who, for Plato, the mimetician is.  That 
Plato is a mimetician is not at all apparent in ‘Typography’ until Hegel’s mirror is installed, until 
we are reflected back.  ‘But nothing is too strong here, and all means are permitted in “capturing” 
the mimetician.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 95)  “Can this be the means of all means?”  
 
One of the implications of my first chapter, given that I argue that the theory of the Forms is a 
theory of mimesis, is that Plato is a mimetician.  And as Lacoue-Labarthe discusses in his following 
section on ‘the Unstable’, there is definitely mimetic rivalry at play here.  Hence we need two 
mimeticians and competing types of mimesis. However, for Lacoue-Labarthe argument requires 
that we see the installation of a mirror as enough to make one a mimetician.   This means, given that 
the tale of Perseus is one of the frames for this discussion, that because Perseus uses a mirror to 
overcome Medusa, he too is a mimetician.   
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However, this seems less plausible.  For it is a matter of “know-how” and we know that Perseus at 
least required instruction.  Plato requires no instruction though, as he installs the mirror.  However, 
it is not this mirror per se that shows us Plato.  Plato is not seen in his own mirror; rather it is 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Hegel’s mirror that gives us this view.  It is necessary that there 
be two mirror’s in this text, Plato’s mirror paradigm of poetic mimesis, and philosophical theory as 
representation as mimesis as mirror. 
 
Further, in the above; “specularization” assigns to mimesis its means.  Does it?  One would think 
rather that Lacoue-Labarthe’s repetition of Plato’s trick with the mirror/analogy assigns mimesis as 
specularization, that is, speculation (theory of theory) as a specular mirror, as analogy.  And it is 
this repetition that makes of mimesis a “theoretical” practice that organizes itself within the visible.  
This is not to argue however, that mimesis is not a theoretical practice, a question which is 
discussed in the following chapter.  Rather, as I have argued it suggests the choice of analogies of 
mimesis situates it in the realm of the visible.  And certainly Plato situates poetic representation in 
this realm by his installation of the mirror.  However, it is Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of Hegel’s 
mirror that consigns “all” theory, not just “a” theory of mimesis to that realm.  Hence he concludes 
“(re)presentation/reproduction as imitation with the character of veri-similitude, etc”.  
 
However, the problem that Lacoue-Labarthe finds with Plato’s mirror paradigm is repeated in his 
repetition of the Platonic installation of “the mirror”.  This is Lacoue-Labarthe’s second point, “it 
assigns to mimesis its means”.  That is, Lacoue-Labarthe consigns representation as mimesis to the 
mirror.  And in repeating one of Plato’s tricks, Lacoue-Labarthe (re)consigns mimesis as mirroring.  
The repetition of the “trick with the mirror” inverts Plato’s “What is mimesis?” to “Who is the 
mimetician?” leaving us to wonder once again “What is mimesis?”  Does it belong to the realm of 
the visible, is the mirror analogy as efficacious as it appears? 
 
We are left to ponder if it is not the choice of analogy and metaphor, rather than theory that ‘makes 
of mimesis a “theoretical” practice that organizes itself within the visible’.  I will argue in the 
Chapter 5, Mimesis: Writing, that theoretical practices, although mimetic, are well be beyond the 
realm of the visible, and therefore mirrors.  For example, arguing that the Forms are functionally 
mimetic of the particulars seems to suggest that speculation can go beyond the specular.  
 
Finally, although Plato considers poetic representation as mimesis as imitation, this does not mean 
that Plato considers all mimesis or even all representation as such.  And if we recall Book III, not 
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even all poets are banished from the Republic, although undoubtedly those who remain must be of 
the right kind.  Indeed for Lacoue-Labarthe to argue for mimetic rivalry in Plato he must consider 
that there are at least some forms of representative mimesis that are not debased by Plato as mere 
imitation.  We might consider answering one of Lacoue-Labarthe’s final questions: “Is the use of a 
mimetic means enough to conjure mimesis?”  If what is meant here by “mimetic means” is the 
installation of a mirror or even the repetition of this installation, I suggest not.  What it does is 
consign mimesis as representation, including theory, to the mirror.  This means can be used to 
reflect mimeticians, as the installation of Perseus’s, Plato’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s “mirrors” have 
shown.  But we are left with the questions that “catching the mimetician” by repetition and 
installation have not answered.  We are left with Plato’s turn of the mirror “What is mimesis?”   
And further, is mimesis as representation beyond the visible, beyond reflection, and beyond the 
mirror?   So it would seem that in this case at least, the use of a mimetic means is not enough to 
conjure mimesis.  (I keep thinking of the sorcerer’s apprentice here.) 
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Mimesis: Psychoanalysis 
 
Freudian Psychoanalysis uses the myth of Narcissus’ entrapment by the mirror/pool to theorize not 
only a pathological narcissism but also a particular subjectivity. For Freud, this subjectivity is the 
subjectivity of every-man.  Freud bases his understanding of the subjectivity of every man on his 
conceptualization of the id and primary narcissism.  What we will see in the mirror/pool of Freud’s 
primary narcissism shows us not only the self, which one expects of narcissism, but also the mother.  
 
I ask the question “what is the mother doing in a theory of Narcissism?”  For surely who Narcissus 
sees is himself.  However, as we trace her reflection it becomes apparent that the mother is the 
“object of desire”.   Further, the mother necessarily inflects (or infects) the Oedipus complex.  For if 
the mother (or substitutes for her) is not the object of desire, then the Oedipus complex, with its 
incestuous and patricidal structure, collapses.  Hence, the mother is necessary to the theory of 
Narcissism such that she is later a primary figure in the Oedipus complex.  We can say then that 
Narcissism is already Oedipal. 
 
Notably, Echo is absent from psychoanalytic discourse, which is passing strange for something 
known as the talking cure.  Perhaps she is rejected by this discourse as a repetition of her rejection 
by Narcissus in the myth.  So finally, at the end of this section, I examine the elision of Echo from 
Freudian theory and the Kristevan uptake of Narcissism.  I reread Kristeva’s theorizing through the 
myth of Echo.  What we see is that Freudian theory is Narcissistic in the pathological sense of being 
trapped by the image of the self. Further, women’s, in this particular instance Kristeva’s, theoretical 
speaking position within patriarchal discourse is Echoistic. I am thinking here especially of Joan 
Scott's (Scott, 2002) notion of Echo in ‘Feminist Reverberations’ as a distorting reverberation and 
rebounding.  Scott’s notion of echoism differs from the psychoanalytic notion of echolalia, which is 
the autistic reiteration of others, words and behaviours.   
 
 
Freud and Narcissus 
 
The myth of Echo and Narcissus is an account of rejection and unrequited love – Echo’s rejected 
and unrequited love for Narcissus and Narcissus’s impossibly unrequited love for his image in the 
mirror/pool.  In both cases, unrequited love causes the protagonist’s death and transformations.  
Narcissus becomes a flower living on the borders of ponds, and being reflected in them.  Echo 
becomes an iterative disembodied voice.  The Freudian account of Narcissism is not an account of 
 92 
unrequited love however.  Rather it is an account of the very possibility and basis of love.  Hence 
we firstly examine the “original” myth as recounted by Ovid. 
 
Ovid’s Echo and Narcissus 
 
Narcissus is the son of the river nymph, Liriope, and the river, Cephisus.  The infant Narcissus was 
so perfect that everyone who saw him, loved him. Liriope took Narcissus to visit the prophet 
Tiresias, who foretold that Narcissus would live to old age “if he does not come to know himself”. 
(Ovid 1955)  By the time Narcissus was sixteen he had rejected all those who had fallen in love 
with him.   
 
One day Narcissus was seen by Echo, who also fell in love with him.  Echo was cursed by Juno to 
repeat the last words spoken.  Therefore, to make overtures to Narcissus, she had to wait until he 
had spoken and repeat his words. 
 
Becoming lost one day, Narcissus called out for his companions, ‘Is there anybody here?’ Echo 
answered: ‘Here!’   Looking around in astonishment he shouted ‘Come!’ and Echo responded 
likewise.  Finally Narcissus called “Come here and let us meet!”’ Echo joyously responded ‘Let us 
meet!’ came out of hiding, ‘and made to throw her arms around the neck she loved’.  However, 
Narcissus fled from her saying the he would rather die than be touched by Echo.  Scorned by 
Narcissus, Echo hid herself.   Yet, Echo’s love for Narcissus remained along with the pain of his 
rejection.  In grief she finally withered away until only her voice remained.   
 
Eventually one of Narcissus’ spurned admirers asked Nemesis30 to have Narcissus love and be 
spurned as they all had been.  Nemesis responded to the prayer. 
 
Seeking to quench his thirst in an immaculate pool, Narcissus became enchanted by the beautiful 
reflection he saw.  Narcissus fell in love with that reflection.  (Ovid 1955) Initially, Narcissus is 
deceived that the image is someone else, but eventually he understands that it is his own reflection 
that he loves.  Being unable to attain his love or to have it requited, Narcissus begins to grieve and 
pine away.  Although Echo is still angry with Narcissus’ treatment of her, she takes pity on him.  As 
often as Narcissus sighed ‘alas’ she would respond ‘alas’.  When he said his final ‘farewell’ she 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 ‘Ovid called Nemesis “the Goddess who abhors boastful words,” because she brought all kings and heroes down to 
destruction in the end, no matter how arrogant they might become.’ (Walker 1983, 721) 
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responded ‘farewell’.   On his death, Narcissus was transformed into a flower.   The prophet 
Tiresias’ reputation was assured. 
 
Freud and Narcissism 
 
Freud’s theories of narcissism and primary narcissism are based on this myth.  One of the features 
of the theory of narcissism that ties it to the myth is that there is no theory of echoism in the 
Freudian opus.  So like Narcissus of the myth Freudian and psychoanalytic discourse rejects/elides 
Echo from its space.  In Kristeva’s terms we can understand Echo as the abject, the “radically 
excluded” that “draws me towards the place where meaning collapses”. (Kristeva 1982)   
 
The “abject” is usually understood in Kristevan terms as the rejection of the relationship of the child 
with the mother.  However, despite Kristeva’s protestations the mother is not abjected from Freud’s 
Primary Narcissism or from the Oedipus complex.  So Kristeva’s notion of the abject mother does 
not apply to Freudian theory. The relationship to the mother, although denied or repressed in 
patriarchal and psychoanalytic discourses, is not as radically excluded (abjected) as the possibility 
of a relationship with the non or pre-maternal body of the speaking subject of Echo.  That is, Echo’s 
non-maternality is what is abjected.  We shall return to Echo and abjection after examining Freud’s 
narcissism for we know that Narcissus and indeed Narcissism do not abject the mother.  
 
The Psychic Space of Primary Narcissism: The Id 
 
Freud divided the subject into three – the id, the ego and the super-ego.31  The id is the psychic 
space of primary narcissism, the relationship between the infant and its mother.   
 
The id is governed by the primary process of the Pleasure Principle and is the seat of the instincts.  
Freud claims that the aim of the instincts is the quiescence of the instinct.  Although the id is with 
us throughout our lives, it precedes both the ego and the super-ego. It is with us from birth, even 
prior to birth. The id provides all the energies for object cathexes to the subject.   Further, the 
energy of the id can be displaced from one object to another. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 More accurately Bettelheim argues that Freud did not wish psychoanalysis to become the province of the medical 
profession and its love of obscure terminology.  “Whenever Freud thought it possible, he tried to communicate his new 
ideas in the most common terms, words that his readers had used since childhood”.  (Bettelheim 1983, 9) The 
translation of the Freudian corpus into English, Bettelheim argues, covers over Freud’s innate and theoretical 
humanism.  Even the term psychoanalysis looses its meaning as a taking apart of the soul. (Bettelheim 1983,13)  Hence 
for Freud it would be more accurate to say that the psychoanalytic terms ego, id and super-ego, are actually the I, the It 
and the above I. (Bettelheim 1983, 72) 
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In A Primer of Freudian Analysis (1979) Hall argues that as well as sensory and motor systems, the 
individual for Freud has a perceptual system.  This perceptual system forms mental pictures or 
representations of objects that are preserved as memory traces.  These memory traces bring our past 
into our present.  The primary process attempts to discharge tension by establishing an “identity 
perception”.  Hall argues that by identity perception “Freud meant that the id considers the memory 
image to be identical with the perception itself”. (Hall 1979, 25)   
 
Laplanche and Pontalis argue that for Freud, the death instinct is “the fundamental tendency of 
every living being to return to the inorganic state”.(Pontalis 1988) Hence, Freud is able to maintain 
that we all die from internal causes. As with all Freud’s dualisms the “death instinct” has as its 
complement “life instinct”.   Laplanche and Pontalis point out that “Freud looks upon these new 
instincts as the instincts par excellence, in that they typify the repetitive nature of instincts in 
general”. (Pontalis 1988) The libido is opposed to the destructive nature of the death instinct and its 
aim is to render it innocuous.  To do so, the libido diverts “that instinct to a great extent outwards 
… towards objects in the external world”. (Pontalis 1988)   
 
Freud’s Narcissus: Narcissism and Primary Narcissism 
 
This is the pattern of all primordial Creation Legends: the self created Mother who gives 
birth to her Son/Lover, from which the initial polarity of all manifestation springs. (Farrar 
1987, 9)  
 
I cannot suggest at what point in this process of development a place is to be found for the 
great mother-goddesses, who may perhaps in general have preceded the father-gods. (Freud 
1950, 185) 
 
The myth of Echo and Narcissus gives us two accounts of mimetically capacious objects – Echo’s 
voice as echo and Narcissus’ visually mimetic pool/mirror.  Narcissus is trapped by the mimetic 
mirror/pool, and Echo’s mimetic voice traps her in repetition of another’s words. However, what we 
see in the Freudian mirror is (always) Narcissus, but not only Narcissus.  In ‘On Narcissism: An 
Introduction’(ON from now on)  The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud Vol. 14 67-73 Freud lays out his theory of love, the libido theory.  In so doing 
Freud distinguishes between two kinds of love – narcissistic and anaclitic.  Freud argues that the 
object of desire in primary narcissism is the mother.  Further, Freud argues that one of the objects of 
desire in anaclisis is the mother or substitutes for her.  This means that love is mimetic.    Hence, 
Freud’s anaclitic love remains narcissistic and situates the mother in his narcissian mirror. She 
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certainly is not part of Narcissus’ mythological reflection.  As Freud bases his theory of “love” on 
this myth, does he in the final analysis, get caught in the mirror?32   
 
From the outset of the lecture ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’, Freud asserts that narcissism is a 
part of normal “human sexual development”.  This shifts narcissism from the domain of pathology 
to the realm of usual human development.  In ON, Freud explores narcissism and anaclisis, and lays 
out his libido theory.   
 
…[F]inally it seems probable that an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be 
described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a 
place in the regular course of human sexual development.  (Freud 1953-74, 65) 
 
 
Kristeva suggests in Tales of Love (Kristeva 1987) that Freud offers a “massive nothing” in relation 
to women.  However, mothers or the mother are integral to psychoanalysis.  Here is a woman upon 
whom the theory is dependent as the object of desire and the very possibility of love, mimetic love, 
as the object of love is a substitute for the mother.  Further, as the object of desire in primary 
narcissism, anaclisis and the Oedipus complex, we can see the mother as a return of the repressed.  
Ergo Freud offers at least something in relation to women as mothers (misguidedly or not). 
 
Toward the end of his explanation of the libido theory in ON, Freud distinguishes between 
narcissistic love and anaclitic love in the following way. 
 
A person may love:- 
(1)  According to the narcissistic type: 
 
(a) what he himself is (i.e. himself) 
(b) what he himself was 
(c) what he himself would like to be 
(d) someone who was once part of himself 
 
 
(2)  According to the anaclitic (attachment) type: 
(a) the woman who feeds him 
(b) the man who protects him  
and the succession of substitutes who take their place. (Standard Edition Vol. 14 1985, 
84) 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Narcissus’ mother Liriope appears only once and that is at the outset of the myth.  Her importance is only that she 
takes Narcissus to have his future foretold. 
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Notably, the distinction between narcissistic and anaclitic love rests on the object of desire.  Love of 
the narcissistic type is for the self, while anaclitic love appears to belong to objects beyond the self, 
‘the woman who feeds him’ and ‘the man who protects him’ and their substitutes.  However, ‘the 
man who protects him’ does not arise more than this one instance in ON. What remains as the 
external object of anaclitic desire, is “(a) the woman who feeds him” and the succession of 
substitutes that take her place.  Let me suggest that “substitute” here be understood as mimetic.  In 
excluding (b) from anaclitic love, Freud resituates anaclitic love in the state of primary narcissism.   
 
We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects – himself and the woman who 
nurses him – and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which 
may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object choice. (Standard 
Edition 1953-74, 81-81) 
 
It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child’s 
original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual 
object. (Standard Edition 1953-74, 82) 
 
 
At the outset of ON it seemed that the object of desire of narcissistic love was the self. However, 
the above two quotes make it clear that even in Freud’s first type of love, narcissistic love, the 
mother is the sexual object.  Hence the objects of desire in primary narcissism or narcissistic love 
are the self and the mother.  Further, the object of desire for the male child in anaclitic love remains 
the mother, or substitutes for her.  Hence love for the male child and the man he will later become is 
a matter of mimesis. 
 
It remains clear that for Freud, anaclitic desire remains with the male.  There is one instance though 
in which “even … narcissistic women, whose attitude towards men remains cool” (Standard Edition 
1953-74, 83) can develop “complete object choice”, that is, anaclitic love, namely, when they have 
a child.  The woman eludes narcissism by becoming a mother.  That is she eludes narcissism by the 
mimetic gesture of becoming a mother, namely the object of desire.  We can see that love for both 
the male and the female relies on a mimetic movement. 
 
Return of the Repressed Matriarchal Mythology   
 
At the outset of this section I used two quotes, one by Farrar and one by Freud to situate us in what 
can only be described as Freud’s returning the repressed matriarchal mythology which has as its 
foundation the Mother/Son dyad. 
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Freud says that there are fundamental differences in the object choices of the male and female sexes 
but “[c]omplete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male”.  
Hence, the dyad mother/child becomes mother/son almost immediately.  Yet, as we saw above, for 
Freud, women are or remain essentially narcissistic in their desire but may escape by the mimetic 
gesture of becoming mothers.  This leaves us with two possible objects of desire for anaclitic love.  
In the case of the male it is the mother substitute and in the case of the female, it is to become the 
mother.  Therefore, for Freud, anaclitic love is the province of men and mothers.  What remains of 
anaclisis in both cases is the mother/child dyad; which, of course, in phallocentric discourse is 
necessarily the mother/son dyad. 
 
The quotes at the outset of this section align Freud’s narcissistic anaclisis with a return of repressed 
matriarchal mythology, for that is the site of the mother/son dyad, not the myth of Echo and 
Narcissus.  Where the myth and the theory differ markedly is in the choice of love-object.  While 
the myth only posits Narcissus as his own object of desire, Freud’s theories of primary narcissism 
and anaclisis posit “the mother” and mimetic substitutes for her as objects of desire.  Hence, even if 
the male develops anaclitic love, the external object of desire is not dissimilar to the object of desire 
of primary narcissism.  Therefore, although Freud attempts a distinction between the two, anaclisis 
remains essentially narcissistic.  Even though there is mention of “the father who protects him”,33 
this object is not seen or heard of again in the theory. The question is “what is the mother doing in a 
theory of narcissism?”  The answer I propose is that Narcissus is Oedipus.  For, if narcissism is not 
oedipal, then psychoanalysis’ two founding narratives crumble. 
 
Narcissus as Oedipus 
 
The two narratives subtending psychoanalytic discourse are the myth of Narcissus and Sophocles’ 
play Oedipus Rex.  In asking the question “what is the mother (and mimetic substitutes for her) 
doing in Freud’s theory of Narcissism?” we discover that what Freud shows us in Narcissus’ mirror 
is Narcissus metamorphosed as Oedipus.    
 
We recall that in the myth, Narcissus’ mother Liriope is peripheral to the action; she is not an object 
of desire.  In the preceding section I argued that the object of desire in Freudian narcissism is the 
mother (and one’s self). The other site of desire for the mother in Freudian theory is the Oedipus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Kristeva will attempt to make much of this “imaginary father” as she calls it. (Kristeva 1987, 41)  This “not I” of the 
imaginary father is the site wherein the ego attempts to “come into being”. (Kristeva p 41,1987)   But what we really 
have here is Freud’s father as ego ideal to complete the Oedipal triad.  No father, imaginary or otherwise, no Oedipus 
complex.  Whether the father is necessary to ego formation is entirely another matter and not within the scope of this 
thesis. 
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complex.  I argue that Narcissism (primary or otherwise) is already Oedipal because the Freudian 
object of desire in both theories is the mother. 
 
From Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex we learn that Oedipus was fated to kill his Father and marry his 
mother.  In the Oedipus complex, fate and act are transmuted to desire.  The two desires are 
patricide and sex with the mother.  However, in the Oedipus complex, the Father interdicts both 
these desires. 
 
(1) At a very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his mother … until the 
boy’s sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more intense and his father is perceived 
as an obstacle to them; from this the Oedipus complex originates.  His identification with his 
father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father in 
order to take his place with his mother. … An ambivalent attitude to his father and an object 
relation of the purely affectionate kind to his mother make up the content of the simple 
Oedipus complex in a boy. (Standard Edition Vol. 19 1953-74, 31-32) 
 
In the Oedipal situation, the child, who becomes a man, ostensibly desires two outcomes – patricide 
and incest with the mother.  However, at base, the desire is singular.  The wished for death of the 
father is only required because of the desire to take the father’s place with the mother.  If the object 
of libidinal cathexis is not the mother, the Oedipus complex collapses.  Further, if the desired object 
is not the mother, there is no need for the patricidal desires.  It goes without saying that Freud had a 
considerable investment, libidinal or otherwise in the Oedipus complex. 
 
 
(2) Since taboos are mainly expressed in prohibitions, the underlying positive current of 
desire may occur as something quite obvious … [f]or, after all, there is no need to prohibit 
something that no one desires to do, and a thing that is forbidden with the greatest emphasis 
must be a thing that is desired. (Totem and Taboo 1950, 69) 
 
(3) This is the pattern of all primordial Creation Legends: the self created Mother who gives 
birth to her Son/Lover, from which the initial polarity of all manifestation springs. … But he 
was her creation, secondary to her, dependent on her in infancy and mating with her only 
when he became adult.  He was first the Son/Lover; only later did he become important as 
the Father. (Farrar 1987, 9) 
 
In highlighting the desire for the mother (and mimetic substitutes for her) we can see that either 
Oedipus is Narcissus or Narcissus is Oedipus.  Further, the rejection of Echo may well be based on 
Narcissus’ inability to recognize love different from self-love (as pride).  Opening this section with 
Farrar’s account of matrilineal primacy in (3) above, we see that the object of desire of narcissism, 
the mother, echoes matrilineal mythology.  This desiring relationship between the mother and the 
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son is not prohibited in matrilineal discourse; rather that relationship is sacred and exalted. Yet it is 
precisely this mother/son desire that is prohibited in the Oedipus complex.  Hence it is the rise of 
patriarchal discourse as the privileged discourse that appropriates this mythology and turns mother 
son desire from venerated to prohibited desire.    
 
The matrilineal mother/son relationship agrees with (1) and the child’s attachment, “object-
cathexes” with the mother.  In (2) Freud argues that it is only what is desired that becomes taboo.  
Hence, Freud interjects the child’s identification with the Father. The Father interdicts the 
relationship with the mother.  In accordance with Farrar then, the interdiction is only 
understandable when the Father comes to ascendency.  Only later, as Farrar points out, did the son 
“become important as the Father”. (Farrar p 9, 1987, 9)  Without the ascendency or interdiction of 
the Father, there would be no need for the prohibition of the mother as the primary object of desire.  
 
Kristeva’s Narcissus 
 
In Tales of Love (Kristeva, 1987), Kristeva traces a history of amatory discourse.  She begins that 
history in the first instance with Ovid’s Narcissus.  Kristeva then offers an account of the 
narcissistic subject; a narcissistic subject even more complex than Freud’s.  Although in 
‘Narcissism: The New Insanity’ (Kristeva 1987, 103-122) Kristeva reads Plotinus through 
narcissism, it is not the highly complex version of narcissism with which she reads Plotinus.  
Although titled ‘Narcissus: the New Insanity’ it is not this reading that is of interest to me here.  
Kristeva returns to Ovid’s Narcissus for her reading.  Perhaps Plotinus is immune to a 
psychoanalytic reading as his notion of “MONOS PRO MONON” suggests.  Kristeva teases this 
formulation out as being alone with him who is alone.  Obviously this particular examination allows 
for reading Plotinus as Narcissus with the mother nowhere in sight. 
 
However, it is to Kristeva’s revision of Freudian narcissism in ‘Freud and Love: Treatments and Its 
Discontents’ that we need to turn for a psychoanalytic version of narcissism. (Kristeva 1987, 21-59) 
 
Echo: subject to enunciation 
 
Kristeva attempts to bring the speaking body back into discourse by arguing that the logic of 
language is already operating at the material level of bodily processes and that bodily drives 
make their way into language.  She posits that signifying practices are the result of material 
bodily processes. … All signification discharges bodily drives.  Hence, signification has 
material motivation.   (Oliver p xvi, 1993)   
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Butler argues that Kristeva uncritically adopts Freud’s drive theory (‘The Body Politics of Julia 
Kristeva’ Ethics, Politics and Difference in Julia Kristeva’s Writing, 1993, 164-79) and hence falls 
prey to the same kinds of politicized binarism found in psychoanalysis and philosophy where the 
feminine is defined only by/in relation to the privileged masculine.  However in ‘New Maladies of 
the Soul’, as throughout all her writing, Kristeva acknowledges her Freudian (and Lacanian) debt 
and reconsiders the investigation of “drive theory” to include linguistic theory and contemporary 
neuroscience.  Further, by bringing the subject back into discourse Kristeva is not merely iterating 
Freud; rather she echoes Freud and hence goes beyond him.  
 
Kristeva uses “drive theory” as part of her linguistic theory of the subject-in-process/on trial.  In 
theorizing this subject, Kristeva telescopes psychoanalysis, linguistic theory, philosophy, and 
Marxist theory into her “speaking subject”.  This multi-theorizing shows that Kristeva is very aware 
of the historicized ideo-sociological individual nature of the subject of analysis.  Her concerns may 
be expressed as an examination of the means of production of the subjectivity of the subject.34  This 
is not a conflation of theories but a “creation” of a theory that uses all the elements of these often 
disparate discourses. 
 
This is not to say however, that her work is unproblematic regarding women, woman, the Maternal 
and motherhood.  Nor is this section an attempted feminist recuperation of Kristeva’s work.  Rather, 
in situating Kristeva as Echo to Freudian discourses’ Narcissus, I am attempting to show that her 
work on the maternal, abjection and the speaking subject, though ambiguous in relation to the 
maternal and women, does exceed the Freudian and Lacanian accounts of the subject.  Further, in 
situating Kristeva as Echo I enter the debate in a way that does not require that she be situated as 
“phallic mother”, for feminists.  This concern is raised by Boulous-Walker in Philosophy and the 
Maternal Body: Reading Silence. (Boulous-Walker 1998) Boulous-Walker points out that feminists 
may desire that Kristeva “provide us not just with the questions but also the answers”. (Boulous-
Walker 1998, 128)  
 
The problem that I think arises for Kristeva’s writing is not “essentialism”, as some argue, nor is it 
an issue of the sex/gender distinction.  Rather, if we situate Kristeva as a feminist of difference, 
what, for her, do these differences amount to, especially as we are born into discourses that are still 
patriarchal and for psychoanalysis, and particularly in this instance, phallocentric?   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 There is the problem here of ‘retrojection’.   I think of retrojection as the difficulty arising in theorising subjectivity 
(or anything generally), in Kristeva’s case psycho-semioticity.  Namely theory is already (always) theorized and 
projected back (hence retrojected) on to the infant’s body.   
 101 
Although Kristeva’s work does use and go beyond both Freud and Lacan, her semiotic maternal 
chora remains the site of affect and drives, whilst the paternal symbolic is the realm of logic, 
grammar and syntax.  While Kristeva argues that the symbolic (paternal) is perpetually disrupted by 
the semiotic (maternal), does her politics of difference leave us fundamentally where we have 
always been within discourses that privilege the paternal law and the phallus?  These questions 
begin to highlight the difficulty of the female/feminine speaking subject born into those discourses.  
Her position is that of Echo, the abjected subject of enunciation. 
 
In Revolutions in Poetic Language, (Kristeva & Oliver 1997) Kristeva works through the psycho-
linguistic subject.  Kristeva’s “speaking subject” specifically challenges the Lacanian observation 
that the unconscious is structured like a language.  This psycho-linguistic subject is generated 
through the semiotic/symbolic breached by the thetic.  Kristeva argues that rather than the 
unconscious being like a language, in fact, the semiotic precedes language and is its logical 
foundation. 
 
Tracking the maternal through the semiotic and the abject 
 
In Revolutions in Poetic Language (Kristeva & Oliver 1997), Kristeva posits the semiotic modality 
as the site of heterogeneous drives that precede and disturb the symbolic order.  She argues that 
drives, rhythm, and pre-symbolic musicality “decompose language”.   It is at the point of rhythm 
and musicality that we may suggest an echoistic repetition in the drives that disturb Kristeva’s 
semiotic motility between soma and psyche.  The semiotic is a heterogeneous system in flux that 
can be read from the symbolic.  We can understand the semiotic as the un/non/irrational preceding a 
subjectivity constituted by secondary repression, namely language. 
 
Kristeva uses Freud’s notion of “drives” as “instinctual energies”.    These drives are heterogeneous 
with several possible conflicting drives, for example life drive and death drive, oral and anal drives, 
libidinal drives, etc.  Kristeva suggests that the dominant drive of the semiotic chora is Freud’s 
death drive as it is the most instinctual, although why she privileges this drive is not clear.  As 
Laplanche and Pontalis indicate, Freud was aware of the contradiction in formulating the pleasure 
principle as serving the death instinct. (Pontalis 1988) However, the primacy of the death drive 
allows the semiotic chora’s path of destruction, aggressivity and death.  These drives, Kristeva 
argues, operate between biology and culture. 
 
Kristeva distinguishes the semiotic, its drives and their articulations, from the symbolic.  Kristeva’s 
symbolic is the realm of the subject, the realm of proposition and judgement, and positions, namely 
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rational subjectivity.  Kristeva reserves the term “law” for the “symbolic”, which depends on 
language as a sign system and is subject to grammar and syntax.  The difference between “law” (act 
of judgement) and “order” (rules) is that “order” posits that social organization, always already 
symbolic, that constrains the chora in a mediated form of ordering.   Given, as Kristeva argues, that 
the semiotic “always already” disrupts the symbolic all signification has a material motivation.  
Quite simply, Kristeva’s semiotic, with its eruptions of drives, its mimetic musicality and rhythms, 
is the body put back into language.  The mimetic moments of the semiotic interrupt the “law” and 
“order” of language. 
 
Further, Kristeva argues that the drives undergo stases due to socio-biological constraints.  The 
process of charges and constraints she calls negativity.35  Negativity arrests the facilitation of the 
drives, marks discontinuities in the material supports susceptible to semiotization: voice, gesture, 
and colours.   
 
Conversely, units and differences in the material supports mark the stases in the drives.  Functions 
are then established between the discrete marks articulated according to their resemblance or 
opposition, either by slippage (displacement) or condensation.  Kristeva argues that the principles of 
metaphor (mimesis as argued in the second chapter) and metonymy (displacement and 
condensation) are indissociable from the drive economy underlying them.  Genetic programs are 
semiotic and include primary processes of displacement and condensation, absorption and 
repulsion, rejection and stasis.  These functions are the innate preconditions for language 
acquisition. (Kristeva and Oliver 1997, 39)  This kinetic semiotic body, which precedes the 
establishment of sign systems, is connected and oriented to the body of the mother.  
 
Kristeva situates the semiotic as the maternal chora.  The chora precedes and underlies figuration; it 
is a rhythmic space and is the site of the maternal.  This rhythmic space is the site of mimetic 
repetition. After all that is what rhythm is: a repetitive pulsation and repetitive space between these 
pulses. For Kristeva this semiotic maternal chora, this mimetic space, both precedes and is the 
possibility of the “paternal” symbolic.  It precedes both Lacan’s mirror stage and Freud’s Oedipus 
complex.  We can situate the chora in the id, the realm of Freud’s Primary Narcissism.   
 
 
The chora is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is not a sign); 
nor is it a position that represents something for another person (i.e., it is not yet a signifier !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 ‘We shall call this process of charges and stases a negativity to distinguish it from negation, which is the act of the 
judging subject.’ (Kristeva and Oliver 1997, 37) 
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either); it is, however, generated in order to attain this signifying position.  Neither model 
nor copy, chora precedes and underlies figuration and thus specularization, and is analogous 
only to vocal or kinetic rhythm. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 35) 
 
This is to say that the semiotic chora is no more than the place where the subject is both 
generated and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges 
and stases that produce him. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 37) 
 
 
For Kristeva chora is where “the linguistic sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object and 
as the distinction between real and symbolic”. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 36) The chora is spatiality 
and has no “unity, identity, deity”.  However, the chora is subject to regulating processes, gesture, 
vocalization, objective ordering dictated by socio-historical or natural constraint.  These constraints, 
Kristeva suggests, are “the biological difference between the sexes or the family structure”.36 
(Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 36)  
 
The mother’s body becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic chora and mediates the symbolic 
law that organizes social relations.  The “always already” concrete “operations” order the preverbal 
semiotic space according to logical categories.  The operational state of the chora is that of ‘a 
preverbal functional state’ governing the connections between the body, not yet constituted as a 
body proper, objects, and the protagonists of the family structure. 
  
The Semiotic chora: Primary Narcissism 
 
I cannot suggest at what point in this process of development a place is to be found for the 
great mother-goddesses, who may perhaps in general have preceded the father gods. (Freud 
1950, 149) 
 
 
For Kristeva, the semiotic maternal chora is the space where the subject is “both generated and 
negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that produce 
him”. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 37) In Powers of Horror (Kristeva 1982), Kristeva takes up the 
constitution of the male subject.  It is important to understand that for Kristeva, the female 
infant/child does not abject the mother, for that is a form of “psychic” suicide, or even actual 
suicide.  Kristeva argues that to constitute itself as a subject, the male child abjects (jettisons) the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 One of my concerns, indeed feminist concerns, is what these biological differences amount to.  For the capacity to 
have a baby does not equate to cultural understandings and impositions of ‘motherhood’.  As an infant knows its gender 
before it is two it is not clear what can be designated as purely biological difference.   
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mother. Hence, we can see that with Kristeva’s understanding of the maternal chora we are once 
again in the province of the Mother/Son dyad.  
 
For Kristeva abjection is the violent rejection (purging) of that which is not part of the clean and 
proper self that generates the borders/boundaries of the subject.  The abject describes the relation 
and separation of child from the mother’s body.   
 
Along with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates 
me from the mother and father who proffer it.  “I” want none of that element, sign of their 
desire; “I” do not want to listen, “I” do not assimilate it, “I” expel it.  But since the food is 
not an “other” for “me,” who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I 
abject myself within the same motion through which “I” claim to establish myself. (Kristeva 
& Oliver 1997, 231)  
 
To each ego its object, to each superego its abject. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 230) 
The abject from which he does not cease separating is for him, in short, a land of oblivion 
that is constantly remembered. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 230)  
 
‘The abject is that pseudo-object that is made up before but appears only within the gaps of 
secondary repression.  The abject would thus be the “object” of primal repress … the abject 
confronts us, on the other hand, and this time within our personal archaeology, with our earliest 
attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the 
autonomy of language’. (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 239)  This attempt to ex-ist is that of the son 
over-coming, spitting out the mother.  So we can see that even for Kristeva’s abjection the mother 
must be there to be abjected.  Abjection ties the Son to the Mother.  Therefore the mother is not 
truly abject; she is necessary to this developmental process.  What then is truly abjected? 
 
Definition of Echoism in contradistinction to echolalia 
 
I suggest that the exclusion of Echo in psychoanalytic theory is because her love/desire does not fall 
under the Narcissistic/Anaclitic/Oedipal rubric.  Echo’s love is logically and morphologically both 
prior to maternal love and subsequent to maternal love. 
 
Kristeva and Irigaray have suggested (following Lacan on this point) that it is the "murder" 
not of the father but of the mother (the obliteration of her body and the relegation to nature 
of her undeniably social role of reproduction) that is the founding act of Western civilization 
(Scott 2001, 18.) 
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It is not this “murder” I will examine in this section although Kristeva’s suggests that Matricide “is 
our vital necessity” (Oliver 1993, 62); that is, for women to enter the symbolic.  Rather I will 
examine the theoretical omission of Echo from Kristeva’s reading of Narcissism.  Or rather we can 
note that for Kristeva as well as Freud, Echo remains the untheorized pre-maternal body.   
 
In medical terms “echolalia” describes an “immediate, involuntary and senseless repetition of words 
heard, occurring in some types of mental derangements”. (Macquarie Dictionary)  Examples of this 
spontaneous repetition are seen in people suffering from Tourette’s syndrome and types of autism.   
 
Echo’s speech within those discourses is a strange silence.   The strangeness of this silence is that it 
is spoken (written)37 as repetition of another’s voice, hence the medical notion of echolalia.  
However, Echoism on the other hand gives us a way of understanding the repetition as more that 
just iteration.  In ‘Feminist Reverberations’ (Scott 2002), Joan Scott expands the notion of echo to 
include its distortions and undecidable position of the subject of the utterance.  
 
Echo may be a better metaphor than translation for designating the mutability of words or 
concepts because it’s more mobile, connoting not just a distorted repetition, but also 
movement in space and time-history … The word reverberation carries with it a sense both 
of causes of infinite regression – reverberations are re-echoes, successions of echoes – and 
of effect – reverberations are also repercussions. (Scott 2002) 
 
 
For my purposes, Echo represents the figure of vocal mimesis where voice becomes the mimetic 
object.  Echo is beyond the narcissistic speculative mirror and is denied by that particular 
subjectivity.  One may think that situating women (speakers and writers) as Echoistic seals women 
into mere iteration of the dominant paradigm.  However, Echo shows that despite her position 
within discourse, her reverberations bring that discourse into sharp relief while questioning it.  
Echoistic intonation shows that Echoism entails the logic of mimesis, namely difference and/within 
sameness.  If we read Kristeva’s Matricide as repetition and reiteration of Freudian psychoanalysis, 
we will miss the distortions that exceed the patriarchal psycho-mythology of her discourse.  We will 
miss the mimetic function of Echo as the speaking subject.  It is Kristeva’s positing of the thetic and 
poetic mimesis that opens her discourse to the positing of an echoistic transgression.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 There is I think a distinction to be drawn between the writing subject and the speaking subject.  In the speaking 
subject there is the much discussed illusion of presence.  The writing subject is often not present in this same way as the 
subjective I is in suspension, hence notions of “texts writing themselves”.  However, the writer’s approach is “situated”.  
Situated within its discourse (poetry, philosophy, psychoanalysis) and hence the suspended subject is aware of its 
situation.  So the writing subject in suspension is both absent as the speaking subject and present as the subject of their 
discourse (or otherwise philosophers might write poetry and we couldn’t have that now, could we?). 
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Mimesis, in our view, is a transgression of the thetic when truth is no longer a reference to 
an object that is identifiable outside of language; it refers instead to an object that can be 
constructed through the semiotic network but is nevertheless posited in the symbolic and is, 
from then on, verisimilar.  (Kristeva & Oliver 1997, 47)   
 
Kristeva argues that mimetic verisimilitude preserves meaning and with it a certain object.  Mimesis 
and the poetic language inseparable from it prevent the imposition of the thetic from hiding the 
semiotic process that produces it.  The specific operations by which mimesis and poetic language 
corrupt the symbolic are Freud’s condensation and displacement (metonymy and metaphor).  The 
third process transposition (the passage from one sign system into another) involves altering the 
thetic position – the destruction of the old thetic position (enunciation and denotation) and the 
formation of a new one.  Semiotic polyvalence grants that every signifying practice is a field of 
transpositions never single, identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered. (Kristeva & Oliver 
1997, 48)  Here Kristeva is echoing Freud’s transposition from dream-work.  Moreover, Kristeva’s 
transpositions make her work emblematic of the echoing subject/theorist. 
 
Echo: pre-post maternal love 
 
In the preceding section on Freudian Narcissism, I argued that Narcissus (and narcissism) is 
Oedipal because anaclitic desire is based on primary narcissism in which the child’s/infant’s initial 
desire is for the mother.  Reading Narcissism as Oedipal allows that Echo was not rejected because 
she was a woman per se, but rather because her bodily specificity was pre-maternal.  There has been 
a good deal of debate surrounding the maternal body.  However, where is the pre-maternal body?  It 
is almost impossible to ask the question.  Psychoanalytic discourse does not discuss it; in fact it 
abjects it as argued previously in relation to Kristeva’s notion of abjection.   
 
Kristeva and Narcissism 
 
We find Kristeva’s work on Narcissism in Tales of Love (1987).  Notably, Kristeva does not look at 
the mimetic possibilities opened up by Echo.  Echo is for Kristeva as for Freud elided from the 
discussion of Narcissism.  However, Kristeva’s Narcissus exceeds Freud’s in that she uses 
Narcissism to read a history of amatory discourses, “a sort of philosophy of love”.  Kristeva argues 
that love is “[a] hymn to total giving to the other, such a love is also, and almost explicitly, a hymn 
to the narcissistic power to which I may even sacrifice it, sacrifice myself”.(Kristeva 1987, 1-2)   
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How are we to understand a sacrificed narcissistic love especially when Kristeva devotes the 
majority of the text to analysis of amatory discourses?  Is it impossible to separate the discourse 
from the speaking or writing subject?  Kristeva argues that it is as difficult to talk about love as to 
live it as the meaning of love remains obscure. (Kristeva 1987, 2-3)  What in fact, Kristeva 
wonders, is meant by love and do professions of love from the other mean the same thing?   
 
Kristeva considers the two loves, that of the lover and the beloved, to be incommensurable.  She 
argues that psychic love and physical pain can be attributed to a “Narcissistic wound” an “Ordeal of 
Castration,” or “Death unto the oneself.” (Kristeva 1987, 4)  To track love as narcissistic wound we 
turn to Kristeva’s account of primary narcissism which is even more complex and less lucid than 
Freud’s primary narcissism and yet does not escape mimeticity of the myth of Narcissus.  We 
discover that although Kristeva’s account of primary narcissism is echoistic of Freud, she does not 
use her theory to examine the discourse of Plotinus in ‘Narcissus: The New Insanity’ (Kristeva 
1987, 103-22).  Rather her account of Plotinus does not in fact move beyond the original myth of 
Echo and Narcissus; necessarily, of course, with Echo elided. 
 
In her discussion of ‘Narcissism – A Screen for Emptiness’, Kristeva argues that Freud is 
suggesting that it is “not Eros but narcissistic primacy that sparks and perhaps dominates psychic 
life; he thus sets up self-deception at the basis of one’s relationship to reality”. (Kristeva 1987, 21)  
This self-deception, Kristeva contends, is rehabilitated by Freud in two ways – “narcissistic reward 
(where Narcissus is the subject, or narcissistic delegation (Narcissus is the other; for Freud the 
woman)”. (Kristeva 1987, 21)  Hence narcissism, she argues, underlies all our object choices.  
Kristeva argues that the “ubiquity” of narcissism, far from being originary, is a supplement.  This 
supplement is the product of the “autoeroticism of the mother-child dyad…” (Kristeva 1987, 22)   
 
Once again we can see that the mother is all pervasive in theories of Narcissism, as I argued in the 
earlier section on Freudian Narcissism.  Kristeva though does not notice this connection.  Rather, 
she concedes that narcissism “dependent on a third party … logically precedes that of the Oedipal 
Ego”. (Kristeva 1987, 22)  Primary narcissism preceding the Oedipal Ego, tells us nothing more 
than Freud claimed on the subject.  However, the ternary structure of “Ego-object-Other” and the 
ubiquity of Freudian narcissism had caused some to suggest, Kristeva argues, “that nothing exists 
but originary mimetism”. (Kristeva 1987, 23)  Yet, Kristeva argues that this ubiquity “goes hand in 
hand with its being far from originary”. (Kristeva 1987, 22)  Freudian narcissism, Kristeva argues, 
is “caught in a play of rebounds … [it] seems to be a mimetic play that would establish psychic 
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identities (Ego/object), until that play finally, … reveals itself as a screen over emptiness”. 
(Kristeva 1987, 23)   
 
This notion of emptiness Kristeva contends is the “root of the human psyche”.  With this screen 
over emptiness generated by narcissistic rebounds, Kristeva argues that the aims of psychoanalysis 
have changed”.  Psychoanalysis is no longer Freud’s “symptom as metaphor”, that is condensation.  
Rather, she argues, thanks to Lacan it is the screen itself that is the subject of analysis.  Through this 
Lacanian screen “one detects the workings of significance”, the deformation and formation of the 
subject and of meaning. (Kristeva 1987, 23)  “Now we are well beyond anything Freud had in mind 
for his narcissistic subject”.  Further, Kristeva argues that this situates us in front of the “bar” of the 
Saussurean sign, which Lacan only takes up as the “gaping hole of the mirror stage”. (Kristeva 
1987, 23)  Kristeva argues that the arbitrariness of the Saussurean sign, the gaping hole of Lacan’s 
mirror stage, can be understood “from the standpoint of representation”. (Kristeva 1987, 23-4) 
 
Against the background of “linguistic theory and language learning”, Kristeva suggest that the 
emptiness of narcissism is “intrinsic to the beginnings of the symbolic function” and is the 
“separation of what is not yet an ego and what is not yet an object”. (Kristeva 1987, 24)  One would 
think that, given Kristeva now situates the subject against this linguistic background, that Echo 
rather than Narcissus would provide a more salient theoretical device.  Nonetheless the child, 
Kristeva argues contra Lacan, needs the narcissistic emptiness that is narcissism upholding 
emptiness, to signify itself as a child: a child that is neither psychotic nor an adult.  It is emptiness 
and narcissism that for Kristeva constitute the child’s “zero degree of imagination”. (Kristeva 1987, 
24)  The preservation of the child’s emptiness, Kristeva argues, is “identification”. 
 
Identification with a Metaphorical Object 
 
Kristeva argues that amatory identification as Einfühlung (the assimilation of other people’s 
feelings) is a “loving madness that rests upon a strange object”. (Kristeva 1987, 25)  With 
identification as the assimilation of other people’s feelings, Kristeva contends that what is identified 
with is not an object but rather a model, “a pattern to be imitated”. (Kristeva 1987, 25)  This pattern 
to be imitated, Kristeva suggests, ‘reminds us of an archaic reduplication (rather than imitation), 
“possible before any object choice’”.  Kristeva does not explain the difference between “archaic 
reduplication” and “imitation”.  However, both would have to be considered as patterns imitated 
despite unannounced differences between “reduplication” and “imitation”.  It is, after all, a matter 
of mimesis, in both imitation and reduplication.  This non-objectal pattern, identification as 
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Einfühlung, identification with other people’s feelings, Kristeva argues works with the “redundant 
logic of discourse” and “sets up love, the sign, and repetition at the heart of the psyche”. (Kristeva 
1987, 25)   Hence the psyche is also subject to mimesis. 
 
This “becoming as the One”, Kristeva notes, is considered by Freud as oral assimilation, an archaic 
identification linked to the “oral phase of the libido’s organization[.]”  An example of this, Kristeva 
suggests, can be seen in Ferenczi’s notion of “introjection and incorporation” exemplified by the 
sharing of a communal meal, the “sharing of a common substance”. (Kristeva 1987, 25)  Kristeva 
notes the slippage that occurs between introjection and incorporation where “having” (the shared 
object of the meal) becomes “being like”.  Kristeva argues that “having” and “being like”, the 
“incorporating and introjecting orality’s function is the essential substratum of what constitutes 
man’s being, namely, language”.  For Kristeva then the shared meal, the incorporating and 
introjecting of an object becomes, due to the function of orality, the assimilation of the other’s 
words.  With this assimilation of words the ability to “repeat, and reproduce them, I become like 
him: One.  A subject of enunciation.  Through psychic osmosis/identification.38  Through love”. 
(Kristeva 1987, 26)  This ‘One’, Kristeva points, out is Freud’s “father in individual prehistory”. 
 
However, as Kristeva points out, “[w]e know that, empirically, the first affections, the first 
imitations, and the first vocalizations as well are directed toward the mother”. (Kristeva 1987, 26)   
She argues that for the Father to be “a magnet for primary love” identification is “always already in 
the symbolic orbit, under the sway of language”. (Kristeva 1987, 27)  This gesture of subsuming 
maternal precedence under always already paternal law seems entirely problematic.  This move on 
Kristeva’s part is highly dubious, even though she contends that the symbolic, language, the law 
and perhaps the name of the father precede something that is already a precedent; the mimetic 
primacy of the mother.  Always already cannot precede that which is first; namely always already in 
itself. 
 
Einfühlung (the assimilation of other people’s feelings), Kristeva argues, is with a “metaphorical 
object”.(Kristeva 1987, 29)  We must recall that if this is the case then Einfühlung falls, along with 
all other metaphors as discussed in Chapter 2, under the sway of mimesis.  It is at this point that 
Kristeva succumbs to the tyrannical nature of metaphor as belonging to the realm of the visual.  
Nothing could be less clear than this “journey toward the visible” as an apt account of Einfühlung. 
(Kristeva 1987, 30)  The “[m]etaphorical object of love … outlines the crystallization of fantasy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 I will return to the notion of ‘osmosis’ in Chapter 6 ‘Mimesis: Incorporation’ as a metaphor for understanding the 
body’s interaction with language and the world. 
 110 
and rules the poeticalness of the discourse on love …” (Kristeva 1987, 30) For Kristeva, the space 
of analysis provides the space for love: transference and countertransference.  This space creates “in 
the treatment, not a narcissistic merger with the maternal container but the emergence of a 
metaphorical object – in other words the very splitting that establishes the psyche …” (Kristeva 
1987, 31) This metaphorical splitting, Kristeva contends, is the ‘primal repression’ that “bends the 
drive toward the symbolic of the other”. (Kristeva 1987, 31)   
 
Kristeva argues that the analyst is “a metaphorical object of idealizing identification”. (Kristeva 
1987, 32)  This means, one supposes, that the analyst as metaphorical object of love generates for 
the analysand the splitting that generates a psyche beyond narcissism.  This metaphorical object of 
the analysand is subject to the same metaphorical re-categorization discussed in Chapter 2.  Namely 
the analyst is a re-categorized object of love – a mimetic transposition. 
 
For Kristeva all one need do is overcome one’s “morbid”39 identification with one’s mother to save 
oneself from primary narcissism.  It is questionable whether such identification is morbid at all.  
Especially as Kristeva points out “the first affections, the first imitations, and the first vocalizations 
as well are directed toward the mother”.  Once again, as discussed earlier in the section on Freudian 
narcissism, what is the mother doing in Kristeva’s theory of the narcissistic subject?  The mother, it 
would seem for Kristeva, is someone that must be gotten over, split off from the subject to obtain a 
secure, sound, sane psyche.  This differs from Freud’s libido theory markedly in that the mother and 
mimetic substitutes are for her the normal lot of the human subject. 
 
The question of whether Kristeva has really moved on from Freud is answered by their differing 
treatments of the mother.  Kristeva is echoistic in that she distorts, disturbs, and generates a 
dissonance in psychoanalytic understanding of the functions of the mother in primary narcissism.  
In the first section of this chapter I argued that it was Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of the mimetic 
myth of Perseus that undid his theorizing the mise-en-abyme of theory.  Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
installation produced a kaleidoscopic fragmentation of theory or rather the kaleidoscopic endless 
repetition of theoretical fragments.  This endless repetitious fragmentation may be interesting to 
look at, but where after all has Lacoue-Labarthe left us but merely playing with mirrors?  One has 
to be aware of the power of mimetic myths and objects or the result may not be as one expected.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 “It will be noted that the first identification Freud points to is a morbid identification with the mother …” (Kristeva 
1987, 32) 
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The second section of this chapter analyzed Freud’s uptake of the mimetic myth of Narcissus and 
the notable elision of Echo.  We discovered that Freud’s primary narcissism was bounded by the 
mother as the object of desire, hence primary narcissism and even Narcissism were, in fact, Oedipal 
due to the object of cathexis.  Finally, we looked at Kristeva’s work on amatory discourses to 
discover whether she exceeds Freud’s account of narcissism and is therefore echoistic rather than 
echolalic.  That is, does Kristeva exceed the narcissian mirroring such that her work, whilst echoing 
patriarchal discourses, also distorts and disturbs those discourses.  Is Echo as a theoretical device 
beyond Lacoue-Labarthe’s Persian mirror and psychoanalysis’ Narcissian mirror?   In the first case 
it is clear that the Gorgons as female mimeticians escape Lacoue-Labarthe’s comprehension of the 
mirror of speculation as the installation of Perseus’ mirror captures/destroys neither them nor Plato.  
In the case of the narcissian mirror it is clear despite the bitter and justified feminist debate 
surrounding Kristeva, that she is echoistic rather than echolalic.  Her voice, Echo/Kristeva, cannot 
be seen in the mirror.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Mimesis: Writing 
 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (Wittgenstein 1922, 5.6) 
 
 
Writing is not language, but merely a way of recording language by means of visible marks. 
(Bloomfield p 21, 1935, 21) 
 
From Plato to Saussure, philosophy, metaphysics, linguistics and semiotics have argued that writing 
is merely a poor, perhaps even distasteful yet necessary, copy of speech.  That writing does on 
occasion copy speech is undeniable.  However, I argue is that writing is far more than a mere stand-
in for, or copy of, speech.  Rather, writing is in fact a highly refined mimetic practice.  Writing is 
the mimetic practice par excellence. It is because writing resembles nothing that it is able to 
represent everything.  In this way writing far exceeds speech.  Further, writing as a mimetic practice 
is far more flexible than other mimetic practices.  For whilst writing may represent another mimetic 
practice, say a painting or a sculpture, neither of these practices is able to represent say, 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.   
 
Mimesis, as we have seen in preceding chapters, can be, and in writing is, non-visual, where non-
visual means not looking like what it is a likeness of.   The supreme adequacy of writing as mimetic 
practice is that it does not resemble what it represents.  In fact, if resemblance as likeness was a 
requirement of mimetic practice, then many instances of mimetic practice would fail, for example 
any form of visual art that is not realistic.  Writing as mimetic practice is, I argue, similar to 
Benjamin’s non-sensuous mimesis where non-sensuousness is non-visual.   
 
Finally, writing as a mimetic practice is infinitely creative.  For example, this thesis, whilst 
hopefully a copy of what I think, could never have been spoken, ergo this writing is not a copy of 
speech.  In the same way, theorists and authors of every genre from epic fantasy to quantum physics 
are indebted to writing’s creative facility.  Writing makes theorizing possible. 
 
I began engaging with the notion that mimesis is likeness beyond looking like in Chapter 2 
“Mimesis: Metaphor” where Ricoeur’s uptake of ressemblance as the rule of metaphor failed to 
capture metaphor’s functioning.  In Chapter 3 “Mimesis: Magic”, I discussed Mauss’ notion of “the 
poorly executed ideogram”.  I argued that we can situate writing under the rubric of Mauss’ “poorly 
executed ideogram” since the ideogram’s mimetic function is complex representation. Similarly 
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writing’s mimetic function is complex representation.  By writing I mean black marks on white 
paper.  I call these marks scription; Derrida calls them grapheme or grammè.   I use the notion of 
scription to distinguish my purely pragmatic “what does writing do?” from theories interested in 
ontological status of writing and writers.  Derrida’s Of Grammatology is a sustained critique of an 
epoch wherein writing is considered as merely an appurtenance of speech.  By deconstructing this 
logo-centric historical privileging of speech over writing, Derrida shifts the domain of the argument 
from the philosophical penchant for speech as the bearer of presence to writing as arche-writing or 
trace.  I shall consider Derrida’s position in the second section of this chapter.  
 
 
The point of writing as scription is that it stands for, represents, is mimetic of, something beyond 
itself.  Successful scription means we ignore scription in itself, in its entirety.  We focus on what is 
beyond it, what it is a likeness of, its reference.  Scription as writing is more self-effacing than even 
the sign, although it is necessarily a sign.40  There are however, certain circumstances in which 
scription makes itself apparent.  When we are dealing with unfamiliar writing, for example, a 
foreign language or an ancient text, all we see is scription, namely marks, often black marks, on a 
white paper.41  In its unfamiliarity scription becomes apparent as script to the viewer.  What is lost 
is the script’s mimetic function.  We know that it is mimetic of something, that is, we know it is 
scription. What it is mimetic of is no longer apparent.  Hence the search begins to ascertain the 
mimetic object, thought, etc.   
 
Before looking at writing as a mimetic practice we need to briefly consider the history of theories of 
writing.  This thesis undertakes the search to understand the origins of writing as the history of 
scription.  Unlike some of the theorists considered, this historical examination is not a search for an 
ur-scription or ur-word.  Rather it is a tracing of the conceptual developments of writing (scription) 
and the attempts to understand writing when it is unknown to the reader.  There are two things at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!40!Auerbach’s!seminal!text!Mimesis:"the"Representation"of"Reality"in"Western"Literature!is!about!mimesis,!although!his!project!is!fundamentally!different!from!my!own.!!Auerbach!investigates!mimesis!and!style,!namely!whether!certain!styles!of!writing!are!able!to!mimetically!reproduce!reality.!!!To!do!so,!Auerbach!compares!several!literary!styles!arguing!that!some!are!more!able!to!reproduce!reality!than!others.!!For!example,!he!compares!legendary,!say!Homeric,!literature!to!biblical!text,!arguing!that!because!of!certain!stylistic!features!biblical!text!is!more!able!to!represent!reality!than!legendary!or!Homeric!literature.!!What!precludes!legendary!literature!from!mimeticity!is!that!the!‘style’!does!not!allow!the!inclusion!of!the!political,!economic!and!social!situation!of!ordinary!people,!whereas,!biblical!narrative!produces!the!sublime!from!the!common.!!In!formulating!his!‘separation!of!styles’!Auerbach!is!able!to!show!which!‘styles’!are!able!to!represent!reality,!that!is,!be!mimetic!of!it.!
 
41 Of course marks of any sort or colour on any surface meet the criterion of scription provided the mimetic function is 
served.  Hieroglyphs certainly share the mimetic function of scription, however, hieroglyphs are also pictographic, as to 
some extent are runes, so neither are scription as discussed here. 
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stake when scription is unknown to the reader.  One – the absolute understanding that scription is 
mimetic. There is never a doubt in the historian’s, or the linguist’s, or the semiotician’s, or the 
philosopher’s mind that what is being dealt with is language.  This is evidenced by attempts to 
translate the unknown scription.  Second – the failure of mimesis in foreign scription acknowledges 
scription is a mimetic practice. That is, each and every instance of scription is necessarily mimetic.  
What it is mimetic of is not relevant to this thesis.   
 
To understand what is at stake in uptakes of scription, I first examine two historical analyses of 
writing.  This is a purely arbitrary beginning and strictly speaking not where I began.  Beginning 
with historical accounts is merely a useful, and academic, device, for one must begin somewhere 
and history inevitably provides at least the illusion of temporality to a subject that is atemporal. 
However, if historical analysis is efficacious, it is in its tracing, its backtracking of any subject.  But 
this efficacy, this tracing, this backtracking is always inevitably an over-writing.   I will return to 
this notion of over-writing in Chapter 6, Mimesis: Incorporation, where I engage Liz Grosz’s notion 
of ‘literal’ writing on the body.   
 
Having backtracked, I then engage discourses that theorize writing from other perspectives – other 
positions.  These positions are semiotic, deconstructive and/or philosophical. The question posed to 
all these discourses: is writing/scription a mimetic practice?  And furthermore, how does scription 
as mimetic practice play out? 
 
History of Writing 
 
In Writing systems: An introduction to their linguistic analysis (2003), ‘What is writing?’ Coulmas 
argues that writing is “the single most consequential technology ever invented”. (Coulmas 2003, 1)  
He points out that there are at least six meanings to the term writing – “(1) a system of recording 
language by means of visible or tactile marks; (2) the activity of putting such a system to use; (3) 
the result of such activity, a text; (4) the particular form of such a result, a script style such as block 
letter writing; (5) artistic composition; (6) a professional occupation”. (Coulmas 2003, 1)  It is (1), a 
system of recording language by means of visible or tactile marks, that is the focus of Coulmas’ 
text.  His first chapter outlines seven major conceptualizations of writing from Plato to 
contemporary views.  Oddly enough for a historian, Coulmas begins with Aristotle rather than 
Plato, perhaps because he perceives that Aristotle has had the greatest impact on western 
conceptualizations of writing in that Aristotle clearly devoted a great deal of thought/writing to 
 115 
writing as such.  However, this does overlook the significance of Plato as a writer per se, as well as 
his work on language in Phaedrus. 
 
Coulmas suggests that Aristotle’s concern was not with writing as such; rather he was concerned 
with the “complicated relationships that obtain between, things, ideas and words …” (Coulmas 
2003, 3) Coulmas continues that for Aristotle the common element is the linearity and directionality 
between “a symbolon42 and that which it symbolizes”.  Coulmas formulates the Aristotelian 
relationship as follows: 
 
 things          affectation of the soul            spoken word           written word 
 
“Things exist. You think about them, then you speak, then you write”. (Coulmas p 3, 2003)  
Coulmas argues that for Aristotle “[w]riting is not only preceded by, but subordinated to, vocal 
speech”. (Coulmas 2003, 3)  Aristotle’s linear position is attributable, contends Coulmas, to the 
“Greek alphabet, which is said to be the first full-blown phonetic writing system humanity 
developed”. (Coulmas 2003, 4)  Of course, the problem for the Aristotelian account is that with 
writing there is no need of the spoken word at all.  One can simply go from things to affectations of 
the soul, which I imagine are thoughts about the things that exist or not, to writing about them. 
Nonetheless, Coulmas neatly captures Aristotle’s understanding of writing.  Aristotle’s 
conceptualization of writing and speech does not privilege any particular language or writing 
system over any other as Coulmas’ quote from Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias shows. 
 
Words spoken are symbols of affectations or impressions of the soul; written words are 
symbols of words spoken.  And just as letters are not the same for all men, sounds are not 
the same either, although the affectations directly expressed by these indications are the 
same for everyone, as are the things of which these impressions are images. (1938: 115) 
(Coulmas 2003, 2) 
 
We should be aware here that for Aristotle “image” is a visual metaphor for mimesis as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  So Aristotle could be said to hold a mimetic position on writing.  However, this is not 
really the case in this instance, where Aristotle is considering language in general.  What we can see 
from the above is that Aristotle’s position on language closely resembles Saussure’s account of 
writing as an appurtenance to speech. 
 
A language and its written form constitute two separate systems of signs.  The sole reason 
for the latter is to represent the former. (Saussure 1983, 24)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Coulmas points out that although symbolon is usually translated as symbol the term sign is a more adequate 
translation as it expresses greater neutrality. (Coulmas 2003, 3) 
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Where Aristotle holds that writing is the symbolization of words, Saussure holds that writing 
represents the spoken sign.  Clearly Saussure echoes Aristotle here.  Further, “western” theorists of 
language and philosophers have upheld Aristotle’s conceptualization of writing for a millennium.  
This view neatly echoes the individual’s acquisition of speech and writing.  There are very few 
cases in which a human being does not learn to speak – and indeed to speak first.  Hence one learns 
to speak and then, in most cases, to write, in some limited fashion.  There is a clear distinction 
between a shopping list and a novel, in that it takes infinitely greater skill and practice to produce 
the latter.  A shopping list requires only rudimentary skill and certainly does not affect one’s 
capacity to think. 
 
A different position, Coulmas suggests, can be found in the Taoist work of Liu Hsieh.  Coulmas 
points out that although Aristotle and Liu Hsieh share the same elements of linguistic 
conceptualization for Liu Hsieh “writing systems, rather than being conceptually neutral 
instruments, are thought to act on the way we think”. (Coulmas 2003, 4)  This imputes to writing a 
power beyond that of speech.   Thus writing acts on thinking, and hence on being, in a manner that 
speech does not and cannot.  This issue will be taken up in Chapter 6 “Mimesis: Incorporation”.   
 
The notion that writing acts on thought, Coulmas shows, cannot be derived from Aristotle’s 
position, which, as we saw earlier, operates linearly – from things to impressions on the soul, to 
speech and finally writing.  However the Taoist position opens up this possibility.  Coulmas cites 
Liu Hsieh: 
 
When the mind is at work, speech is uttered.  When speech is uttered, writing is produced. 
 The Tao inspires writing and writing illuminates the Tao.  What in mind is idea 
when expressed in speech is poetry.  Isn’t this what we are doing when dashing off writing 
to record reality? 
 Writing originated when drawing of bird trace replaced string knitting.  (Coulmas 
2003, 4) 
 
The similarity, Coulmas argues, between Liu Hsieh and Aristotle is that “the mind at work” is the 
same as “affectations or impressions of the soul”.  However, where they differ, according to 
Coulmas, is that writing “is credited with a creative analytic potential: it illuminates the Tao”.  
Further “the Tao inspires writing, unmediated by speech”.  An idea in the mind is expressed in 
speech, but also in writing that is employed to “record reality”. (Coulmas 2003, 4)  Accordingly, 
Coulmas points out that Liu Hsieh gives a non-linear account of writing; one that allows that 
writing is not “a mere substitute for speech”. (Coulmas 2003, 5)  Further, Coulmas shows that 
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although Liu Hsieh’s and Aristotle’s theories are conceptually different, they both contain the same 
four elements; “objects, concepts, vocal signs and graphical signs”. (Coulmas 2003, 5)  The greatest 
difference is however, Liu Hsieh’s Taoist notion that writing affects thinking; therefore, writing 
cannot be merely a copy of speech. 
 
Coulmas continues, “Plato sensed the unbridgeable chasm between discourse and text, between 
speech and speaker that writing brings about”. (Coulmas 2003, 5)  Citing Phaedrus, Coulmas 
suggests for Plato writing “was just a memory aid”. Written words are unnecessary, except to 
remind him who knows the matter about which it is written. (Phaedrus 275d) (Coulmas 2003, 5) 
One wonders whether Plato is not being ironic with this statement, given the amount of theory he 
committed to writing.  However, Coulmas considers this quote from Phaedrus as indicative of 
“Plato’s day, [when] knowledge and the knower were not separated, as is typically the case in fully 
literate societies”. (Coulmas 2003, 5)  However, Plato, unlike Aristotle or even Homer, wrote in 
dialogical form, that is with characters speaking with and responding to each other, which may be 
more indicative of privileging speech over writing.   That is, Plato’s writing took the form of 
speech, however contrived this may be in the ‘dialogues’.  Coulmas shows that it is the Platonic 
idea of writing as mnemonic and the Aristotelian idea of writing as a surrogate or representation of 
speech that have underpinned Western thinking. (Coulmas 2003, 5)  The same distrust of writing 
also permeates Eastern thinking. 
 
 
For example, consider the Zen slogan ‘written words are useless’…, which protests the 
distance between message and author/reader and the reliance on objectified knowledge.  
Enlightenment is practice, consciousness in action, the Way; it cannot be captured in fixed 
signs. (Coulmas 2003, 5) 
 
 
Coulmas notes however that there is “no consistent Zen view on writing, just as there is no such 
thing in Plato.  In both cases, skepticism is coupled with veneration”. (Coulmas 2003, 5) 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that something that touches the human mind as deeply as does 
writing should evoke diverse and countervailing responses.  There is something inherently 
contradictory about writing, the paradox of arresting the transitory. (Coulmas 2003, 6) 
 
 
I will return to the notion of contradiction and paradox regarding writing.  For the moment it is 
enough to suggest that writing is paradoxical, hence strictly not contradictory. Considering 
contemporary views, Coulmas argues that “[w]riting suggests fixed categories and stability: words, 
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syllables, letters”. (Coulmas 2003, 7)   Marking the differences between speech and writing, 
Coulmas categorizes them as follows. 
 
 Speech    Writing 
 continuous   discrete 
 bound to utterance time timeless 
 contextual   autonomous 
 evanescent   permanent 
 audible  visible 
 produced by voice  produced by hand  (Coulmas 2003, 11) 
 
Coulmas notes that “each one of these contrasts warrants careful investigation…” (Coulmas 2003 
11)  Initially there seems to be little dispute about these categories, with the exception that writing, 
like speech, is contextual not autonomous.  However, closer examination suggests that writing is 
not discrete in the manner suggested here.  For surely the written text occurs in a continuum of 
written texts.  In fact, it is speech that is “discrete”.  Speech is confined to the temporality of 
utterances and the vagaries of memory.  Unless Coulmas means something like the oral histories, 
stories and grammars passed down in Sanskrit and other oral traditions.  But this is not the claim.  
The categorization above is suggested as generalizable.  Coulmas argues that linguistics may 
attempt to avoid these distinctions by suggesting they are “external contingencies of language, 
which linguistics are not really interested in”.  However, Coulmas points out, this line of reasoning 
leads to the conclusion that both vocal and visible signs would have to be expelled from that 
abstract category, Language. (Coulmas 2003, 11)  This position would be as absurd as it is 
unhelpful, for what then would be the subject of the linguist’s, semiotician’s, or philosopher’s 
investigations?  A different historical perspective on the understanding and development of writing 
is needed.  Hence we turn to the evolutionary model suggested by Roy Harris. 
 
Harris: Evolutionary Writing  
 
In The Origin of Writing (Harris, 1986), Harris argues that Greek and Roman writers considered 
that “writing originated as drawing”. (Harris 1986, 4; see also, Coulmas 2003, 193)   This 
evolutionist position is held by Gelb43 and is the basis of “The” twentieth century position. (Harris 
1986, 76)  However, Harris contends, it is the alphabet that “for Western civilization is the writing 
system par excellence”. (Harris 1986, 7) What this conceptual structure reflects, historically, is the 
ethnocentric bias of a European approach to non-European languages. (Harris 1986, 37) The 
conceptual alphabetization of writing sets up a dichotomy of alphabetic/non-alphabetic which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43See Gelb, A Study of Writing 1963. 
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highlights an “ethnocentric bias” challenged not only by Harris, but also by Derrida.  We shall 
consider Derrida’s deconstruction as ethical writing later in this chapter. 
 
In his chapter ‘The Tyranny of the Alphabet’, Harris highlights the problems of privileging 
alphabetical writing systems over all others.  Harris outlines five types of writing systems – “(i) 
alphabetic, (ii) syllabic, (iii) logographic, (iv) pictographic, (v) ideographic”. (Harris 1986, 30)44  
Harris comments that all historical authorities on writing agree that our “first attempts at writing 
were not alphabetic”. (Harris 1986, 30)  Harris notes that logograms “are signs representing a word, 
but giving no idea of its pronunciation”, pictograms are “signs which take the form of a simplified 
picture of the thing they represent”, while ideograms are “signs representing an idea or a message 
as a whole, rather than any particular formulation of it”.(Harris 1986, 32)  My notion of scription 
pertains to all Harris’ designated writing systems, as well as those listed by Benjamin and Derrida, 
which we shall turn to shortly. 
 
Harris argues that a “double” problem exists for theoretical linguistics.  This ‘double’ problem 
occurs in comprehending two distinct relationships: the ‘relationship between language and its 
“representation”’ and the relationship between language and representation of “language in the 
mind of the native speaker”. (Harris 1986, 38)  Harris suggests that ideally “there would be a one to 
one correspondence between the representing symbols and the linguistic units or structures 
represented”. (Harris 1986, 39) 
 
In short, the alphabet and the sound system would be mirror images of each other.  In 
practice, alphabets generally employed for the recording of historical, legal and literary 
texts, in all cultures which have adopted alphabetic writing, fall short of this 
correspondence. (Harris 1986, 39) 
 
 
Writing, everyone agrees did not originate with the alphabet.  But it is the modern obsession 
with the superiority of alphabetic writing, together with our modern misconceptions of it, 
which are mainly responsible for the misleading way in which the problem of the origin of 
writing is usually approached. (Harris 1986, 76) 
 
Harris argues that the ‘traditional dogma that letters of the alphabet “represent” the sounds of 
speech leads automatically to casting non-phonetic writing retrospectively in a certain evolutionary 
role’. (Harris 1986, 76)   Further, Harris contends that little attention has been paid to “theories of 
mimesis and symbolism in Greek antiquity”. (Harris 1986, 80)  Highlighting the work of the ancient 
Greek historian Diodorus, Harris points out that “hieroglyphic writing simply bypassed speech !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 We might recall here the discussion of Mauss and Hubert’s “poorly executed ideogram”. 
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altogether and attempted a direct representation of ideas”. (Harris 1986, 81)  However, it is not clear 
that as a historian Diodorus understood linguistic theory as such.  Nor is an investigation into this 
particular claim relevant to our purposes.  What is pertinent is Harris’ claim that Diodorus 
“anticipated the modern concept of the ideogram”.(Harris 1986, 81)  Given this “anticipation” of 
ideographic mimesis in Diodorus45, we will briefly revisit Mauss and Hubert’s notion of the poorly 
executed ideogram. 
 
The Poorly Executed Ideogram 
 
As argued in Chapter 3, the poorly executed ideogram functions by non-visual mimesis, where non-
visual means not looking like.  That is, mimesis as representation, where representation eludes 
realism.  I argue that for writing/scription, just as for the poorly executed ideogram, mimesis 
functions as representation beyond resemblance.  Harris points out that the ideogram functions as a 
sign representing a whole idea.  Paradoxically, the less scription resembles what it represents the 
greater the possibility of accurate representation.  For example, while a picture may paint a 
thousand words, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus represents Wittgenstein’s thought in a way that no 
amount of pictorial faithfulness can.  Once the notion of visual accuracy, realism, is removed from 
the idea of the ideogram, then we are left with a neat outline of how writing works at the verbal, 
sentential and textual level.  Moreover, understanding scription is not a matter of understanding 
phonetic writing at the level of the phoneme, or the letter.  Attempts to understand representation in 
general, which include paintings, television, architecture, street signs, as well as writing, speech or 
scription, via the smallest comprehensible unit are absolutely doomed to failure.  First, these 
attempts are already grounded within systems that are not based on comprehension of the smallest 
possible unit.  The art critic brings art critique – its method, discourse and history – to the work of 
art as representation: her critique is overwritten by criticism.46  The linguist brings linguistics to her 
account of language: her account is overwritten by linguistics.  The semiotician brings semiotics to 
her account of signs: her account is overwritten by semiotics.  The philosopher brings philosophy to 
her account of language: her account is overwritten by philosophy.  In all cases the theorist is 
unable to escape the theoretical development of their practice.  This theoretical pre-positioning is 
brought to our attention by Derrida’s complex conjunctions of terms outlining practices usually !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Harris does not supply any evidence to support this claim.  Diodorus Silicus was a historian who documented the 
deeds of “great” men up until the time of Alexander.  There is nothing to suggest in the collected volumes of his works 
that Diodorus engaged in anything like an “anticipation” of any linguistic or ideographic theories whatsoever. 
46 Perhaps what makes Art, “Art”, is not only its potential to exceed the rules of its representation but that on occasion 
artists do exceed those rules in a considered way.   This capacity to exceed the rules of one’s representation may be the 
difference between Art and Art Criticism.  The Artist considers and exceeds the rules of her representation.   The Art 
Critic knows how and whether the Artist has done this.  At no point is it viable for the Art Critic to exceed her own 
representative rules – the rules of Art Criticism.  If she did, she may turn out to be an Artist or worse, a philosopher.   
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considered distinct from one another.  Consider what is at stake in combining the terms historical 
and theoretical as historico-theoretical.  A historico-theoretical nomination aptly accounts for and 
describes the situatedness of a theorist not only within her discourse, but also within the history of 
that discourse.  Moreover, the term historico-theoretical highlights, not only theorizing within the 
discourse, but the historicity of such theorizing. 
 
Secondly, representation, as writing/scription, functions at the both the verbal and sentential levels 
in precisely the same way as it functions for the ideogram.  Both the ideogram and scription are 
complex mimetic representations.  Significant representation does not occur at the alphabetic or 
syllabic or, in the case of pictograms or ideograms the linear, level.   Mimesis as likeness cannot be 
derived unless a complex whole idea is present.   For example the letter “m” whilst recognizably a 
letter of the alphabet is not mimetic except as an instantiation of itself.  If mimesis occurs between 
differing instantiations of “m” it is trivial.  Spatio-temporal or even stylistic difference between 
“m”s leads only to other instantiations of “m”.  The same applies to the syllable “im”.  Strictly, 
mimesis as the order of the similar does not occur at the alphabetic or syllabic level.  This situation 
does not apply to prefixes or suffixes for both are complex and fixed in their meaning.  Prefixes and 
suffixes function in the same way as words. Further, mimetic representation does not occur even at 
the level of instantiation of texts.  Simply, any case of instantiation as such, at whatever level, is 
merely that.  For example, it will not change my reading of the Critique of Pure Reason if I have 
one copy or a hundred copies of a specific translation of the Kantian text.  What will matter is if I 
have two differing translations to read.  Which brings us to the final point. 
 
Scription as a mimetic practice is always, and invariably, a matter of reading.  Moreover, a reading 
is also a matter of scription.  This may seem obvious to the post-modern theorist.  What is so 
obvious that it has not been worth considering is that the writer reads and the reader writes or at 
least at some point have done so.  What is not obvious about this is why it is so obvious that it 
precludes consideration.  For even the most trivial consideration concludes that reading and writing 
are corporeal and necessarily incorporated and in incorporation entail each other.  This is so 
obvious and trivial I will devote the next chapter to it.  It is, however, at the point of reading that 
desire becomes apparent.  Desire for, at minimum, a correspondence between the script and its 
interpretation, the idea or thought and its representation; be that representation alphabetic, 
ideographic, pictographic script.  As noted above, this plays out in inescapable 
theoretical/discursive overwriting.  Desire also leads to ethnocentric bias and privileging of one 
reading and one writing over another.  It is this desirous bias and privileging that Derrida 
deconstructs in Of Grammatology.  At the site of the desirous reading, ethics becomes imperative, 
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as can be seen in the discussion of Benjamin’s ‘On Language as Such and the on the Language of 
Man’ (1978) at the close of this chapter.  Moreover, ethical reading, ethical over-writing as 
theorizing, i.e. ethical scription, is the pretext of the next chapter on incorporation of writing. 
 
The Written: Derrida  
 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1976) is a sustained critique of philosophical theories of writing 
where writing is debased or repressed and speech is privileged.  Notably Derrida’s position shifts 
the domain of the argument from a historical privileging of the “type” of writing based on 
“cultural” ethnocentrism to a “linguistic/theoretical” ethnocentrism which plays out as an 
ontological privileging – that of speech over writing.  This particular ethnocentric gesture, Derrida 
contends has “everywhere and always, controlled the concept of writing”. (Derrida 1976, 3)  Citing 
Rousseau and Hegel at the opening of the ‘Exergue’ (the second and third quotes introducing the 
subject) Derrida illustrates the ethnocentrism of ‘western’ metaphysics. 
 
2. These three ways of writing correspond almost exactly to three different stages according 
to which one can consider men gathered into a nation.  The depicting of objects is 
appropriate to a savage people; signs of words and of propositions, to a barbaric people; and 
the alphabet to civilized people.47  
 
3. Alphabetic script is in itself and for itself the most intelligent.48 (Derrida 1976, 3) 
 
 
Derrida’s consideration of Rousseau and Hegel’s positions on writing corresponds to Harris’ outline 
of historical positions and developments in theorizing writing.  Further, Derrida emphasizes that 
these positions are neither objective nor neutral.  Philosophy and necessarily philosophers in 
adopting an “evolutionary” model of writing are also guilty of the repressive and oppressive gesture 
of not only privileging speech over writing, but of privileging a particular form of writing, i.e. 
analytic philosophy requires a particular style and logic.  Further, while Derrida does not 
necessarily claim this, the privileging of one particular method of writing over another particular 
method of writing is how scriptorial ethnocentricity necessarily plays out as demonstrated above.  
 
Derrida argues that the debasement, repression and/or oppression of writing as such, is due to a 
conceptual necessity.  This conceptual necessity is within philosophy as its discursive history.   
Prefacing his “critical reading” Derrida desires to “free reading” from “the classical categories of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 J.-J. Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues. 
48 Hegel, Enzyklopädie 
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history”. (Derrida p lxxxix, 1976)  Further, it needs to be understood and acknowledged that for 
Derrida a critical reading is necessarily, inextricably critical writing.  This inseparable double will 
be discussed as ethical textual situatedness and representative “excess” later in this section.   
Returning the discussion to philosophy’s historical imperative, Derrida writes that philosophy needs 
to be freed “perhaps above all, from the history of philosophy”. (Derrida p lxxxix, 1976)  The 
conceptual necessity of the oppression of writing is, Derrida shows, based on the metaphysics of 
presence, where presence is conceived as the immediacy of hearing oneself speak.  Continuing the 
discussion in Of Grammatology (OG from now on), Derrida’s ‘Exergue’ outlines the consequences 
of ethnocentrism and the metaphysics of presence for the history of theories of writing: 
 
1. the concept of writing in a world where the phoneticization of writing must dissimulate its 
own history as it is produced;  
2.  the history of (the only) metaphysics … always assigned the origin of truth in general to 
logos: the history of truth, of the truth of truth, … the debasement of writing, and its 
repression outside “full” speech.  
3. the concept of science or the scientificity of science – what has always been determined 
as logic – a concept that has always been a philosophical concept, even if the practice of 
science has constantly challenged its imperialism of logos, by invoking for example, from 
the beginning and ever increasingly, non-phonetic writing. (Derrida 1976, 3) 
 
 
Derrida’s first point is accurate.  I use the term “accurate” here as it seems less culturally and 
philosophically loaded regarding truth claims; logical truth claims, historical truth claims, 
legislative truth claims, scientific truth claims, empirical truth claims, etc., and their discursive 
support of one another.  We have already seen the ethnocentrism of histories of writing laid out by 
Coulmas and Harris.  While Harris and Coulmas could be used to support Derrida’s point regarding 
ethnocentrism in histories of theories of writing, such a gesture would be a fundamental 
“inaccuracy” on my part.  For while this point is “adequately” made by the preceding sections, 
Derrida’s writing acknowledges and exceeds the point of adequation.  For not only are histories of 
writing ethnocentric, histories of writing and theories of writing must “dissimulate” their own 
histories as ethnocentric.  Hence the concept of writing has suffered the biases and denials of the 
historicity of histories of writing. 
 
 
Derrida writes that “[by] alluding to a science of writing reined in by metaphor, metaphysics and 
theology, this exergue must not only announce that the science of writing – grammatology – shows 
signs of liberation all over the world, as a result of decisive effort”. (Derrida 1976, 4)  However, 
Derrida considers that the science of grammatology may never come to fruition. “The science of 
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writing, grammatology is meaningful only within a world where the concepts of speech and writing 
have already been assigned”. (Derrida 1976, 4)  Hence, grammatology, may “…never [be] able to 
define the unity of its project or its object.  Of not being able either to write its discourse on method 
or to describe the limits of its field”. (Derrida 1976, 4)  However, Derrida meditates on what is 
“‘provisionally’ called writing …” (Derrida 1976, 4-5) whilst he anticipates a future which 
questions “the values of sign, word, and writing …” (Derrida 1976, 5) 
 
‘The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’ (Derrida 1976, 6) 
 
 It is therefore as if what we call language could have been in its origin and its end only a 
moment, an essential but determined mode, a phenomenon, an aspect, a species of writing. 
(Derrida 1976, 8) 
 
 
The Derridean concept examined in this section is “supplementarity” and the “trace”.  I argue that 
for Derrida “secondarity” is not a matter of mimesis as such.  Rather, “secondarity” is an economic 
or ethico-political gesture of positionality.  However, “supplementarity” although related in some 
respects to secondarity, is a matter of mimetic function.  Further, the “trace”, found in Writing and 
Difference ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’(Derrida 1978,196-231), which is the second concept to 
be examined here, shares with supplementarity no other relation than the mimetic one.  For traces 
are metonymic and all metonyms are metaphorical.  Hence the “trace” shares the mimetic function 
of metaphor discussed in Chapter 2, ‘Mimesis: Metaphor’. 
 
One may consider that ‘Economimesis’ (Diacritics 1981, v 11, 3 – 25), Derrida’s critique of 
Kantian aesthetics, would pertain to any discussion of writing and/or representation.  However, 
Derrida’s critique of Kant in ‘Economimesis’ is that “Art” is “Art” because it is outside economy or 
economics.  For Kant, Derrida argues, Art and the Fine Arts are “non-exchangeable”:  
 
Non-exchangeable in terms of sensible objects or signs of sensible objects (money for 
example, non-exchangeable in terms of enjoyment – neither as use value nor as exchange 
value). (Derrida 1981, 9) 
 
 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Kant’s aesthetic economy illustrates the independence of “Art”, in the 
Kantian sense, as not only being “free”, i.e. non-exchangeable, but the relationship between beauty 
and disgust; namely, disgust (signified as vomiting) is the coin that radically exceeds and hence 
necessarily allows, the very possibility of beauty.  
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Secondarity 
 
For Derrida “the problem of language” invades the most diverse discourses – diverse in their 
intention, method and ideology.  The inflation of the sign “language”, Derrida argues, is inflation 
itself. Yet “language” itself is still a sign.  The devaluation and inflation of the sign “language” are 
symptomatic of a historico-metaphysical epoch finally determining language as “the totality of its 
problematic horizon”. (Derrida 1976, 6)  The privileging of the phoné is dependent on the economy 
of presence. Hearing oneself speak presents itself as non-exterior, and hence non-contingent, 
signifier.  The economy of presence belongs to the epoch of dichotomies where the idea of world 
origin arises between “worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and 
nonideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc”. (Derrida 1976, 8)   
 
Derrida considers that over the last three millennia everything gathered under the name of language 
is being transferred to or summarized under the name of writing.  Writing no longer designates the 
exterior surface of the signifier of the signifier. It goes beyond the extension of language.  
“…[W]riting thus comprehends language”. (Derrida 1976, 7)  Derrida suggests that writing as 
signifier of signifiers designates the movement of language. “There the signified always already 
functions as a signifier”. (Derrida 1976, 7)  Hence, “[t]he secondarity that it seemed possible to 
ascribe to writing alone affects all signifieds in general[.]49  The advent of writing is the advent of 
this play; the game of secondarity of signifiers.  There is not a single signified that escapes the play 
of signifying references that constitute language”. (Derrida 1976, 7)  “The advent of writing is the 
advent of this play … the inability to regulate the circulation of signs[.]” (Derrida 1976, 7)  This 
play of secondarity of signs destroys the ‘concept of the “sign” and its entire logic’. (Derrida 1976, 
7)   For Derrida the very nature of secondarity as it applies to signifieds that are always already 
signifiers allows that writing ‘that signifier of the signifier’ is the very “movement of language[.]” 
(Derrida 1976, 7)   
 
This gesture teleologically confines writing to a secondary and “instrumental function; translator of 
full speech that was fully present … technics in the service of language; spokesman and interpreter 
of originary speech itself shielded from interpretation”. (Derrida 1976, 8)  Derrida believes that the 
“question about the meaning and origins of writing precedes, or at least merges with, the question 
of the meaning and origin of technics”.(Derrida 1976, 8)  Hence, Derrida writes, the notion of 
technique cannot clarify the notion of writing.  Further, Derrida argues that the western concept of 
language, the construction of the opposition between speech and language is revealed today as “the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 The secondarity of writing as the signifier of a signifier.  
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guise or disguise of primary writing”.  If, therefore, as Derrida suggests, writing was never a simple 
“supplement” to speech, then one must construct a new logic of supplementarity.  I will turn to the 
issue of ‘supplementarity’ shortly. To affirm a concept of writing that exceeds and comprehends 
language presupposes a certain definition of language and writing. 
 
[O]ne says “language” for action, movement, thought, reflection, consciousness, 
unconsciousness, experience, affectivity, etc.  Now we tend to say “writing” for all that and 
more: to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic 
inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying 
face, the signified face itself. And thus we say “writing” for all that gives rise to inscription 
in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the 
order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, 
sculptural “writing”. …(Derrida 1976, 9) 
 
Derrida contends that writing describes not only the system of notation secondarily connected with 
these activities, but also the essence and content of the activities themselves. Content of activities 
seems a peculiar way of describing what is done in an activity.  Of course this shifts writing from 
being a question of ontology, “what is x?” to “what does x do?”  The present chapter makes the 
same gesture.   
 
Derrida argues that whilst the theory of cybernetics “oust[s] all metaphysical concepts – including 
the concepts of the soul, of life, of value, of choice, of memory, … it must conserve the notion of 
writing, trace, grammè [written mark] or grapheme[.]”  (Derrida 1976, 9)   “Even before being 
determined as human … or non human, the grammè – or the grapheme – would thus name an 
element …” That element is the “origin of meaning in general”. (Derrida 1976, 9)   
 
Derrida’s ruminations on theoretical mathematics, whether its writing is understood as sensible 
graphie or the ideal synthesis of signifieds or a trace, shows that it has never been linked to phonetic 
production. (Derrida p 1976, 9-10)  Mathematical writing challenges the ideal of phonetic writing 
and its metaphysics, particularly epistemology.  Istoria (history) and epistémè (knowledge), Derrida 
argues, have always reappropriated presence. (Derrida 1976, 10)   
 
Practical methods of information retrieval extend “the message” where it is no longer the written 
translation of spoken language, although information retrieval goes with the extension of 
phonography, conserving spoken language without the presence of a speaker.  Hence, Derrida 
contends, the absence of the speaking subject coupled with the anthropology and history of writing, 
shows that phonetic writing is limited in space and time and limits itself as it proceeds, imposing its 
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laws on cultural areas that have eluded it.  I will take up the issue of the “temporality” of writing 
later, suggesting that writing is atemporal. 
 
Derrida argues that in affirming writing as comprehending and exceeding language, we tend to say 
writing encompasses “action, movement thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, 
experience, affectivity … [as well as] physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic 
inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also beyond the signifying face, the 
signified face itself”. (Derrida 1976, 9)  Thus, Derrida points out, “writing” as inscription in general 
“is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also musical and 
sculptural writing”. (Derrida 1976, 9) However, for Derrida writing also includes “athletic writing”, 
“military” or “political writing”.  Accordingly for Derrida, even cybernetics must maintain the 
“notion of writing, trace, grammè [written mark] or grapheme …” (Derrida 1976, 9) Derrida argues 
that the grammè or grapheme (graphie is a manner of writing) names a non-simple element as 
medium or atom of arche-synthesis in general “that is to say, the origin of meaning in general”. 
(Derrida 1976, 9) 
  
Mathematics, Derrida contends, is held to be an ideal writing while phonetic or alphabetic writing is 
imperfect. (Derrida 1976, 10)  “Beyond the theoretical mathematics the development of practical 
methods of information retrieval extends the possibilities of the “message” vastly, to the point 
where it is no longer the “written” translation of a language, the transporting of a signified which 
could remain spoken in its integrity”. (Derrida 1976, 10) 
 
The Signifier and Truth 
 
Perhaps the horror of Derrida’s writing on writing is that it troubles the very heart of philosophy: 
Truth, where truth as truth is always implicitly capitalized and capitalized on.  ‘The “rationality” … 
which governs a writing … no longer issues from a logos’. (Derrida 1976, 10)  Derrida illustrates 
how writing deconstructs all signification that issues from logos, especially the signification of 
truth. (Derrida 1976, 10)  Within logos (god’s understanding, philosophical or anthropological 
sense) “the essential link to the phonè would be immediately proximate to that which within 
“thought” as logos relates to meaning …” (Derrida 1976, 11)  
 
In Chapter One, I argued that Plato’s “Theory of the Forms” was an account of functional 
mimeticity wherein a particular was functionally mimetic of the Form.  Further, I argued that for 
Plato, Philosophical writing was functionally mimetic of, not only the particular, but also the Form 
as well.  Hence, Plato privileged Philosophical writing because of its verisimilitude; philosophical 
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discourses are a truer substitute for that which they represent.  Writing is significatory 
verisimilitude. Moreover, it is in Book X of the Republic that Plato installs the mirror analogy for 
poetic representation. Hence, Plato develops the metaphoric conceptualization of writing as 
mirroring and reflection, albeit to dismiss and debase poetic writing as mirroring.  I contend then, 
given these arguments, that mimetic substitution and transformation of signs as signifier/signified 
and conceptualized through the metaphorics of reflection and mirroring are pre-Aristotelian.  Yet, it 
is with Aristotle, according to Derrida, that these reflective and binary conceptualizations of the 
sign begin. 
 
For Aristotle, Derrida contends, the voice is a producer of mental experience while written words 
are the symbols of spoken words.  (Derrida 1976, 11)  Further, Derrida argues, for Aristotle the 
voice signifies mental experiences which “reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance”. (Derrida 
1976, 11)  Therefore, for Aristotle, an act of translation50 occurs between being and mind as well as 
things and feelings.  However, conventional symbolization occurs between mind and logos.  The 
first convention is spoken language and “[w]ritten language would establish the conventions 
interlinking other conventions with them”. (Derrida 1976, 11)   
 
Derrida continues that for Aristotle “[a]ll signifiers and first and foremost the written signifier, are 
derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the 
signified sense…” (Derrida 1976, 11)  “The written signifier is always technical and 
representative”.  This does not mean that for Aristotle the signifiers do not function mimetically, 
quite the contrary, as argued in Chapter Two.  It is, however, Aristotle’s conceptualization of 
writing as derivative, Derrida argues, that constructs the very origin of the notion ‘signifier’. 
(Derrida 1976, 11)  Ergo, “[t]he epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as a mediation 
of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning”. (Derrida 1976, 12-13) Derrida’s 
“consideration” of Aristotle’s notion of writing as “mediation of mediation” neatly echoes the 
Platonic argument of the Theory of the Forms wherein “poetic” representation/writing is at a third 
remove from, derivative and mediate of, the “truth” of the Form.  Therefore, it is to the epoch of the 
debasement of writing as mediated signification, that difference and the separation of the signified 
from the signifier, or their parallelism belong. (Derrida 1976, 13)     
 
For Derrida, the history of the notion of the linguistic sign as writing requires the concomitant 
conceptualization of the signifier and the signified as its constituents.  The signifier/signified binary 
is, Derrida argues, an ontico-theological and historical necessity.  “The sign and divinity have the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Translation is, of course, necessarily a mimetic practice. 
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same place and time of birth.  The age of the sign is essentially theological.  Perhaps it will never 
end.  Its historical closure is, however, outlined”. (Derrida 1976, 14) “We know, however, that the 
thematics of the sign have been for about a century the agonized labor of a tradition that professed 
to withdraw meaning, truth, presence, being, etc., from the movement of signification”. (Derrida 
1976, 14)  Derrida agues that “[t]he exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general 
… and that there is no linguistic sign before writing”. (Derrida 1976, 14)  Hence Derrida’s 
formulation of the position that writing precedes the sign. 
 
Aporias: supplementarity 
 
The relationship between supplementarity and the trace exists only in that they both function 
aporetically and, I argue, mimetically.  Apart from these complex functions, they are fish of entirely 
different species.  I engage supplementarity first because it clearly functions metaphorically, where 
metaphoricity is substitutive.  The trace, on the other hand, initially seems to function 
metonymically.  However, I argue, all metonymic gestures are functionally and necessarily 
metaphorical. Yet this function is asymmetrical.  That is, while all metonyms are metaphorical, all 
metaphors are not necessarily metonymical.  Further, it is the metaphoric function of substitution 
that makes supplementarity and traces mimetic.   
 
We find Derrida’s work on supplementarity in OG “…That Dangerous Supplement…” (Derrida 
1976, 141-64)  Derrida insists that the “concept of the supplement – which here determines that of 
the representative image – harbours within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange 
as it is necessary”. (Derrida 1976, 144) 
 
The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest 
measure of presence.  It cumulates and accumulates presence.  It is thus that art, technè, 
image, representation, convention, etc., come as supplements to nature and are rich with this 
entire cumulating function. [Derrida’s italics]… But the supplement supplements.  It adds 
only to replace. … As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it 
produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness [my 
italics].  Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by 
allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy.  The sign is always the supplement of the 
thing itself. [Derrida’s italics] (Derrida 1976, 144-5) [my highlight] 
 
 
For Derrida, one of the functions of the supplement is that it “adds only to replace” where 
replacement as such fills a void or a lack.  However, the abyssal nature of the infinite chain of 
supplements elucidated by Derrida in OG ‘The Exorbitant. Question of Method’ (Derrida 1976, 
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157-164), is not pertinent to this thesis, although I certainly will look at Derrida’s choice of “chain” 
as a metaphor for the relationship of supplements to each other.  What is pertinent is 
supplementarity’s functions of replacement and substitution.  It is in replacement and substitution 
that mimesis abides and not only as supplemental metaphoricity.   
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, ‘Mimesis: Magic’, objects were substitutions for people or things one 
wished to influence.  So supplementarity as substitution must also be a matter of power, namely the 
power to influence.   Supplementation as such is powerful in that it overcomes the metaphysics of 
presence.  The metaphysics of presence typically constructs binaries as dichotomies – dichotomies 
of presence/absence, interiority/exteriority, and most importantly linguistic, semiotic, and 
philosophical theories of reference and various permutations of signification as speech/writing and 
the sign as signified/signifier.   Derridean supplementarity dissolves the ‘/’ of dichotomies.   
 
In Chapter Four ‘Mimesis: Myth’ Freudian ‘anaclitic’ love was based on substitution of/for the 
mother.  With the chain of supplementarity as replacement and/or substitution of/for “a lack” 
Derrida examines Rousseau’s deprecation of the substitution of/for mothers, onanism as substitution 
of/for sex lacking a partner, i.e. gratification by sexual imagination, and finally, but not least 
importantly, writing as a substitution for speech.  In choosing to metaphorize supplementarity as a 
“chain”, ‘The Chain of Supplements’ (Derrida 1976, 152-57), Derrida announces the linkage, the 
connection of these mimetic substitutions as not only replacement of/for a particular instantiation of 
a particular lack, for example Thérèse as Rousseau’s “substitute” for “mamma” (Derrida 1976, 
157), but also the relationship of supplements’ “linkage” to each other; say onanistic 
imagination/signification of Thérèse, substituting for sex with Thérèse, who is in turn the substitute, 
and hence a signification, for mamma. Via the chain of supplements Derrida is able to argue that 
writing precedes the sign.  However, to understand the plausibility of this argument we need to 
begin with Derrida’s analysis of Rousseau’s position on speech. 
 
While Derrida critiques “only one particular motif in Rousseau…” (Derrida 1976, 141) that motif is 
Rousseau’s devotion to a full “pure” and present speech.  A speech, Derrida suggests, that is for 
Rousseau a “speech as it should be or rather as it should have been”. (Derrida 1976, 141)   Derrida 
argues that at one and the same moment, Rousseau’s “straining toward the reconstruction of 
presence […] valorizes and disqualifies writing at the same time.  At the same time; that is to say, in 
one divided but coherent movement”. (Derrida 1976, 141-42) It is, of course, at this moment that 
aporia occurs. 
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Derrida’s examination of supplementarity begins with an account of Rousseau’s substitution of 
mothers or motherly love.  As we saw earlier, for Freud, this substitution of mothers was the basis 
for anaclitic love.   However, Derrida cautions the reader that “in spite of certain appearances, the 
locating of the word supplement is not at all psychoanalytical …” for a psychoanalytic reading of 
supplementarity would  “take us outside of the writing toward a psychobiographical signified, or 
even toward a general psychological structure that could rightly be separated from the signifier”. 
(Derrida 1976, 159) [my italics]   Hence, Derrida’s famous, often disputed and much debated claim 
that “[t]here is nothing outside of the text”. (Derrida 1976, 158)  This controversial claim will be 
revisited in the next chapter ‘Mimesis: Incorporation’.  Rousseau holds however, as Derrida shows, 
an ostensibly opposite view to Freudian anaclitic love in that “there is no substitute for a mother’s 
love”. (Derrida 1976, 146)  For Rousseau this substitution, like others, is an evil against Nature. 
 
If, premeditating the theme of writing, I began by speaking of the substitution of mothers, it 
is because, as Rousseau will himself say, “more depends on this than you realize”. (Derrida 
1976, 146) 
 
 
The question we must consider then is what is at stake in supplementarity as replacement and/or 
substitution, whether it be of mothers or anything else.   
 
The supplement will always be the moving of the tongue or acting through the hands of 
others.  In it everything is brought together: progress as the possibility of perversion, 
regression toward an evil that is not natural and that adheres to the power of substitution that 
permits us to absent ourselves and act by proxy, through representation, through the hands 
of others.  Through the written [par écrit].  This substitution always has the form of the sign.  
The scandal is that the sign, the image or the representer, become forces and make “the 
world move”. (Derrida 1976, 147) [my italics]  
 
So the heart of supplementation is substitution.  Substitution is mimesis as “the moving of the 
tongue”, speech.  Further, in absentia, supplementation by a stand-in, is to “act by proxy, through 
representation, through the hands of others”, substitution grants presence in absence.  This legal or 
votive representation of the substitute, is author/ized, that is validated by written permission 
(author/ity).  Hence “[t]his substitution always has the form of the sign”.  We can say at this point 
that substitution as representative signification is in fact mimesis as signature.   Further, the 
signature under the conditions of votive authority does in fact and on these particular, but not all, 
occasions function as additive. It grants by proximation double authority, double votive power.  
And the signature serves yet another mimetic substitution.  It legally substitutes for the/a person, 
hence the importance of reading anything before you sign it.  Further, the signature as signification, 
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I will argue in the next chapter ‘Mimesis: Incorporation’, is an aspect of what it is to be, or perhaps 
more aptly to do, the specificity of linguistic embodiment.  
 
Derrida expands on efficacy of supplementarity.  For not only is it the case that where there is 
substitution be it of mothers, representation or writing, namely signification as such, there is 
mimesis, but substitution, miming is enjoyable. 
 
For it is not the question of diverting total enjoyment toward a particular substitute, but now 
of experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality. (Derrida 1976, 152)  
 
And a little further on: 
 
It is at the moment when the mother disappears that substitution becomes possible and 
necessary.   The play of maternal presence or absence, this alteration of perception and 
imagination must correspond to an organization of space. (Derrida 1976, 152-53) 
 
… In a word, I needed a successor to mamma. … I found in Thérèse the substitute 
[supplement] that I needed. (Derrida 1976, 157) 
 
 
Here we are not only reminded of Freud’s account of anaclitic love, but also of Fort/Da; the child’s 
game, the play of substitution that allows him (and it is invariably and necessarily a ‘him’ for 
Freudian theory) to, in his imagination, begin to compensate for the repeated presence and absence 
of the mother.  Further, consider Derrida’s quote from Rousseau’s “Dialogues [Pléiade, vol. 1] (p. 
800), “to the end of his life he will remain an aged child”. (Derrida 1976, 153)   This absent 
presence of the mother is a wounding that is only overcome by the substitution(s) of anaclitic love.  
In Rousseau’s case, Thérèse substitutes for mamma.  Further, Thérèse literally approximates 
mamma.  In substituting for mamma that is in the absence of mamma, Thérèse makes mamma 
proximate, that is, present.  Moreover, Thérèse also substituted for Mme de Warens, another earlier 
love whom Rousseau called Maman.  Does this mimetic supplementarity of mothers mean that 
Freud was Rousseauean when theorizing anaclitic love?  Perhaps.   
 
Why has Derrida, a philosopher of exquisite scholarship and respect for all those who have 
preceded him, failed to note the similarities here?  Is it really an oversight of theoretical repetitions?  
This oversight is even more puzzling when one considers Derrida’s work in Writing and Difference 
(Derrida, 1978) entitled ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’. (Derrida 1978, 196-231)  Surely, given 
this, we can claim for Freud precisely the same textuality that Derrida insists on for Rousseau.  But 
the oversight is not as some might suppose prejudicial reading of Freud on Derrida’s part.  One can 
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readily note some theoretical similarities in the claims of Rousseau and Freud without producing a 
psychoanalytic reading.  And it is precisely psychoanalytic readings that Derrida forbids us as he 
considers such readings “banal” and “naïve”. (Derrida 1976, 159)   
 
 
Whatever the case, Derrida notes that “[t]he supplement is what neither Nature nor Reason can 
tolerate”. (Derrida 1976, 148)  Yet, even for Rousseau, supplementarity must in some sense become 
“tolerable”.  How then, do we shift from the “catastrophe” of the supplement with its substitutive 
core to the enjoyment of “miming” substitution as such?  Derrida argues, “indeed it is a question of 
the imaginary”. (Derrida 1976, 151) 
 
The supplement that “cheats” maternal “nature” operates as writing, and as writing it is 
dangerous to life. This danger is that of the image.  Just as writing opens the crisis of the 
living speech in terms of its “image,” its painting or its representation, so onanism 
announces the ruin of vitality in terms of imaginary seductions. (Derrida 1976, 151) 
 
So Derrida posits, in the case of Rousseau (and this may be applicable to authors in general), that 
supplementarity is writing, is the image, is painting and/or representation; signs that belie and cheat 
“maternal nature” because they are supplements for Her.  Signs as substitutes, as writing, are 
“dangerous to life”.  Further, onanism, rather than actual seduction and sex, is supplemental and as 
such, is a sign.  As writing is dangerous to full and living speech, so too anything belonging to the 
“imaginary”, that is, representation/signification per se, is dangerous in its supplementarity.  Hence 
one concludes that it is more than the mere “ruin of vitality” at stake; it is a matter of literal and 
literary im/potency.  Given, of course, that one has to concede that onanism precludes the very 
possibility of maternal fecundity.  Perhaps literary fecundity requires the literal denial of potency 
by onanism.  For Rousseau, as Derrida shows, is overcome by supplemental substitutions and 
displacements – he is overcome by the mimetic necessity of the chain of supplements. Moreover, as 
we will see shortly, Rousseau is haunted by the immorality of supplementarity.  Whether or not 
supplementarity as such is in fact a moral issue is not the point here.  By adopting a self-flagellatory 
position on it Rousseau certainly considers at least some forms of supplementarity as morally 
unsound.   
 
Derrida argues that in “out-distancing” and breaking with Nature, supplementarity “like the sign … 
bypasses the presence and the duration of being”. (Derrida 1976, 151) 
 
The restitution of presence by language, restitution at the same time symbolic and 
immediate.  This contradiction must be thought.  Immediate experience of restitution 
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because as experience, as consciousness or conscience, it dispenses with passage through 
the world.  What is touching is touched, auto-affection gives itself as pure autarchy. (Derrida 
1976, 153-54) 
 
 
So it is language, auto-affection by writing, Derrida points out, that grants Rousseau his pure and 
perfect self-governance.  Presence restored by auto-eroticism and imagination; the contradiction of 
the symbolic (non-present) and the immediate (the self-presence of touch), the act of speaking, or in 
this case one needs to be careful to point out, the im/mediacy of the act of writing.  Writing as 
supplementarity is mimesis itself.  And supplementarity, mimesis, seemingly has the double and 
contradictory consequence of being both desired and feared.  Let me begin by reiterating an earlier 
quote and focus, not on supplementarity per se, but rather the enjoyment, or lack thereof, of various 
mimetic practices. 
 
For it is not the question of diverting total enjoyment toward a particular substitute, but now 
of experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality. (Derrida 1976, 152) [my italics] 
 
 
In the above, Derrida argues that it is not a matter of the diversion of a particular substitute that is 
enjoyable; rather it is the miming, the act of substitution itself that is the cause of enjoyment.  That 
is, enjoyment is obtained through mimesis as such, not the act of particular supplemental 
instantiation.  In Rousseau’s case the supplemental particular is Thérèse.  However, it is not 
Thérèse’s particularity as maternal supplement that is the cause, or at least the only cause, for 
enjoyment here.  Rather, it is Thérèse in the imaginary, Thérèse as the fantasized, the imagined, the 
sign as object of onanism.  This makes Thérèse not only supplementary of Rousseau’s mamma, but 
the (or one) onanistic supplement – a mimetic fantasy.  And as mimetic fantasy, doubling what is 
already supplemental, Thérèse becomes a sign.   But mimetic doubling is, however, not always 
enjoyed by Rousseau.  It is clear for Derrida that the enjoyment of miming, in and of itself, 
illuminates the paradox of imagination and signification – one can make the absent present while its 
instantiation remains absent.  For Derrida mimesis as ap/proximation, making the absent present as 
imaginary, is enjoyable.  However, as Derrida shows, this does not hold for Rousseau.   
 
In order to explain his “dislike” for “common prostitutes,” Rousseau tells us that in Venice, 
at thirty-one, the “propensity which had modified all my passions” (Confessions, p.  41) … 
has not disappeared: “I had not lost the pernicious habit of satisfying my wants [donner le 
change]”51… (Derrida 1976, 154) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 In French “donner le change” means substituting the appearance for the real thing, so as to deceive or at least get by. 
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The supplement is maddening because it is neither presence nor absence and because it 
consequently breaks both our pleasure and our virginity.  “…abstinence and enjoyment, 
pleasure and wisdom, escaped me in equal measure” (Confessions, p 12). (Derrida 1976, 
154) 
 
 
Consider the above where Derrida argues that “[t]he supplement is maddening because it is neither 
presence nor absence …” This is not the only difficulty or paradox of supplementarity that troubles 
Rousseau.   Derrida shows us that Rousseau’s is unable to be abstinent and to enjoy that non-
abstinence.  Rousseau has a propensity for sex “with common prostitutes”.  However, for common 
prostitutes to be supplemental, one has to consider what or who they supplement, for they are not 
supplemental of sex per se.  But Derrida does not explain the supplementarity of sex with 
prostitutes here.  Instead, Derrida creates a diversion.  Derrida argues, and I think incorrectly, that 
“[t]he enjoyment of the thing itself is thus undermined, in its act and in its essence, by frustration.  
One cannot say therefore that it has an essence or an act (eidos, ousia, energeia, etc.)”  (Derrida 
1976, 154) Let me rephrase Derrida’s point just slightly. One cannot say that sex with common 
prostitutes has an essence or is an act, because the thing itself, sex with prostitutes, is frustrating and 
not enjoyable.  Heaven help us if things in themselves as acts or as having an essence are dependent 
upon their being not frustrating and enjoyable.  What needs to be accounted for here (beyond the 
issue of economic exchange) is: in what sense is prostitution supplemental?   That is, how is 
prostitution a substitute for, mimetic of or even an addition to?  Is it supplemental for Rousseau 
because it is a substitute for sex with Thérèse?   Is sex with common prostitutes supplemental of 
masturbation?  Derrida does not tell us.  Let me suggest however, that it could be considered as 
either of these things.  But for Rousseau I think sex with common prostitutes could be included in 
the chain of supplements that “cheat” and “belie” and rob Mother Nature of her due.  Further, 
Rousseau considers recourse to prostitutes “pernicious”.   So recourse to prostitution is more than 
an issue of frustrated supplementarity.  For Rousseau it is a matter of injuriousness – injurious to his 
health perhaps, but definitely injurious to his moral standing within the community. Both traits are 
shared by another of Rousseau’s confessed supplementary and pernicious proclivities. 
 
Rousseau confesses to masturbation, which at the time would have been a considered reprehensible 
as well as being a pernicious substitute for sex; sex that is, in this case undoubtedly, doubly 
supplemental.  Moreover, masturbation is doubly supplemental as it involves auto-eroticism as a 
substitution for copulation as well as engaging the imagination and therefore signification. 
Rousseau himself claims that the ability for both pleasure and/or wisdom escape him.  In confessing 
these lacks, or lapses of virtue, Rousseau forbids himself the satisfaction of double mimetic 
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supplementation or the Thérèse of his imagination/signification and onanism.52  Hence, Derrida 
writes that for Rousseau the ‘supplement is maddening’.  And as if “things are not complicated 
enough”, Derrida points out that for Rousseau, “cohabitation with women” can only be lived 
“between hetero-eroticism and auto-eroticism”. (Derrida 1976, 155)  Consider Rousseau’s own 
position on Thérèse. In a word, I needed a successor to mamma. “… I found in Thérèse the 
substitute [supplement] that I needed.” (Derrida 1976, 157) The “maddening” aspect of 
supplementarity for Rousseau is not that supplement transgresses the law of non-contradiction by 
proximation that is, making absence/presence.  I suggest that for Rousseau only certain 
instantiations in the chain of supplementarity are maddening and unpleasurable.  Consider the 
supplements Derrida shows us. Rousseau considers certain supplementations as unvirtuous.  And, 
as unvirtuous, miming, as substitution experienced in its totality is immoral.  Hence, Rousseau 
cannot or will not allow himself the pleasures and enjoyments supplementarity could afford him.  
So whilst Derrida understands the “pleasures” of miming, Rousseau does not.  One could argue that 
Rousseau is a masochist, and hence derives enjoyment from what he considers to be his immoral 
behaviours.  However, Derrida does not argue this.  So it is Derrida, not Rousseau, who derives 
enjoyment from substitution “experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality”. 
 
The supplement has not only the power of procuring an absent presence through its image; 
procuring it for us through the proxy [procuration] of the sign, it holds it at a distance and 
masters it.  For this presence is at the same time desired and feared.  The supplement 
transgresses and at the same time respects the interdict.  This is what also permits writing as 
the supplement of speech; but already also the spoken word as writing in general.  (Derrida 
1976, 155) 
 
Further, what holds for Rousseau, but cannot hold for Derrida, given the above argument, is that 
supplementarity as signification is transgressive.  I contend that supplementarity is transgressive if 
and only if one holds to certain ethico/logico -philosophical positions.  Positions which Derrida is 
fully cognizant of and critiques in his subsequent section, ‘The Exorbitant. Question of Method’ 
(Derrida 1976, 157-64) It goes without saying that Derrida’s entire deconstructive corpus is a life-
time’s sustained critique of western metaphysics’ positions. 
 
For Derrida, the chain of supplements transgresses through signification, i.e. the procurement and 
mastery of the metaphysics of presence.  The binary logic that sustains the metaphysics of presence 
as the dichotomy presence/absence entails a fundamental interdict – the “Law of Non-
Contradiction” and its consequent “Law of Excluded Middle”.  The “Law of Non-Contradiction” 
holds that anything that has the logical form of “p and not p” is always false.  Moreover, and more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Or any other person who is the subject of his onanistic imagination. 
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strongly than mere falsity, the consequent Law of Excluded Middle proposes that there is simply no 
extant thing that can be both “p” and “not p” at the same time.   
 
Now, for Derrida’s argument to hold he must construct supplementarity as signification such that 
“p” is “presence” and “not p’ is absence; formulating absence as not presence.  The logical formula 
would then be that signification is “both presence and not presence”.  Ergo, the formulation of 
absence/presence is logically false and therefore transgresses the “interdict” of non-contradiction.  
However, provided one does not hold to “the Truth” of this particular Logical Law, and certainly 
Derridean Deconstruction, Dialetheism and other non-binary logics do not, then the “absent/ 
presence” of signification neither “transgresses” nor “respects” this interdict.  Moreover, and for the 
same reasons, this “presence” as absent/presence need not be “desired and feared”, for there is no 
need to fear transgressing a law that has been shown to be not a law; there is nothing to fear as 
nothing is transgressed.  Therefore, supplementarity is neither unethical nor immoral.  However, 
what supplementarity as signification and the “chain” of supplements confirms once again is the 
necessarily paradoxical nature of mimesis. 
 
What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the “dangerous supplement,” is 
that in what one calls real life of these existences “of flesh and bone,” beyond and behind 
what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, there has never been anything 
but writing… (Derrida 1976, 158-59) 
  
In ‘II. Imitation’, Derrida argues “Rousseau is sure that the essence of art is mimesis”. (Derrida 
1976, 209)  However, the discussion of songs, melodies, harmony and painting are only of interest 
to us as in as much as they too are supplements and Derrida draws out their supplementary 
significance as signs, and as such, analogous to writing.  
 
Benjamin and nonsensuous mimesis 
 
In this way language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behaviour and the most 
complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a medium into which the earlier powers of 
mimetic production and comprehension have passed without residue, to the point where they 
have liquidated those of magic. (Benjamin 1978, 336) 
 
 
In ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ Benjamin argues that nature creates similarities and that the “highest 
capacity for producing similarities ... is man’s”. (Benjamin 1978, 333)  He argues further that we 
“possess a canon according to which the meaning of nonsensuous similarity can be at least partly 
clarified.  And this canon is language”. (Benjamin 1978, 334)  Whilst acknowledging that 
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onomatopoeia is usually considered the mimetic in language, Benjamin takes nonsensuous mimesis 
further, arguing that the spoken word “illuminates, by the relation of its written form to what it 
signifies”. (Benjamin 1978, 335)  
 
Language as non-sensuous mimesis 
 
Nature creates similarities.  One need only think of mimicry.  The highest capacity for 
producing similarities, however, is man’s.  His gift of seeing resemblances is nothing other 
than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like 
something else.  Perhaps there is none of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty 
does not play a decisive role. (Benjamin 1978, 333) 
 
What are we to make of the notion of nonsensuous mimesis that is clarified in language?   I take it 
that non-sensuousness is just that; a form of mimesis not apparent to the senses.  That is, mimesis 
that is non-visual and non-audible and non-tactile.  This non-sensuous mimesis is language, 
mimetic language, spoken and illuminated by the written.  It may be argued that language is both 
audible and visual; namely one hears speaking and one sees writing.  However, that is not how 
language is mimetic.  Language does not look like nor sound like the thing(s) it is a likeness of.  
Writing (and speech) is mimetic precisely because it does not look like or sound like the thing it is a 
likeness of.    
 
However, the concept of nonsensuous similarity is of some relevance.  For if words meaning 
the same thing in different languages are arranged about that thing as their center, we have 
to inquire how they all – while not possessing the slightest similarity to one another – are 
similar to what they signify at their center. (Benjamin 1978, 335) 
 
For Benjamin, signification is nonsensuous similarity.  Benjamin considers “the thing” that is the 
center of signification.  So a “tree” is signified in different languages by different words.  In English 
it is “tree”, in French it is “arbre”, in Latin “arbor”, in Italian “albero”.   Benjamin argues that 
despite the difference in the words forming the constellation around the thing each of those words is 
similar to the thing.   Ergo, tree, arbre, arbor, and albero, while different from each other are all 
similar to the thing that is a “tree”.  These words or instances of scription are similar to the thing 
because for Benjamin similarity is signification and each instance of signification although different 
from others is similar to the thing which is constant.  That is, signification is similarity.  
Nonsensuous similarity is mimesis. 
 
In brief, it is nonsensuous similarity that establishes the ties not only between the spoken 
and the signified but also between the written and the signified, and equally between the 
spoken and the written. ’ (Benjamin 1978, 335) 
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To clarify this, Benjamin argues that the “mimetic element in language can, like a flame, manifest 
itself only through a kind of bearer.  This bearer is the semiotic element.  Thus the coherence of 
words or sentences is the bearer through which, like a flash, similarity appears”. (Benjamin 1978, 
335)  Hence mimesis occurs for Benjamin not only at the level of the word but also at the level of 
the sentence.  For Benjamin the coherence of words in a sentence is the semiotic element.   That 
semiotic element is the bearer of mimesis.  Mimesis occurs not only between things and spoken or 
written words but also between speech and writing.  Throughout ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ 
Benjamin does not privilege speech over writing.  Both are equally the bearers of semiotic mimesis.   
 
Language 
 
In opening his essay ‘On Language as such and on the Language of Man’, Benjamin states: 
 
Every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of language …  It is 
possible to talk about a language of music and of sculpture, a language of justice … about a 
language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians … To sum up: all 
communication of mental meanings is language, communication in words being only a 
particular case of human language … 
(Benjamin 1987, 314) 
 
All that is asserted here is that all expression, insofar as it is a communication of mental 
meaning, is to be classed as language. (Benjamin 1987, 315) 
 
 
Benjamin argues that mental meaning is communicated in language, not through it; and this 
“mental entity” is distinguishable from language. (Benjamin 1978, 316)  He argues further that it is 
the paradoxical connection and distinction between language (as understood from the above) and 
this mental entity (“essence, meaning”) that is the center of linguistic theory.  Benjamin continues, 
the mental “is identical with the linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of communication”. 
(Benjamin 1978, 316)  “Language communicates the linguistic being of things. ... All language 
communicates is itself”. (Benjamin 1978, 316)  He argues further, language is the medium of 
communication.   
 
Mediation, which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the fundamental 
problem of linguistic theory, and if one chooses to call this immediacy magic, then the 
primary problem of language is its magic. (Benjamin 1978, 316-17) 
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Further, Benjamin argues “Man alone has a language that is complete both in its universality and 
in its intensiveness”. [Benjamin’s italics]  (Benjamin 1978, 319)  For Benjamin the intensiveness 
and universality belong to naming, that is man’s being.  By intensiveness Benjamin highlights the 
distinction between the linguistic being of man and the linguistic being of nature (and of things); the 
linguistic being of nature and things does not name.  This distinction belongs to naming which only 
man does.  He argues that the mental being of man is communicable without “residue” and through 
him “pure language speaks”.  This is because the mental being of man is language itself, and as 
such, man is the only speaker of language.  “Name, however, is not only the last utterance of 
language but also the true call of it”. (Benjamin 1978, 319)  In name, Benjamin argues, is the 
essential law of language. 
 
The question Benjamin poses is whether the mental being of man and of things can be described “as 
of linguistic nature”. (Benjamin 1978, 319)  He answers that given mental being is situated within 
the communicable, it is therefore linguistic, hence tautological.   
 
There is no such thing as a meaning of language; as communication, language 
communicates a mental entity, i.e., something communicable per se. [Benjamin’s italics] 
(Benjamin 1978, 320) 
 
Benjamin argues further that the differences between are gradual.  That is differences occur in 
density “of communicating (naming) and of the communicable (name) aspects of communication”. 
(Benjamin 1978, 320)  He argues these clearly distinguishable spheres, naming and name, are 
constantly interrelated.  Benjamin states that graduated differences occur within mental being itself 
and can not be embraced by any higher category, as the graduation is a matter of degrees of 
existence.  The equation of mental and linguistic being is “of great metaphysical moment” to 
linguistic theory as it constitutes the intimate connection with the philosophy of religion.  This 
connection “is the concept of revelation”.(Benjamin 1978, 320) 
 
Benjamin explains that the concept of revelation is “what is meant” by the apparent conflict 
between the expressed and the inexpressible and the unexpressed in linguistic formulations.  On 
consideration of the conflict, he argues that in perspective of the inexpressible one sees the last 
mental entity, which is clear in the equation of mental and linguistic being.  It is the notion of an 
inverse proportionality between mental and linguistic being that is disputed.   
 
For this latter thesis runs: the deeper, i.e., the more existent and real the mind, the more it is 
inexpressible and unexpressed, whereas it is consistent with the equation proposed above to 
make the relation between mind and language thoroughly unambiguous, so that the 
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expression that is linguistically most existent (i.e., most fixed) is linguistically the most 
rounded and definitive; in a work, the most expressed is at the same time the purely mental.  
Exactly this, however, is meant by the concept of revelation, if it takes the inviolability of 
the word as the only and sufficient condition and characteristic of the divinity of the mental 
being that is expressed in it.  The highest mental region of religion is (in the concept of 
revelation) at the same time the only one that does not know the inexpressible.  For it is 
address in name and expresses itself as revelation.  In this, however, notice is given that only 
the highest mental being, as it appears in religion, rests solely on man and on the language in 
him, whereas all art, not excluding poetry, does not rest on the ultimate essence of language-
mind, but on language-mind confined to things, even if in consummate beauty.  “language, 
the mother of reason and of revelation, its alpha and omega,” says Hamann. (Benjamin 
1978, 321) [Whose italics?]  
 
 
Benjamin states that language “itself” is not expressed in “things themselves”.  Discussing the 
literal and metaphorical senses of this statement he says: “the language of things is imperfect, and 
they are dumb”.  This is because things are denied the “pure formal principle of things – sound”.  
The communication of things is a more or less material community, and is immediate and infinite.  
And like every linguistic communication it is magical.  The difference rests, however, in the 
difference between the material and the mental.  The magic of human language is that it is 
“immaterial and purely mental, and the symbol of this is sound”. (Benjamin 1978, 321) 
 
The next section of Benjamin’s discussion he bases on the first chapter of Genesis, arguing that the 
interpretation is neither biblical nor subjection of the Bible as revealed truth, but discovery of what 
emerges from the biblical text in “regarding the nature of language”.  Benjamin discusses the two 
creation myths, the second version, which he places first, “tells of the breathing of God’s breath into 
man, also reports that man was made from the earth”. 
 
Benjamin argues: 
This is, in the whole story of the Creation, the only reference to the material in which the 
Creator expresses his will, which is doubtless otherwise thought of as creation without 
mediation.  In this second story of the Creation the making of man did not take place 
through the word: God spoke -- and there was -- but this man, who is not created from the 
word, is now invested with the gift of language and is elevated above nature. (Benjamin 
1978, 322) 
 
Benjamin continues: 
This curious revolution in the act of creation, where it concerns man, is no less clearly 
recorded, however, in the first story of the Creation, and in an entirely different context it 
vouches, with the same certainty, for a special relationship between man and language 
resulting from the act of creation.  The manifold rhythm of the act of creation in the first 
chapter establishes a kind of basic form from which the act that creates man diverges 
significantly.  Admittedly this passage nowhere expressly refers to a relationship either of 
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man or of nature to the material from which they were created; and the question whether the 
words “He made” envisages a creation out of material must here be left open, but the rhythm 
by which the creation of nature (in Genesis 1) is accomplished is: Let there be -- He made 
(created) -- He named.  In individual acts of creation (1:3; 1:11) only the words “Let there 
be” occur.  In this “Let there be” and in the words “He named” at the beginning and end of 
the act, the deep and clear relation of the creative act to language appears each time.  With 
the creative omnipotence of language it begins, and at the end language as it were 
assimilates the created, names it.  Language is therefore both creative and the finished 
creation, it is word and name. (Benjamin 1978, 322-23) 
 
The difference Benjamin posits between the language of God and that of man is that “God made 
things knowable by their names.  Man, however, names them according to knowledge”. (Benjamin 
1978, 323)  Benjamin further distinguishes between the threefold rhythm of the creation of man and 
the creation of nature.  Whilst he notes the parallelism between the two “creations”, the difference 
between man and nature, Benjamin points out, is that “God did not create man from the word, and 
he did not name him.  He did not wish to subject him to language, but in man God set language, 
which had served Him as medium of creation, free”. (Benjamin 1978, 323)  Benjamin continues 
that this creativity “relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge”.  His argument is that “man 
is the knower in the same language that God is the creator”.  That is, God created the knower in the 
image of the creator.  Benjamin points out that the mental being of man is therefore the language in 
which creation took place.  Creation took place in the word, and God’s linguistic being is the word.  
“All human language is only reflection of the word in name.  Name is no closer to the word than 
knowledge is to creation”. (Benjamin 1978, 323)  Comparing the infinity of human language and 
the infinity of the word of God, Benjamin notes that the language of man always remains analytical 
and limited. 
 
At this point in the essay that Benjamin takes up the language of man as a naming language.  
Benjamin asserts that it “is therefore the linguistic being of man to name things”.[Benjamin’s 
italics] (Benjamin 1978, 317)  Man as a name giver is a notion familiar to us from Chapter 1 in 
which I examined Plato’s account of the mimetic nature of naming.  In discussing naming as the 
linguistic being of man, Benjamin argues that while other things linguistically communicate with 
man, in naming man communicates his mental being with God. (Benjamin 1978, 318)  Naming, he 
argues further, is the highest meaning and sole purpose of language, and “language is the mental 
being of man”. [Benjamin’s italics]  (Benjamin 1978, 318)  Benjamin suggests that in naming, the 
mental entity that communicates itself is language.  And because the mental being of man is 
language he cannot communicate himself by it, only in it. 
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I want to proceed now to discussing ethical writing and incorporation.  To do so we will continue 
our examination of Benjamin with a nod to Derrida and consideration of Grosz’s claim that the 
body has been literally written on. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Mimesis: Incorporation 
 
 
In the preceding chapter I argued that writing is a mimetic practice.  In this chapter I will consider 
the implications of a corporeality that engages in this practice – is in fact defined by writing as a 
mimetic practice and defines itself by this practice.  One of the implications of this is that human 
corporeality is mimetic in a manner not quite captured by Benjamin’s non-sensuous mimesis.  
Benjamin’s account of language as non-sensuous mimesis is incomplete in the sense that it leaves 
“language” as a medium of “mimetic production and comprehension”, “the highest level of mimetic 
behaviour”, as somehow outside or beyond its human corporeality.  Hence we need to think through 
this mimetic behaviour as not only “non-sensuous” in the sense that Benjamin means as non-visual, 
wherein non-visual is not looking like, but as sensuous and ergo corporeal.   
 
To begin investigating sensuous mimesis as corporeal I will return to Chapter 3 and Foucault’s 
discussion of the similitudes, in particular convenientia.  As we will recall mimesis as convenientia 
is a matter of continuity and contiguity – “[r]esemblance imposes adjacencies that in their turn 
guarantee further resemblances”. (Foucault 1970, 18)   I will begin to think through corporeality as 
mimetic adjacency – convenientia.  In the case of human corporeality, convenientia highlights the 
relationship of similarity between male and female bodies, which seems obvious.  However, this 
mimetic relationship is discursively inflected – reproducing femininity and masculinity.   
Simultaneously there is both the necessity of there being convenientia between human corporeality, 
such that the species can continue, and discursive practice – written mimetic practice, that pre- and 
reproduces, inflects that corporeal necessity.  This plays out as both recognition of the necessity of 
the mimetically adjacent corporeality and a horror of that similar corporeality.  Ergo, discursive 
practice attempts the magician’s gesture of “getting hold of something at very close range by means 
of its likeness”.  The magician’s gesture is using the power of mimesis over the mimetic.  Thinking 
through this mimetic simultaneity takes seriously Grosz’s formulation in Volatile Bodies: Toward a 
Corporeal Feminism and subsequent feminist writing that the “body is literally written on”.  
 
Convenientia and Corporeal Adjacency 
 
Corporeal mimesis as convenientia accounts for not only human female and male bodies, but also 
the corporeality of other species.  As we recall convenientia is spatial to the extent that it requires 
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contact between things.  Further, convenientia denotes adjacency—a juxtaposition of things such 
that their edges mingle—“the end of one denotes the beginning of the other”. (Foucault 1970, 18)  
“Convenientia is a resemblance connected with space in the form of a graduated scale of 
proximity”. (Foucault 1970, 18)  This idea of graduation of scale resonates with Benjamin’s notion 
of degrees of linguistic capacity.  Foucault continues ‘by linking of resemblance with space, this 
“convenience” that brings like things together and makes adjacent things similar, the world is linked 
together like a chain’. (Foucault 1970, 19)  Hence, corporeal convenientia is the bringing together, 
the noticing of the side-by-sideness, the mimetic nature of biological bodies.  The mimetic 
adjacency of human female and male corporeality is so intimate that it not only perpetuates the 
species via contact, but we transfuse blood and transplant organs thanks to our proximity.  The 
convenientia of other species is marginally less proximate. However, developments in genetics and 
biology allow that we can grow organs for human use in other species.   
 
Given this corporeal mimesis how do we account for the privileging of one corporeality over 
another?  That is constructing the mimetically similar as alterity.  The logic of alterity is not the 
similar as same and different but is dichotomized as “similar”/ “dissimilar” or not quite similar 
enough.  Hence alterity as difference in corporeal convenientia is prescribed as dissimilarity – not 
as corporeal adjacency and proximity that is the order of the similar, but rather as a horror of the 
similar.  This horror plays out in constructing proximity as distance and privileging particular 
bodies dependent on degree of proximity.  That is the desire for corporeal convenientia where the 
most proximate corporeality, the most similar is the privileged corporeality.  Simply, men are more 
similar, more corporeally proximate, to each other than they are to women.   And it is here that 
horror develops, the less proximate, the more horrific.  For biologically, genetically, neurologically 
(etc.) speaking while bodies are certainly different from each other, it is not clear what these 
differences amount to.  How is it that one body is determined to be ‘better’ and ergo deserves 
‘privileging’ over another?   
 
What is clear is that biology and genetics determines that I am female and human and hence 
disappointingly will never know what it is like to be my female cat, or my male cat, for that matter.  
In fact it is the case that I am probably more similar to male humans than cats by and large.  
However, it is difference constructed as distance, the similar as the dissimilar that operates here.  It 
is not that we are female or male per say.  Rather it is that female becomes feminine and male 
becomes masculine.  At this point the magicians trick comes in – the getting hold of something at 
very close range by means of its likeness – simply, to gain power over it.  In Chapter 4 ‘Mimesis: 
Myth’ I showed that a mimetic means was used to gain power over mimesis, namely Perseus’ shield 
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was used to conquer the Gorgon who was possessed with her own power to produce mimetic 
likenesses.  In the move from female to feminine, male to masculine, the same gesture is used.  
 
Corporeality as Discursive Effect  
 
I am going to examine a couple of moments in Feminism and the Biological Body (Birke, 1999), 
which trouble me greatly as a feminist who is not a biologist.  For what is at stake in this text is not 
the “biological” body as Birke claims.  Rather, the problem that arises is one of mimesis and in two 
ways.  Firstly, there is a confusion of representation: how like corporeality is textuality?  Secondly, 
and relatedly, how do metaphors construct the biological body?   For what Birke engages in is a 
critique of “mechanistic” metaphors of the biological body and “post-modern” metaphors of fluidity 
– the problem being a failure of mimetic adequacy.  There are some highly problematic and 
uncritical moments in Birke’s text, not because Birke is a biologist or a feminist, but rather because 
she sees feminism as “disembodying” the body because it has not attended to the “biological” body.  
 
One of the difficulties of thinking about corporeality as discursive effect is to understand that some 
discourses construct corporeality as if they don’t construct corporeality.  The conclusion is that 
there is something fundamental about corporeal materiality that is “un” or “non” constructed.  This 
produces some strange claims about corporeality and obviates the desire that there be some thing 
that is a text and something that is corporeal and that those things be fundamentally, radically and 
materially different, which of course they are.  However, there is a necessary interplay and 
intrication in humans between corporeality and textuality.  Simply put, if there is one thing that 
differentiates us from other species it is our textuality: we write and read texts, we are implicated in 
them and in/form/ed by them.  Our corporeal relationship with our textuality is extremely complex, 
especially as mimesis as writing is at play, and I will return to that shortly.  However, it is not the 
case that corporeality and textuality can be radically distinguished.  For example, the simplistic 
notion that there are bodies and there are books and well, they’re different.  However, something 
very like this claim underpins Birke’s thinking.  
 
Feminist theorists have analyzed in depth the concept of difference and how that is inscribed 
on the body: what constitutes and produces difference for example?  Difference here means 
not only gender, but the multiple social differences of race, class, sexualities, degrees of 
impairment/disability, and so on.  Some differences seem, indeed, to be inscribed upon the 
surface; others are less so.  Yet the anatomical, internal, body in these formulations seems to 
disappear, except as a set of signifiers.  Caddick (1992) argues that earlier feminist 
theorizing that minimized sexual difference (insisting on androgyny), and recent feminist 
explorations of difference, have in common that they disembody.  Bodies, in some 
theorizing, seem to become little more than texts, she suggests. (Birke 1999, 27) 
 147 
 
 
One of the issues highlighted by Birke, citing Caddick, is that in some contemporary feminist 
theories of difference disembody bodies such that bodies “seem to become little more than texts … 
”. (Birke 1999, 27) Birke’s concerns about post-modern readings of the body are based on a 
misapprehension of what constitutes a texted body.  The problem here is that Birke is constructing a 
dichotomy between bodies and texts, an analytic gesture par excellence – there are bodies and there 
are texts, and these are radically different entities.  In fact, it is not clear what “text” even means 
here unless it means something like book.  But it does imagine “texts” are not (em)bodied or 
incorporated, that is, “texts” are somehow outside the body – distinct from bodies.   
 
Further, what is lost in the claim that bodies are little more than texts is the complexity of bodies as 
both textualized and textualizing.  To clarify the issue somewhat I am going to point out that some 
bodies aren’t even considered as textualizing, although they are certainly textualized.  Those bodies 
would be non-human bodies.  Moreover, for Birke there seems to be a confusion about semiotic 
signification such that the body disappears “except as a set of signifiers”.  Even more problematic is 
the suggestion that “recent explorations of difference … disembody” and that this “disembodiment” 
can be laid at the feet of feminism.  In fact, it is not feminism that has “disembodied” or better yet, 
biologically speaking (dis)organized, corporeality. Rather we might consider that “biology” has 
disembodied (dis)organized corporeality by constructing bodies as “mechanistic” rather than 
“organismic”. 
 
Further it would be odd for any feminist to claim that we are “little more than texts”.  No critical 
practice has worked harder to return to women and others their bodies – their corporeal specificity.  
Feminism has situated bodies in historico-politico-cultural-academic practices – practices that are in 
fact textual.  Moreover, the issue for feminists is not that we are not biological.  Rather the issue is 
claims of biological determinism.  Now I am fairly certain, as I pointed out above, that I am 
biologically determined to be a human animal rather than a cat, and biologically speaking I am no 
more or less female than my cat.  What I am equally certain of is that I have no idea outside 
historico-politico-cultural, that is textual practices, of biology and determinism and biological 
determinism, what that actually means, except for the misfortune of being unable to be or become a 
cat.   
 
It is not a problem of being biologically, chemically, genetically etc. anything or something.  Rather 
it is a problem of ascribing, predetermining, meaning to/of those things.  And quite frankly 
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ascribing and determining meaning is at minimum a (con)textual practice.  And it is precisely the 
textual practices of biology, bio-medicine and science that Birke critiques.  However, it is not the 
case that feminism and “post-modern” (whatever might be meant by the term) discursive practices 
disembody by turning them into little more than texts.  Rather, “post-modern” discursive practices 
understand bodies as texted by discursive practice(s).  Human bodies in/corporate discursive 
practices.  I will return shortly to the corporeal embodiment of discursive practices which I think 
through as incorporated rather than inscribed.  It is embodied discursive practices that text the body.  
“Post-modernity” points out that “the Sciences” including biology and “the Humanities” are 
discursive practices.  Further, highlighting the discursivity of the “sciences” elucidates a further 
dichotomous construction.  Namely that science deals with “material” bodies and the humanities 
deal with “cultural” bodies – with the cultural being the textual.  This assumes that there are 
unconstructed non-textualized material bodies for scientists to work with/on and that the textual is 
ergo (im)material.   However, I will argue shortly that textual practices are, in point of fact, 
material.  It is a misapprehension to suppose otherwise. 
 
Birke is concerned about the disappearance and/or silencing of the “biological” or ma(t)er/ial body.  
She argues that whatever “differences we might speak of between people – in their culture, or in the 
external appearance of their bodies – their interiors, we assume are similar”. (Birke 1999, 27)  This 
is corporeal convenientia at the level of the organism.  However, it is not an assumption that 
peoples’ interiors are similar; they are similar.  And precisely to the same extent that their exteriors 
are similar.  People look like people whatever their, racial, sexual and/or cultural differences.  In 
terms of feminist critical practice, and Birke’s requirement of returning to biological corporeal 
“interiors” one need merely note that no intra-species group have been more determined by 
differences in their biological interiors than women.  It is not that our internal differences aren’t 
biological.  Rather, it is a matter of how those differences have been read, interpreted and 
constructed.  This is the construction of alterity - the logic of which I pointed out earlier is a 
privileging of proximate similarity.   
 
Finally, I want to briefly examine another of Birke’s claims about ‘textuality’ that she sees as “post-
modern” due to the contemporary use of metaphors of fluidity. 
 
What, for example, are the consequences of describing the body in terms of postmodern 
boundary transgressions, of ever-fluid flows? … What I find frustrating about the narrative 
of fluidity is that it seems to lose sight of the ability of the biological body to be self-
organising and self- determining – to be transforming within itself.  It also loses sight of the 
constraints of flesh (Newman 1995); organisms simply are not that fluid or flexible in the 
development of their body plans. (Birke 1999, 169) 
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Unfortunately, this claim seems to conflate metaphoricity and literality.  To describe or metaphorize 
corporeality in terms of fluidity simply does not amount to saying corporeality is only a fluid 
materiality or better yet a liquid.  Although, one has to say that corporeally we are compositionally 
largely fluids.  We are bloody, sweaty and secreting and these fluids transfuse and “transgress” 
corporeality understood as clean and proper, inside and outside (see particularly Kristeva, Powers of 
Horror, 1982 and relatedly Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 1985 and This Sex Which is 
Not One, 1985).  What this does suppose is that we are not constrained in and by corporeal fluidity.  
Further, it remains unclear what is precisely at stake in proclaiming a problematic of “post-modern 
boundary transgressions of ever fluid flows” and that “organisms simply are not that fluid or 
flexible in the development of their body plans”.  What “fluidity” suggests in these contexts is that 
organisms are neither mechanistic nor rigidly bounded by an internality or externality.   It is also 
not a “post-modern” claim that organisms are unconstrained by their morphological development, 
which is what “body plans” are.  I don’t know of any theorists, “post-modern” or otherwise, who 
suggest that they can morphologically develop or transform into cats. 
 
In particular, my plea is for a view of the biological body that embraces transformation and 
change and prioritises the body in relation – thus emphasising the ‘body’s world’. (Birke 
1999, 158) 
 
I cannot, unfortunately, develop on my own the kind of ‘new biology’ for which I plead.  It 
would take the efforts of many of us.  My hope is, however, that more engagement of social 
theorists with biology might help to encourage the kinds of questions and hypotheses that 
could eventually contribute towards new frameworks of thinking in biology.  Perhaps what I 
seek is a cyborg biology, a hybrid form. [Note 77] (Birke 1999, 187) 
 
Unfortunately, despite her plea, Birke does not return to the “body’s world” as transformational, 
changeable or relational.   Birke’s hope for a “new biology” requires returning our interiors – giving 
corporeality back its organs, rethinking corporeality as organism.   Further, Birke’s text is strangely 
ironic.  For in critiquing bio-medical practice and comprehension of corporeality she adopts the 
very tools she objects to as “post-modern”.  That is Birke takes a linguistic turn and critiques bio-
medical mechanistic metaphors.   Hence her complaint is not so much about returning us to our 
corporeal interiors and organs, rather, it is about competing metaphors – which, to belabour the 
point, are textual not biological.  Therefore it is not a struggle between something textual and 
something biological.  Rather it is a competition between representational, i.e. mimetic adequacies. 
 
It is precisely to the internal, the interior but not exactly the depths of corporeality that I will now 
turn, unfortunately without a “biological”, “organic”, or “organismic” model or metaphor to support 
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this turn.  However, this turn is not a turn from the external, the exterior or the surface.  Rather it is 
an attempt to think through corporeality as discursive incorporation as mimesis and writing as 
mimetic excorporation.  It is an attempt to write corporeal materiality not only as “inscribed” but 
also as a living surface-depth perpetually writing rather than only written.  It is also an attempt to 
respect corporeality as living and lived.  For I share not Birke’s “biological” concerns, which end 
up as rather odd ontological claims about what is “real” or “natural”, unconstrained or 
unconstructed.  However, I do share her corporeal discomfort, namely that corporeality is not only 
exterior, external or surface.  Rather, corporeality is always at the same time internal and external, 
interior and exterior, surface and depth.  Hence my notion of writing as incorporation and 
excorporation tries to reflect the relationship and transformational interplay between these modes of 
corporeality.  Moreover, my claim is that corporeal materiality is discursive materiality.  There is no 
corporeality that is “little more than texts” or signs.  Such claims assume that discursivity and 
textuality are external, exterior and surface, ergo “non” or “in” corporeal; somehow separate or 
separable.  Corporeality is textual, texted, texting, signified, signifying – significant. 
 
Reformulating inscription as incorporation 
 
Thinking through writing as a mimetic practice and moreover a corporeal practice entails two 
moments.  The first is a consideration of “inscription” as the model/metaphor of writing.  Rather 
than suggesting that corporeality as written on is “inscribed” I suggest that corporeality is also “pre-
scribed” or pre-textualized, that is pre-written.  This entails taking seriously Grosz’s notion that 
corporeality is literally, rather than metaphorically, written on, although it is clear that there are 
moments of tension between literal and metaphorical comprehension of writing as corporeal.  The 
second entails understanding the power of writing as a mimetic practice to produce, reproduce and 
gain control of and over corporeal convenientia – the use of the power of mimesis to overpower the 
mimetic. 
 
The body is quite literally rewritten, traced over, by desire.  (Grosz 1994, 56) 
 
What psychoanalytic theory makes clear is that the body is literally written on, inscribed by 
desire and signification, at the anatomical, physiological and neurological levels.  (Grosz 
1994, 60) 
 
If the writing or inscription metaphor is to be of any use for feminism – and I believe that it 
can be extremely useful – the specific modes of materiality of the “page”/body must be 
taken into account: one and the same message, inscribed on a male or female body, does not 
always or even usually mean the same thing or result in the same text.  (Grosz 1994, 156) 
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I will deny that there is the “real,” material body on the one hand and its various cultural and 
historical representations on the other.  It is my claim throughout this book that these 
representations and cultural inscriptions quite literally constitute bodies and help produce 
them as such.  (Grosz 1994, x) 
 
 
In her introduction to Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Grosz, 1994) [Volatile 
Bodies from now on] Grosz asks us to consider whether the effect of “depth and interiority” of the 
subject can be as fruitfully accounted for as inscription, transformation and primacy of a corporeal 
surface.  Grosz maintains that her text “refigures” the body “so that it moves from the periphery to 
the center of analysis, such that it can now be understood as the very “stuff” of subjectivity”. (Grosz 
1994, ix)  This shift from interiority to surface, Grosz argues, allows corporeality to be reconsidered 
in such a way as to show a denatured, social and historical body, a body actively produced as a 
body of a particular type.  Writing, I suggest, elaborating on Benjamin’s notion of linguistic 
mimesis, is an archive of sensuous mimesis that precisely captures Grosz’s account of the 
production of bodies as denatured, historical and socio-cultural corporeality.  
 
 
Pre-texts and Pre-scription  
 
It is not simply that the body is represented in a variety of ways according to historical, 
social and cultural exigencies while it remains basically the same; these factors actively 
produces the body as a body of a determinate type.  (Grosz 1994, x) 
 
 
Grosz argues that bodies are “literally” constituted by cultural and historical representations.   
Whilst cultural representations of corporeality may appear to be largely visual and idealized, the 
power of these representations is indebted to mimesis in that they are corporeal similarities.  Visual 
representations are mimetically capacious objects, however problematic they may be.  Similarly, as 
I argued in the preceding chapter, writing is mimetic practice, hence texts are mimetically capacious 
objects.  What needs to be considered here is the relationship between writing as a mimetically 
capacious object and its capacity to produce bodies of “a determinate type”.  As simply put as 
possible, the ability, not only for the representation to be similar to the thing it represents, but the 
representation’s ability to produce the thing as similar to representation.  That is, for the 
representation, in this case writing, to determine the thing.   There are several interrelated issues 
here.  The first is not so much the “enjoyment” of the mimetic discussed in Derrida’s account of 
Rousseau and supplementarity in the preceding chapter.  Rather there are doubled moments wherein 
desire constructs the similar as similar of a particular type, while at the same time constructing the 
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desire or need to become that particular similar.  The latter is close to Benjamin’s account of the 
powerful “compulsion”, not to be like something else, but to be “like” a likeness.  The former 
constructs the model or type and at the same time not only requires that type be met but understands 
and uses the compulsion to be like, in this instance, the “likeness” itself. 
 
Mimesis: writing corporeality 
 
To the extent that mimesis is at play in discourses of the body I argue that Grosz’s formulation of 
the written body and subsequent feminist uptakes of that formulation can be taken literally.  In 
Chapter 3, I examined Mauss and Hubert’s notion of the poorly executed ideogram.  The poorly 
executed ideogram is a mimetic object that does not “look like” the thing it is mimetic of and yet 
retains its similarity to that thing.  Writing is just such a mimetic object.   While writing fails to 
“look like” the object it is similar to, it maintains its similarity.  This means discourses of the body 
make mimetic objects, “likenesses” of the body – discourses of the body literally write the body, 
not only as a body of a determinate type, but as written, as a sign of that writing, a sign of that 
similarity.   Hence, corporeal mimesis is not only corporeal convenientia wherein bodies are similar 
to each other.  As well as this, corporeality becomes similar to, mimetic of the texts and discourses 
it writes.  The extent that corporeality can be similar is the precise extent to which it is the desired 
form.   
 
Tracing the history of discourses of corporeality provides not only a corporeal bibliography, but 
also a history of author/ity over written bodies.   There are two mimetic objects here: writing as a 
mimetic object of corporeality and corporeality as a mimetic object of writing.  These objects are 
not in any way simply separable from each other.  Rather, they produce, re-produce, inflect and 
reflect each other – they mutually determine each other. Author/ity is not merely the magician’s 
trick of getting hold of something at very close range by means of its likeness in order to influence 
it, that is, to have power over that object.  In writing, the magician becomes the mimetician as 
author and authority and the writing authoritative. Writing as authoritative, is the power of the text 
as likeness, of likeness as such.   
 
What psychoanalytic theory makes clear is that the body is literally written on, inscribed, by 
desire and signification, at the anatomical, physiological, and neurological levels. (Grosz 
1994, 60) 
 
For Foucault, power deploys discourses, particularly knowledges, on and over bodies, 
establishing knowledges as the representatives of the truth of those bodies and their 
pleasures.  Discourses, made possible and exploited by power, intermesh with bodies … 
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Power is the condition of possibility of these true discourses, the motivating force behind 
their profusion and the energy which inscribes them on bodies and pleasures. (Grosz 1994, 
150) 
 
 
History, philosophy, literature, science, biology, medicine, politics, psychoanalysis etc. are not only 
corporeal practices, but also corporeal practice as discursive practices and therefore textual 
practices.  It is intriguing in reading Foucault that while “discourse” is made possible and exploited 
by “power” as Grosz points out above, it is never clear how this is achieved apart from the 
mobilization of technologies and sites or institutions.  In thinking through the relationship between 
“power” and “discourse” a further deployment becomes evident, namely power as author/ity, the 
power to authorize, that is, write over or over-write corporeality.   
 
What is perhaps unique to the corporeality of the late twentieth and earlier twenty first century is 
that we are by and large more or less literate.  To belabour the point, corporeality at this time, more 
so than any other time, is a reading and writing corporeality.  However, it is not the case that 
literacy has equally empowered individuals.  There is an asymmetry between bodies that read and 
bodies that write.   All bodies that write necessarily read, however many bodies that read do not 
write.  What is deployed in the literate body is not only Foucault’s “sex” and “confession” as 
understood in The History of Sexuality, which is a matter of a masculine speaking or a speaking 
subject or a subjectivity that must speak its sexuality as deviancy.  It is also the deployment and 
proliferation of texts, textuality, and discursivity.  It is a matter of writing, precisely to the extent 
that Foucault, or anybody else for that matter, could write about the deployment of “sex” and 
confession.   Indeed it is not so much that “power” is the “condition and possibility” of discourse, 
true or otherwise.  Rather it is discourse as authoritative which is powerful.  Foucault’s notion of 
“power” in its permutations and institutions does not bring together or divide words and things. 
(Grosz 1994, 148)  Discourses as authoritative and authorized exploit the mimetic relationship 
between words and things, the textuality of literate corporeality.  Writing is the inseparability, the 
necessary similarity of the text and the thing made manifest in literate corporeality.  I remember 
learning to read, teaching my daughter to read – “a” is for “apple” with a picture of an apple on the 
page.  Learning to read mimesis – the similarity between “apple”, the picture of the apple and an 
apple.  It was many years before I learned that “p” was for “p-ness” or penis or phallus or 
phallogocentrisim.  Reading is the most intimate, the most internalized exteriorization of the literate 
body.  Reading is the incorporation, the taking in to the body, of writing.  The writer, the author as 
magician and authority, is the mimetician producing the mimetic object – the text, the book, the 
body of works with the precise aim of being read, of being incorporated.   Textual incorporation as 
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reading, is “writing on the body”.  It is the power of mimesis, the order of the similar, which not 
only produces the mimetic object, the writing, but the power of the mimetic object to produce the 
similar in the reader which is the aim of the writer.  In discourses of the body, of corporeality, the 
aim is to produce a body as similar to the text, the mimetic object.   
 
 
Mimesis between the body and the page 
 
The body is quite literally rewritten, traced over, by desire. (Grosz 1994, 56) 
 
What psychoanalytic theory makes clear is that the body is literally written on, inscribed, by 
desire and signification, at the anatomical, physiological, and neurological levels. (Grosz 
1994, 60) 
 
If the writing or inscription metaphor is to be of any use for feminism … the specific modes 
of materiality of the “page”/body must be taken into account: one and the same message, 
inscribed on a male or a female body, does not always or even usually mean the same thing 
or result in the same text. (Grosz 1994, 156) 
 
In the preceding section I argued for a literal interpretation of the Grosz’s formulation of the written 
body, which occurs in the first and second quotes above.  I have argued that the literate body is the 
site (or perhaps cite) of the deployment of discourses of the body, of which psychoanalysis is only 
one – philosophy of course, is another.  In the last quote Grosz shifts from a body that is literally 
written on to a position that the notion of the written body as metaphorical.  This move elaborates a 
tension, a slippage between literal and metaphorical comprehensions of corporeality as written – as 
the surface of writing.  This becomes clear a little further on when Grosz challenges her own 
“model”. 
 
The kind of model I have in mind here is not simply then a model of an imposition of 
inscription on a blank slate, a page with no “texture” and no resistance of its own.  As any 
calligrapher knows, the kind of texts produced depends not only on the message to be 
inscribed, not only on the inscriptive tools – stylus, ink – used, but also on the quality and 
distinctiveness of the paper written upon.  Perhaps, then, a more appropriate model for this 
kind of body writing is not the writing of the blank page – a model which minimizes the 
impact and effects of the paper itself – but a model of etching, a model which needs to take 
into account the specificities of the materials being thus inscribed and their concrete effects 
in the kind of text produced. (Grosz 1994, 191) 
 
The metaphorization of the body as page and/or paper shifts between two inextricable moments of 
mimesis as writing and mimetic representation in general which I will take up in the last chapter, 
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‘Mimesis: Exemplarity’.  The tension or slippage here is that while writing is a corporeal mimetic 
practice, the mimetic object, whilst engaging the power of mimesis, is always a simulacrum, a 
model, a metaphor.  In the literate body, writing will always be both literal and metaphorical.  The 
power of metaphor as mimetic intuition discussed in Chapter 2, ‘Mimesis: Metaphor’, is the ability 
to perceive the similarity between two sometimes radically and materially different things.   Hence 
Grosz’s shift from “literal” to “metaphorical” body writing need not be read as a recanting of an 
earlier position due to the rather obvious material difference between bodies and pages.  Without 
denying her previous position Grosz proposes a refinement of her model/metaphor.  And for good 
reason.  In accounting for the specificity of the “surface” of writing, the material differences 
between one page and another, or one body and another, there exists the possibility of a body 
writing, and a body of writing, beyond what has been and is written and authorized by one body.  
As Grosz argues the “question of sexual difference admits of no outside position”. (Grosz 1994, 
191)  In the literate body, the question of sexuality is always and immediately a question of 
textuality.   Hence it is a question not only of “sexual ethics” but also textual ethics, that is, how to 
write ethically. 
 
Mimesis between the Calligrapher and the Palimpsest 
 
I want to ruminate for a while on the difference between writing as calligraphy and a corporeality 
that is unmistakably already written on.   As Grosz clearly indicates the body as surface needs to be 
considered in its specificity and as site of possible resistance.  Throughout Volatile Bodies Grosz’s 
metaphor for writing is inscription.  In the above she suggests ‘a model of etching’.   Both these 
models of writing understand their surface as blank bland page, as a tabula rasa.  Writing as 
inscription is a cutting into, a scarification, a permanent marking of surface such that it cannot be 
re-inscribed.  Moreover, Grosz is also aware of the problems of “etching”, which she clarifies in her 
notes.  Etching she points out “assumes the independent preexistence of its raw materials, whereas 
what I want to suggest is that these very elements are produced in the inscriptive process”. (Grosz 
1994, 227)   For Grosz inscription and etching are closely aligned in a way that very nearly echoes 
Derrida’s point that there is nothing outside the text.  Moreover, it is no longer a matter of elements, 
“raw materials”, pages, bodies – it is a matter in this case of the “inscriptive process” – the process 
of writing – a case of the already written.  In effect the written and writing body is a palimpsest.   
The notion of the literate body as a palimpsest implies that it is a body that is also already literated, 
even before its literacy.  This suggests at minimum that bodies have a written history; belong to 
history as a history of writing bodies as not merely bodies of a determinate type, but as authorized.   
If writing is a mimetic process and moreover a corporeal process then it becomes a matter of who 
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writes, who is authorized and/or sanctioned, to access the power of mimesis – not only who writes, 
but what form, what method, what process of writing. 
 
The power of writing as inscription or perhaps etching as a model/metaphor of process is that it 
particularizes a methodology, a type of writing as belonging to a body horrified by other bodies, 
and, with far different consequences, its own.  Inscription as a mode of writing is masculine and 
belongs to men.  While writing as inscription is a method of producing and privileging the corporeal 
convenientia between similar bodies it also produces writing as wounding. Bodies as not only as 
already wounded, but also bodies that require perpetual re-wounding as re-inscription.  This is what 
it is to write incisively (with every pun intended and no pun at all).  Incisive writing is objective – 
clear, clean, ostensibly precise.  Its’ objectivity requires distance – authority as dis-embodiment – 
authority without an author.  It is a thematic inter- and intra-discursive ideo-mythology of the 
disembodied – writing.  It deploys the already written, to write.  Author/ity telescopes the past into 
the present, it brings the weight of dead men writing with it.  Authority is historico-cultural writing 
of n/ever present mortified bodies.  To think this through I want to take up Susan Bordo’s accounts 
of hysteria and anorexia not as disordered or pathological but as instantiations of inscription – a 
perpetuation of authorization, writing horrified by embodiment as such. 
 
Engendered writing 
 
I am not a gender skeptic.  However, I think perhaps there is only one gender.  Even I am outraged 
that I would make such a claim.  This claim suggests that masculinity and femininity are both 
constructions of historico-socio-cultural authority, a body writing its horror, not (only) of another 
body, a sexed (female) body, but its own embodiment.  That is femininity (and masculinity) has 
nothing to do with femaleness as such and everything to do with male embodiment as such – 
everything to do with authorization – everything to do with writing – who writes, what is written.   
 
Reading Bordo’s Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and The Body (1993) what 
caught my eye was her parenthetical comment about contemporary femininity “(read: without need, 
without want, without body)”. (Bordo 1993, 47)  Bordo points out a little earlier “whatever the 
causality, the old dualities are clearly being culturally re-inscribed”. (Bordo 1993, 42)  Bordo brings 
together not only the cultural situatedness of hysteria and anorexia but also the observation that “as 
hysteria has shed its symbolic, emotional, and professional freight, as it has become a historical 
phenomenon, that it has become possible to see it, in some ways for the first time”. (Bordo 1993, 
50)  Or perhaps, to write it, re-cite it for the first time.  What is striking in Bordo’s account is that 
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what is constructed as faulty and flawed thinking or beliefs or “distorted attitudes” in the anorectic 
body is actually “a fairly accurate representation of social attitudes toward slenderness or the 
biological realities involved in dieting”. (Bordo 1993, 58-59)  That is, not that women’s 
interpretations are faulty, they are in fact very close and careful readers of what is required of their 
bodies in any given culture at any given time – were they academics they would be highly astute 
semioticians – for they not only see the signs they embody them.  Hence I will re-ask, not only 
Bordo’s question “whose body is this?”, but further, what is significant, what is the “slender” body 
a sign of, whose body is this a likeness of?  What is it mimetic of?   
 
Corporeal convenientia suggests that the slender body is Plato’s beautiful boy and that we have 
never left the Symposium – who could forget that Eryximachus the physician was there and he sent 
the flute girl from the room.  Hence I want to open, not quite a dialogue between Eryximachus and 
the flute girl but a recital between homo-erotics, and dis/embodiment – the moment when the 
Material Girl (Madonna) becomes a little boy.  The venue (the scene) takes place between the 
Symposium and Bordo’s Unbearable Weight: Feminism Western Culture, and the Body (1993).   It 
is recitation of authority, discursivity, rhetorical strategies and desire – a moment of literation – 
writing. 
 
Reading Bordo’s account of 1983 meeting of the New York Centre for the Study of Anorexia and 
Bulimia I suggest that challenge to Orbach’s theoretical acuity was done on the basis of discursive 
authority – a mobilization of the power mimesis – the authority of the magician.   
 
 
For Orbach, anorexia represents one extreme on a continuum on which all women today 
find themselves, insofar as thy are vulnerable, to one degree or another, to the requirements 
of the cultural construction of femininity.  This notion provoked criticism from the (all 
male) panel of commentators, two psychiatrists and one clinical psychologist.  The political 
implications of Gilligan’s talk had been missed by her respondents (and by Orbach) 
…Orbach’s talk … elicited from them a passionate defense of “traditional women,” with 
Orbach the feminist portrayed as unsisterly and unmotherly and the panelists cast as 
sympathetic protectors of those groups that Orbach had abused. … The panelists thus 
represented themselves both as better feminists than Orbach (that is, more concerned with 
actual women’s lives), better “women” (more empathic, more caring), and at the same time 
dazzling masculine Prince Charmings, rescuing women from the abstract and uncaring 
politics of feminism. …How can it be that her analysis both explained and failed to explain?   
This apparent contradiction in the estimation of the panel can be accounted for only by the 
hidden stipulation that the theory, no matter how well it illuminates a given phenomenon, is 
inadequate unless it also sets down general criteria to enable clear and precise distinguishing 
between “normal” and “pathological” members of a population.  (Bordo 1993, 47-49) 
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I want to sketch a double take.  Bordo suggest that the male panelists missed the political 
implications of Orbach’s paper on the cultural implications of anorexia as an extremity on a 
continuum of women’s experience of femininity.  Firstly, the male panelists did not miss the 
political implications of Orbach’s analysis, for medicine, psychiatry, psychology, etc., as practice(s) 
and discursive practice(s) are highly political – medical “opinion” on embodiment often becomes 
legislation.  Medical discourse(s), legal discourse(s) and political discourse(s) are not neatly 
distinguishable discourse(s) they are discursive interpolation.53   
 
There are two rhetorical strategies here, an appeal to abstraction and an ad hominem argument. The 
mobilization by the panelists of the purported ‘abstraction’ of feminism is a double gesture – firstly 
it situates theorizing the body as a male privilege, secondly it suggests that their own practice(s) are 
not as such abstract or theoretical.  In outlining the hidden stipulations or theoretical requirements 
of discourse(s) – that it set down “general criteria” that it be “clear” and “precise”, that it 
distinguish between, in this instance “normal” and “pathological”, that it designate “populations”, 
what is stipulated is that theory be abstract.  Hence, Orbach can be accused at one and the same 
time of being both abstract and not abstract.   It seems to me the only “failure” Orbach or any other 
women theorist writing might make is that she stipulate as a “general criterion” a “population” of 
women.  Her other “failure” is the “failed” abstraction, the “failed” generalization, a failure of 
universalizability, the most abstract abstraction – a failure to write as if your writing included every 
body.  The second rhetorical strategy in the above is the one most frequently leveled at feminism, 
the ad hominem argument, you’re not a real woman.   Hence the male panelists are able, at one and 
the same time, be better feminists and better men.54 If gender theory has taught me anything, it has 
taught me that femininity belongs to masculinist discourse – to one body, the male body. This 
means that masculinity and femininity are one gender distributed over two bodies.  Moreover, 
whatever observations feminists make they are open to accusations of not including men in them. 
Such a strategy means in this instance that feminists (women) aren’t paying attention to whatever 
cultural distortions men might suffer: “Look – don’t we suffer too?”  However, what underlies 
Bordo’s and indeed my own anxieties as a feminist of difference is this – the oldest demand of all – 
that women be everything for everybody all the time.   
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 An instance of this at the moment in Australia is the Governmental Policies and legislation around smoking.  Another 
moment surrounds the Heart Foundation’s tick of approval on food products. 
54 I remember trying to have a discussion once with a white male friend about his insistence that he was a feminist.  I 
suggest his assertion was the same as claiming he was ‘black’.  He found my arguments unpersuasive. 
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What is even more difficult is Bordo’s account of postmodern bodies and “deconstructionism”.   In 
Bordo’s account of the “Material Girl” becoming a little boy – I observed the moment when the 
purported “death of the author” supposedly ushered in “the audience”; an era defined by two myths 
– the myth of “infinite interpretability” and the myth of the literate body as an equally empowered 
reader.   
 
At the same time, the portrayal of Madonna as a porno queen-object is deconstructed, 
McClary argues, by the end of the video, which has Madonna changing her clothes to those 
of a little boy and tripping of playfully, leaving the manager of the house sputtering behind 
her.  McClary reads this as “escape to androgyny,” which “refuses essentialist gender 
categories and turns sexual identity into a kind of play”. (Bordo 1993, 274) 
 
 
Underlying the “postmodern” uptake of McClary’s reading of Madonna’s “escape to androgyny” is 
the one metaphor of bodies-in-the-world at “play”.  I only have time here to open a critique of the 
“game” metaphor which underscores every notion of “play” including and perhaps especially a 
‘postmodern’ feminist comprehension of who the “players” are and what in fact “playfulness” is.  
McClary’s account of this video suggests that it need not be read as the object of the patriarchal 
gaze: “its energy can motivate play and nonsexual pleasure”, the energy that is, of the “female 
object”.  Bordo reads this video quite accurately as the dominant position of the objectifying gaze 
that has never been anything but male.  Reading Bordo’s reading of the “transformations” of 
Madonna’s body I watched it metamorphose between a multiplicity of moments of homo-erotic 
desire in which there is nothing “playful” at all.   
 
Firstly, in the notion of “androgyny” what is at play is the absurdity of a double embodiment of a 
youthful sexual boy/girl, hermaphrodism read as indeterminacy and paradoxicality.  Androgyny is 
an antitype, a foreshadowing as overshadowing, typified as slender, gangly, young – small or non-
breasted, small hipped, etc.  If “she” is anything “she” is a young male – the “andro” defaces, 
inscribes, neutralizes whilst neutering the “gyne”.  “She” is the beautiful youthful male body.  
Moreover, it is highly questionable as to what is at stake in Madonna’s “changing”, “transforming”, 
putting on the clothes of “a little boy”.  Does this re-cite pedophilia and/or infantilism?  Does it 
construct the objectifying gaze as a boy’s fully understandable and necessary curiosity – 
surreptitious girly gazing – all boys being a just a bit naughty in this regard?   I will suggest that no 
little girl has ever or could ever “trip” playfully away in such a “scene”.  The flute girl has not only 
been sent from the room; she never saw herself “naked”.  
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It doesn’t strike me as immediately obvious that anything has in fact been deconstructed here, 
because the “playfulness”, the play, and the play between plays is that between boy(s) and men.  
What is lost in whatever Bordo typifies as “post-modern conceits” and in a great many uptakes of 
deconstruction, if I have read Derrida aright, is that deconstruction is an extremely rigorous, careful 
and moreover highly respectful, analysis of its theoretical, historical, philosophical, cultural 
antecedents – it is hyper-analytics and/or hyper-critique, not non-analytics and absolutely not being 
un-analytical.  If I were to claim anything for deconstruction, which, I am most hesitant to do, it is 
at minimum a situated strategic analytic practice of analytic practice – writing critiquing writing 
while writing.  What has come about in many “postmodern” uptakes of deconstruction is not only 
babble in the tower of Babel, barely coherent ecstatic texts adopting a “style” with no 
comprehension, no critique, no analysis of the stylistics of style, the writing of writing.  Bordo’s 
expression of her anxiety about “post-modern” writing/analysis inflects an intellectual and 
theoretical concern often leveled at such writing. 
 
Instead of distinctions, endless differences reign – an undifferentiated pastiche of difference, 
a grab bag in which no items are assigned any more importance or centrality than any 
others. … This spectacle of difference defeats the ability to sustain coherent political 
critique. (Bordo 1993, 285) 
 
  
If I were to say anything here I would suggest that “deconstruction” of any text is one of the most 
political gestures a theorist – a situated embodied writer – could make.  What is “played” out in 
expressing concern vis a vis “postmodern” theory is a differential – body, writing.  And given that I 
take my playfulness seriously I will point out that there are underlying contemporary anxieties two 
dichotomies: free will/determinism and serious/playful.  Furthermore, what is at stake here is an 
embodied writing/reading/theorizing, a matter of the author/ity of the author  – discourse – a matter 
of how to write, what to write, and what will be authorized, what writing/discourse is authoritative – 
a matter of men writing their authority.  Somewhere between every body and no body are the un-
authorized writings of women writing.  In the literate body all modes of writing, including 
“inscription”, deploy at one and the same time the similarity of words and things, discourses of the 
body and bodies, and maintain the difference between words and things, texts and bodies.   
 
Calligraphic Corporeality 
 
Such a reading of writing and corporeality understands corporeality as a discursive effect.  For 
feminism, as a critical discursive practice, this plays out in re-writing and re-thinking the body of 
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the text and textual corporeality as discursivity literating embodiment.  Earlier I made two claims 
regarding corporeal convenientia, not only that it privileges a corporeality most similar to its own 
embodiment, its desire as desirability – it writes a horror of embodiment as such.   
 
Reading Descartes’ cogito (and the godliness of god) suggests that not only is “the mind” privileged 
over “the body”, but that what is desirable about “the mind” is that it is disembodied – returning us 
to the parenthetical:  “(read: without need, without want, without body)”. (Bordo 1993, 47)  Writing 
that privileges “the mind”, “the intellect”, “the rational”, “the reasonable”, “the civilized”, “the 
sacred”, etc. ad nauseam and ad infinitum, exposes the desire for disembodiment while in some 
way recognizing the necessity of embodiment.  Hence, it is not only that medical discourses 
mobilize normal/pathological dichotomy as standard of assessing the health of bodies as Bordo 
argues.  The distribution of one gender over two bodies means that both the necessity and the horror 
of embodiment can be displaced onto a body that is not quite similar enough – a little less 
corporeally convenient.  And that body comes to represent the horror of embodiment and the need 
to have power over embodiment.  Hence embodiment as such is written/read as pathological.  It is 
the displacement of one body’s horror at the necessity of death and the vicissitudes of living which 
is displaced onto female embodiment.    It is a noticing that a material difference between men’s 
writing and men’s bodies is that the written, while outlasting the writer, is never beyond author/ity.   
 
To the extent that it has been possible the preceding is an overture, a revision vis a vis “inscription” 
as material embodiment of one body – a moment of writing the material specificity of one 
“page”/body writing its desire(s) and horror.   Hence, corporeal convenientia is a moment of 
elaboration, rather than “inscription”, of male embodiment and masculinist desire and discourse(s) 
read off female bodies.   
 
If the writing or inscription metaphor is to be of any use for feminism … the specific modes 
of materiality of the “page”/body must be taken into account: one and the same message, 
inscribed on a male or a female body, does not always or even usually mean the same thing 
or result in the same text. (Grosz 1994, 156) 
 
 
Feminism as critical practice (re)literates corporeal specificity, attends to the corporeal specificity 
of women’s bodies writing – it (re)faces the/its page.  
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Calligraphy and Idiomatic Writing  
 
I find I miss heroines and actresses more than I can say – I cannot even imagine what the feminine 
of philosopher is/was.  However, I do have some idea of what a feminist philosophy of difference 
might write. 
 
As any calligrapher knows, the kind of texts produced depends not only on the message to 
be inscribed, not only on the inscriptive tools – stylus, ink – used, but also on the quality and 
distinctiveness of the paper written upon. (Grosz 1994, 191) 
 
 
I suggest that calligraphic writing can be undertaken as idiomatic elaboration.  Hence, “idiomatic” 
writing would be an embodied practice, or rather acknowledge writing as embodied as practice.  
This suggests several things, not the least of which is that idiomatic writing is ostensibly a departure 
– a departure from writing that conforms to certain discursive and disciplinary practices.  In the 
preceding chapter I used Derrida and Benjamin’s writing(s) to argue that writing is a mimetic 
practice.  What I failed to do was address Derrida’s writing as idiomatic, which is the greatest 
challenge to reading/comprehending his work.  Derrida’s philosophical writings are 
unapologetically writerly and require not only (re)learning to read but comprehension of philosophy 
as written practice(s).  Hence Derrida’s idiomatic writing challenges and exceeds – it is mimetic 
writing as (dis)similarity.  This means not only that Derrida’s writing is/was n/ever outside 
philosophy as writing, it is exemplary of writing elaborating writing.  To the extent that this is so I 
consider Derrida’s writing(s) as calligraphic rather than inscriptive.  The final chapter attempts to 
elaborate calligraphic writing as an écriture corporelle, and the exemplarity of the example. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Mimesis: Exemplarity 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter I argued that the formula “written on the body” could be understood as 
both literal and metaphorical.  This argument is founded on reconceptualizing “writing” as an 
embodied mimetic practice.  The conjunction of writing as a mimetic practice that is both literal and 
metaphorical, collapses the distinction between these two concepts – concepts that are usually held 
as radically distinct, mutually exclusive modes of writing.  This is not to claim, however, that there 
is no distinction that can be made between types of writing.  Perhaps a more useful way of thinking 
about it is that some things are more or less fictive, metaphorical, etc. than others.  However, this 
does situate writing as an embodied mimetic practice.  Holding such a position requires noticing 
that often boundaries between discourses such as philosophy and literature are not readily or easily 
distinguishable. 
 
Hence this final chapter will open a conversation with/between these two oft distinguished genres 
and considers the possibility of moving toward a calligraphic, rather than an inscriptive writing.  
The movement toward calligraphic writing takes up the challenge outlined in Grosz’s Volatile 
Bodies.  To do so I read Kant’s work on mimesis and exemplarity in the third critique with Kafka’s 
In The Penal Settlement and Greenaway’s film The Pillow Book.  There are several things to be 
considered here.  First, that the relationship between the example and the exemplar is odd to say the 
least.  It is at minimum a mimetic relationship.  In teasing this out we will see that not only is the 
relationship a mimetic one, but it functions similarly to the relationship between the forms and the 
Particulars argued in Chapter 1.  Whilst not arguing that writing is “functionally” mimetic, as the 
forms and their relationship to the particulars, i.e. the particular realization or instantiation of, say, 
the form of chairs. I argue that the forms stand in a relationship of exemplarity to the particulars.  
Moreover, it is not clear whether a form could be comprehended or thought without instantiations 
of the particulars.  Similarly, it is not clear whether something could be considered exemplary 
without a plethora of examples to abstract an exemplar from.  Hence, the relationship is more 
complex than it is usually considered to be.  Considering this complex relationship shows that 
mimesis always exceeds and at the same time remains within the bounds of the mimetic.  
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Comprehending mimesis as excessive allows us to rethink Kant’s discussion of genius and mimesis 
in the Third Critique.   
 
Finally, we will treat the examples of Kafka’s In The Penal Settlement as an obvious example of 
inscriptive writing, and The Pillow Book, as Greenaway’s uptake of calligraphic writing.   Thinking 
through these examples via Kant opens us to the necessary understanding of writing as both an 
aesthetic and an ethical practice.  The challenge of the future will be to move toward ethical writing 
– a philosophical writing that is elaborative rather that argumentative – a conversation. 
 
Exemplarity and the forms 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that not only did the particulars stand in a mimetic relationship to the forms, 
but that Plato was privileging philosophical over poetic mimesis.  As we recall, Plato’s concern 
with the representative arts is that they are at a third remove from the truth of the forms. 
 
The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from the truth, and it is able to 
reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of mere 
phenomenal appearance.  (Plato 1987, 426) 
 
This distance from the truth, I argued in Chapter 1, was due to Plato’s situating the representative 
arts as belonging to the realm of appearance, ergo as apprehending only that which is seen.  
However, what is pertinent for this discussion is not Plato’s account of the relationship between the 
representative arts and the particulars, which will be taken up briefly later in this section, but the 
relationship between the forms and the particulars.  The relationship between the form and the 
particulars, I argued, is that the particulars are functionally mimetic of the forms.  That is, for 
example, the form of chair is “object for sitting on”.  Each realization of a particular chair then is 
mimetic of the function “object for sitting on”.  This notion of functional mimeticity accounts for 
the relationship not only between the forms and the particulars, but also the relationship of the 
particulars to each other.  Therefore, it is not a large claim to suggest that all chairs are like each 
other in that they are “objects for sitting on”.  
 
However, throughout his theorizing Plato strategically never suggests what the relationship is 
between the forms and the particulars, or the particulars and each other, before arguing that the 
relationship of the representative arts is triply removed from the truth of the forms.  This triple 
distance of poetry and other representative arts from the truth is generated not only from 
constructing poetry, etc. as mimetic of the particulars, but the particulars’ relationship to the forms 
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as a relationship of doubled distance.  Plato argues that the relationship between the representative 
arts and the particulars is mimetic.  Hence poets and other artists only have knowledge of the realm 
of appearances.  Further, throughout his argument Plato holds that the difference between the poet 
and the craftsman is one of knowledge.  Simply, Plato argues that the craftsman has greater 
knowledge of his object than the poet or the artist.  Once again, however, Plato does not elaborate 
what this knowledge, or more accurately, this lack of knowledge is.  Rather, Plato claims greater 
verisimilitude of the particulars to the forms – the particulars being only two removes from the truth 
of the forms.    
 
However, there is a further argument for the mimeticity of the particulars to the forms that 
elaborates on my initial arguments for functional mimesis.  There are three things to consider.  
Firstly, that the particulars can only have a mimetic relationship to the forms.  This necessary 
mimeticity is developed in Plato’s notion of verisimilitude, i.e., the knowledge of the crafts-person 
and her object.  Secondly, the difference of verisimilitude between the crafts-person and the poet is 
one of poesis, that is, making and/or production and its inextricable connection to the object 
produced.  And finally, that the relationship is one of exemplarity, i.e., the particulars are examples 
of the form, which serves as an exemplar.  Moreover, this relationship of exemplarity is necessarily 
mimetic and excessive.  Holding that the relationship between the forms and the particulars can 
only be a mimetic one is a much stronger claim than my opening arguments suggest.   
 
Whilst arguing that the particulars are functionally mimetic of the forms accounts for the 
relationship of the forms to the particulars, it does not account for the difference in knowledge 
between the craftsman and the poet or representative artist, so insisted on by Plato.  This difference 
depends minimally on Plato holding a mutually exclusive position between the realm of 
appearances and the realm of phenomena – a claim about reality – the reality of the forms, the 
reality of the particulars and the unreality of poetry etc.  Moreover, it requires a singularity of each 
form and a plurality of particulars.  It is the singularity of the forms and the multiplicity of 
particulars that allows us to begin thinking of this relationship as one of exemplarity.  The 
relationship of the example to the exemplar requires both knowledge and verisimilitude, which can 
only be derived from poesis.  And finally, a distinction between what the poet makes and what 
craftsmen make.  It has always struck me as odd that there is no form of poetry or painting or 
writing – a position that can only be maintained by Plato by consigning poetry etc. as 
representations that is, visually mimetic, a distinction that I have already argued in Chapter One.  
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Otherwise, Plato would have to hold that poetry, painting etc. were somehow unskilled – a position 
he simply would be unable to support.55   
 
Exemplarity and poesis 
 
‘God, then, created only one real bed-in-itself in nature … at any rate he didn’t produce 
more than one, and more than one could not be produced.’  … 
 
‘And what about the carpenter? Does he make or manufacture?’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘And what about the artist? Does he make or manufacture?’ 
‘No.’ 
‘Then what does he do?’ 
‘I think we may fairly claim that he represents what the other two make.’ 
‘Good,’ said I.  ‘Then you say that the artist’s representation stands at a third remove from 
reality.’  (Plato 1987, 425)  
 
‘Suppose, then, a man could produce both the original and the copy.  Do you think he would 
seriously want to devote himself to the manufacture of copies and make it the highest object 
in life?’ (Plato 1987, 427)  
 
From the above it is clear that Plato connects poesis with not only the object produced but with the 
process of production or manufacturing of the object, for the very simple reason, one supposes, that 
one cannot when dealing with crafts separate the object of production from its production and its 
producer.  Whilst Plato never discusses the process of production as such, he does argue that the 
craftsman “has his eye on the appropriate form”. Notably the craftsman has his eye on an 
“appropriate” form – singular.  Plato argues that there can only ever be one form of a set of 
particulars and God makes that form.  Hence, there is only one form for “bed”, “table”, etc.  
However, Plato continues “no craftsman could possibly make the form itself” (Plato 1987, 423) 
Elaborating this particular point, Plato curiously draws attention to a similarity of production of 
objects between the poets and the Gods.  For Plato claims that the poet can make all objects both 
animate and inanimate – a power exclusive to the Gods or God.  We know however, that Plato only 
draws attention to this godlike capacity to elicit a negative from it – the implication being that only 
the Gods have the power to make all objects.  Plato argues that the poet is a craftsman who can 
“make all the objects produced by other particular crafts”. (Plato 1987, 423) The implication is that 
the poets somehow believe they can make everything, i.e. they have God-like powers of creation.   
Plato’s argument, of course, is spurious.  We have no idea what Homer and/or other artists think 
about their creation/s.  However, what is pertinent for Plato is not what poets think about their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Here we are entering into the old dispute about the distinction between art and craft which I have no space to engage. 
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powers of creation.   Rather, Plato needs to differentiate between types of objects-of-production, 
that is, between representation and reality.  
 
Discussing the difference between objects-of-production of the poet, the Gods and the craftsman 
Plato asks whether the artist “makes” of “manufactures”: “I think that we may fairly claim that he 
represents what the other two make”. (Plato 1987, 425) This statement, whilst attempting to 
preclude poetry as a form of making in itself, actually draws attention to the question: what is the 
difference between representation and manufacture or making?  Perhaps Plato is being ironic given 
that poesis and its derivations, one of which is poetry, mean “to make”.  Moreover, Plato would not 
wish to exclude philosophical writing from reality.  Whatever is the case here, Plato inextricably 
links creation with poesis, poesis with knowledge and knowledge with reality.   And, most 
pertinently for our purposes, it is the singularity, the originality, the uniqueness, the paradoxical 
non-repeatable imitability of the forms, which give them their exemplary function.  It is these 
features, outlined by Kant in The Critique of Judgement and discussed by Martin Gammon in his 
article ‘“Exemplary originality”:  Kant on genius and imitation’,56 that will be taken up shortly in 
our discussion of Kantian mimesis. 
 
Plato argues that by necessity God creates only one form of any object or particular.   
 
‘God, then, created only one real bed-in-itself in nature … and more than one could not be 
produced.’ 
‘Why?’ 
‘Because, suppose he created two only, another would emerge whose form the other two 
shared, and it, not the other two, would be the real bed-in-itself.’ (Plato 1987, 424-25) 
 
 
The above provides an explanation for the uniqueness of any form – its necessarily singularity.   
Simply, if there were two forms of a chair, a third could be abstracted from the pair.  Ergo, the form 
is always singular.  Moreover, this “shared” nature would make the pair of forms like one another, 
mimetic of one another.  For this is what it is to “share” a feature.  It is the shared features of the 
beds that are abstracted when their form is apprehended.  Indeed, were there two forms of bed those 
forms would become particulars, namely instantiations of something else.  The singularity of the 
forms means that they are original and essential.  Moreover, this originality means that the form can 
only precede the particulars.   Further, because God is the originator, the creator, of all things Plato 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Gammon’s article is found online and does not include page numbers.  I have however, printed this article and the 
page numbers reflect the printed version. 
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suggests that “we might call him [the] author of its nature or some such thing”. (Plato 1987, 425)  
[my italics]57   
 
Hence, the form necessarily precedes the particulars.  Otherwise, how could a craftsman have an 
eye to it?  Plato argues accordingly that the craftsman must have his “eye” on the “appropriate” 
form when he makes his object. 
 
‘Then we normally say that the maker of either of these kinds of furniture has his eye on the 
appropriate form when he makes the beds and tables we use; and similarly with other things.  
For no craftsman could possibly make the form itself, could he?’ (Plato 1987, 423) 
 
 
From the above it is clear that the form is essential to the particulars.  For if the particulars do not 
share the essential nature of the form, if they are not similar to that form, they cannot be realizations 
of that form.   Moreover, the form must be imitable given these aspects.  However, given that there 
can only be one form to each set of particulars, the form itself is unrepeatable.  Because the form is 
conceived of in this manner – unique, singular, essential, imitable and unrepeatable – the forms are 
exemplary.  The exemplarity of the forms then, is their mimetic excess, their paradoxical 
unrepeatable imitability. 
 
To understand the exemplary nature of the forms one simply need ask what relationship the object 
can possibly have to the form such that it is clear that the craftsman has had an appropriate eye on 
it.  That is, if the particular is not “like” the form, mimetic of the form, then how could there be an 
appropriation, a realization of that form?  
 
Plato’s argument for precedence and essential nature of the forms may suggest that they, like 
geometrical objects, are a priori.58   However, this cannot be the case because knowledge of the 
forms requires, not only an eye to the forms but the experience of making the particulars – and more 
than one particular.  The knowledge Plato needs here is experiential.  Not only is this knowledge a 
posteriori but also, such knowledge is difference between the master and the apprentice.  Surely 
Plato would not seek knowledge from an apprentice, as they would not be experienced enough.  
Moreover, there is a curious oversight on Plato’s part about making or creating objects.  That is, 
poesis can only occur through repetition.  Simply, to come to know something, from making chairs 
to learning logic, playing a musical instrument to writing, one must repeatedly practice the task.  
Further, proof of mastery requires that one must make one’s object to the requisite standard.  That !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 We might think about God as an ultimate ‘author/ity’ as understood in Chapter 6. 
58 This is not to say that I think geometrical objects are a priori, I don’t.  However, it is not relevant to this thesis. 
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means, making an object similar to the master’s object and to the formal requirements of that 
object.  Ergo, knowledge belongs to a mimetic process.   
 
In many cases proof of competency, let alone that of mastery, requires exactitude in the production 
of the object, for example, the chair made by the apprentice must be exactly like the chair made by 
the master, or as near as possible, given that there will always be at minimum a spatio-temporal 
difference between objects.  This is mimesis as reproduction, knowledge as poesis as adequacy.  
The notion of poesis as adequacy calls to mind Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction”.  The issue here is not a loss of “aura” suffered by an artwork that is mechanically 
reproduced.  For Benjamin, aura is the situatedness of the artwork – a series of displacements across 
time and space.  Rather, the issue is the attempted iteration of the object – something like a point for 
point exactitude between the object and its reproduction.  For Benjamin that is mechanical 
reproduction of artworks.  However, this attempted iteration can never be completely accurate, for 
even photographic reproduction changes several characteristics of an original – size, colour, depth 
and surface texture come immediately to mind.  Hence, something more is at stake than aura in 
mechanical reproduction.  We can draw a parallel in the contemporary production of furniture.  Flat 
pack furniture and mass-produced furniture shift poesis from the realm of the human to the 
capacities of computers and their programmers.59  Objects made by craftspeople these days are rare 
and expensive.  The loss in these mechanically produced objects, I argue, is their mimetic excess.  
To think through mimetic excess we turn to Kant’s aesthetic theory in The Critique of Judgment.    
 
Mimetic Excess 
 
In The Critique of Judgement (1952) (the Third Critique from now on), Kant argues that fine art is 
the work of genius and as such is “exemplary originality”.   
Kant’s genius is an exemplary original who stretches the boundary of her field without breaching it.  
For Kant’s genius, while breaking the rules of her art, is at the same time bound by taste and 
knowledge acquired during her education.  From this acquisition we can understand that genius’ 
work as mimetic excess.  For genius must at one and the same time exceed the rules of her art and 
yet remain within her discipline.  
 
In his article ‘“Exemplary originality”: Kant on genius and imitation’ Gammon argues that in 
formulating genius as an exemplary original Kant generates the paradox of canonical succession.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Although this does mean that the labour of putting the object together is a very human one – in fact the major expense 
of ‘labour’ is what is removed from the object.   There are several features of cost minimization to be accounted for 
here that a Marxian analysis is inadequate for, including shifting labour to developing countries. 
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That is, how can genius be exemplary such that other geniuses can follow her and at the same time 
be original?  This paradox dissolves however, if one understands Kant’s work on mimesis in section 
50, in which he describes artistic poesis and discusses the acquisition of knowledge and taste.  
 
In his discussion “Art in general”, in “Book II. Analytic of the Sublime”, Kant distinguishes 
between Art and Nature in several ways.   
 
(I)  Art is distinguished from nature as making (facere) is from acting or operating in 
general (agere), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that  of the 
latter (opus) as work from operation (effectus).    
 By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places 
reason at the basis of its action, that it should be termed art.  (Kant 1952, 162-63) 
 
Art then, for Kant, is “making” and “work”.  Art is a product of an “act of the will” with “reason” 
as the “basis of its action”.  In point (2) of his discussion Kant distinguishes art from science as 
“practical”, “technic” and “what one can do the moment one only knows what is to be done” 
without one needing to produce the thing as such. (Kant p 163, 1952)  Finally, Kant distinguishes 
art from “handicraft”.   Art, for Kant, is “free” and “play”, “an agreeable occupation on its own 
account”.  While this is an infinitely more positive account of art than Plato’s it still relies on a strict 
binarism.  For Kant then, art is not a “theoretical faculty” nor is it “skilled” as in the ability of being 
able to produce an object one knows how to make.  Moreover, art is not “labour, i.e. a business, 
which on its own account is disagreeable” and done only because it is paid and hence may be “a 
compulsory imposition”.  (Kant 1952, 164) Initially, Kant seems to exclude the work and skill 
involved in producing a work of art, the years of repetition of the components that make up any 
piece – training for which often begins in childhood.  This unacknowledged repetition means that 
there is a mimetic debt unaccounted for by art theorists and by the wider community.60  However, if 
we understand that for Kant fine art, the product of genius, is always reined in by taste, the 
acquisition of knowledge, and the application by the genius of the rules of art and taste, then the 
mimetic debt overlooked by many is accounted for in his theory. 
 
[F]or fine art , in the fulness of its perfection, a large store of science is required, as, for 
example, knowledge of ancient languages, acquaintance 
with classical authors, history, antiquarian learning etc.    Hence, these historical sciences, 
owing to the fact that they form the necessary preparation and groundwork for fine art, and 
partly also owing to the fact that they are taken to comprise even the knowledge of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!60!One of the problems lies with the suggestion that art is not ‘work’ in the commonly understood notion of that term.  
Moreover devoting oneself to any of the ‘arts’ is often very poorly paid – the starving artist/writer.  
 
 171 
products of fine art (rhetoric and poetry), have by a confusion of words, actually got the 
name of elegant sciences.  (Kant 1952, 165)  
 
 
From the above, it is clear that Kant’s position on “fine art” is not Platonic.   The difference 
between a Kantian and Platonic position on art is that for Kant art is a knowledgeable pursuit, while 
Plato holds that art lacks knowledge as verisimilitude.  However, the attribution of “science” as 
belonging to art seems to be a contradiction.  For Kant’s earlier position on fine art is that it is an 
act of free will strictly lacking in the “sciences”, for “science” is merely a matter of the logical 
extension of learning.  However, rather than arguing that Kant’s position is contradictory, it is more 
fruitful to see Kant’s argument as paradoxical.  Hence, Kant’s connection of art and science 
expands his earlier discussion in which he differentiates between types of “skills”.   Kant’s 
differentiation of skills is based on “what one can do the moment one only knows what is to done”, 
that is, the ability to produce the object. (Kant 1952, 163)  Kant’s first example is that of someone 
knowing how a shoe must be made but being unable to make it.  “Camper describes very exactly 
how the best shoe must be made, but he, doubtless, was not able to turn one out himself”. (Kant 
1952, 163)    
 
The distinction Kant is drawing is a difference between types of knowledge, i.e. between theoretical 
knowledge or “science” and know-how or skill.  The problem that arises here comes from Kant’s 
earlier arguments in which he holds that art is both theoretical and skilled.  However, Kant is 
pointing out a difference between “knowing how” a thing is done, and being able to actually do the 
thing which is a matter of production that is, poesis.  
 
In the example of the shoemaker Kant clarifies the difference between the ability for “exact 
description” and knowledge.  Simply, Camper’s description, unless it was a manual on making 
shoes, cannot be knowledge.  To use a different example, theoretically people know how to play 
guitar without being able to play guitar.  What is at stake in both Kant’s example and my own is 
whether theoretical accounts, or the capacity for exact description, should be called knowledge.  
The question is whether Kant’s example really gives him what he needs to support his distinction. 
 
The difference between the example of the guitarist and the example of the shoemaker is one of 
common perception.  In the case of the shoemaker, people by and large believe they know how to 
make shoes. For example a shoe needs to have a sole, a top and some heels.  If one glues and 
stitches these things together, then one has a shoe.  In the case of the guitar player, people 
understand that one sits or stands and presses the strings on the appropriate position on the fret 
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board.  Were it the case that one had to describe both these abilities the preceding descriptions 
would suffice.  Were more detailed information required it could be garnered with relative ease.  
However, would we in either case wish to call this capacity for description knowledge?  In Kant’s 
example and my own, the difference between the shoemaker and Camper, the guitarist and the 
general public is the ability to produce the thing they describe, that is, poesis.   Kant, then, clearly 
distinguishes between description and knowledge on the basis of one’s capacity to produce the 
object. 
 
 
Genius and mimesis 
 
On this showing, the product of genius (in respect of so much in this product as is 
attributable to genius, and not possible learning or academic instruction,) is an example, not 
for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of 
the work), but to be followed by another genius – one whom it arouses to a sense of his own 
originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art 
itself a new rule is won – which is what shows a talent to be exemplary. (Kant 1952, 181) 
 
 
In his article ‘“Exemplary originality”: Kant on genius and imitation’ (1997) Martin Gammon 
provides a historical account of the “paradox” found in Kant’s Third Critique.  This paradox, 
Gammon argues, consists in Kant’s holding that genius in art is a matter of free spirit which must be 
used as a model for subsequent artists, that is, the problem of canonical succession.   However, the 
greater paradox is, I argue, that according to Kant fine art as the product of genius can only be 
understood as a constrained freedom.   It is the constrained freedom of genius that is mimetic 
excess.  Moreover, understanding constrained freedom as mimetic excess allows us to resolve 
Gammon’s problem of “canonical succession”.  Hence we need to consider what laws can be laid 
upon Kant’s geniuses such that their freedom is constrained. Kant’s discussion of “taste” elucidates 
at least some of these constraints.   
 
To ask whether more stress should be laid in matters of fine art upon the presence of genius 
or upon that of taste, is equivalent to asking whether more turns upon imagination or upon 
judgement.  Now, imagination rather entitles an art to be called inspired (geistreiche) than a 
fine art.  It is only in respect of judgement that the name of fine art is deserved.  (Kant 1952, 
182) [Kant’s italics] 
 
Kant argues that in “lawless freedom imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but 
nonsense; the power of judgement, on the other hand, is the faculty that makes it consonant with 
understanding. … The requisites for fine art are, therefore, imagination, understanding, soul and 
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taste”. (Kant 1952, 183)  In the related footnote Kant elaborates briefly on the relationship these 
requisites have with each other.  “The first three faculties are first brought into union by means of 
the fourth”. (Kant 1952, 183) 
 
In section 48 of the Third Critique, “The relation of genius to taste”, Kant subjects genius to 
production, such that fine art requires the production of the objects of genius. (Kant 1952, 172)  
From the above, it is clear that freedom is one of the attributes Kant considers necessary to the 
production of fine art.  However, Kant also subjects genius to “taste”.  This second requirement is 
necessary as it precludes “original nonsense”.   In requiring that genius be subject to taste Kant 
produces the paradox of constrained freedom, which, I argue, is mimetic excess.  As argued above, 
the production of the object or poesis properly belongs to mimesis.   Further, assessing the finality 
or completion of the object is a matter of “taste”.  Taste, as we shall see, is the constraint on the 
freedom acquired throughout the educative process, a process that also belongs to mimesis.  And 
finally, genius as such is the moment of mimetic excess, the inimitable model.   
 
It is important to note in section 48 that Kant grants the artist her “slow and even painful process of 
improvement”. (Kant 1952, 174)  Kant’s slow and painful process of improvement, I suggest, is an 
acknowledgment of the years of repetitive training, the acquisition of the “craft” of art, pointed out 
earlier as mimetic debt.   However, it is not only the development of her craft that is at stake in the 
artist’s educative process.  During her education the artist is taught to develop her taste.   This 
means that “taste” as part of the educative process is also part of the mimetic process.   In section 
50, Kant argues that the artist practices and corrects her form and controls her work through 
attempts to satisfy taste.  
 
Taste, like judgement in general, is the discipline (or corrective) of genius.  … It introduces 
a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought, and in so doing gives stability to the 
ideas … and judgement, which in matters of fine art bases its decision on its own proper 
principles, will more readily endure an abatement of the freedom and wealth of the 
imagination, than that understanding should be compromised.  (Kant 1952, 183)  
 
 
However, there is more at stake in disciplining genius according to “the understanding’s conformity 
to law”. (Kant 1952, 183)  For Kant, the problem of educating genius, the mimetic process of 
education itself, may in fact preclude genius as such.  As Kant argues, genius cannot be a matter of 
“learning” or “academic instruction”.  Nor is it a matter of “imitation” except in the case of being 
“followed” by another genius. To understand the problems Kant sees for the mimetic process of 
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education we need to turn to section 49 of the Third Critique which outlines not only what 
constitutes genius, but also Kant’s nuanced notion of mimesis.   
 
Kant’s mimesis 
 
As argued by Gammon, various readers of Kant’s work suggest that a paradoxical relationship 
exists between genius as exemplary originality, that is, as an example to be followed, and the 
originality of the genius as such, as being a model for emulation.  Gammon’s paradox dissolves, 
however, if one looks closely at not only Kant’s notion of mimesis, but also his explication the 
problems of pedagogical imitation – a process that recognizes the very necessity of mimesis to that 
process.  That is, not only the difference between following and imitation, which is Gammon’s 
focus and which we will turn to shortly, but Kant’s distinction between imitation and aping.   
 
Yet, since the genius is one of nature’s elect – a type that must be regarded as a rare 
phenomenon – for other clever minds his example gives rise to a school, that is to say 
methodological instruction according to rules, collected, so far as the circumstances admit, 
from such products of genius and their peculiarities.  And, to that extent fine art is for such 
persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, through the medium of a genius, gave the 
rule. 
  
Two things are worth noting in the above.  First, is Kant’s acknowledgement that the geniuses are a 
“rare phenomenon” – they are “nature’s elect”.  This means that Kant understands that genius as 
such cannot be learned.  Second, the genius is exemplary and as such imitable. 
 
But this imitation becomes aping when the pupil copies everything down to the deformities 
which the genius only of necessity allowed to remain, because they could hardly be removed 
without loss of force to the idea.   This courage has merit only in the case of a genius.  A 
certain boldness of expression, and, in general, many a deviation from the common rule 
becomes him well, but in no sense is worthy of imitation.  … Mannerism is another kind of 
aping – an aping of peculiarity (originality) in general, for the sake of removing oneself as 
far as possible from imitators, while the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time 
exemplary is absent.   (Kant 1952, 181) [Kant’s italics] 
 
 
In the above Kant not only outlines his concerns about mimesis in the educative process, but he 
recognizes mimesis as requisite to that process.   Kant’s distinction between “following”, 
“imitation” and “aping” is clear.  Genius’s “exemplary originality” is the basis for all three.  Genius 
is “followed” by subsequent geniuses.  Genius is “imitated” by “clever minds” that give rise to a 
new school.  And neither geniuses nor their imitators should be aped.   Hence for Kant “genius” is 
both exemplary and example.  The difference between the three is not a matter of mimesis as such 
but rather what the genius exemplifies for different students, for as we saw in the preceding section, 
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geniuses are subject to the same educative processes as the rest of us.   Therefore, to understand 
Kant’s notion of following we need to consider what constitutes genius. 
 
First, that it is a talent for art –not one for science, in which clearly known rules must take 
the lead and determine the procedure.  Secondly, being a talent in the line of art, it 
presupposes a definite concept of the product – as its end.  …  Thirdly, it displays itself, not 
so much in the working out of the projected end in the presentation of a definite concept, as 
rather in the portrayal, or expression of aesthetic ideas containing a wealth of material for 
effecting that intention.  Consequently the imagination is represented by it in its freedom 
from all guidance of rules, but is still as final for the presentation of the given concept.  
Fourthly, and lastly, the unsought and undesigned subjective finality in the free harmonizing 
of the imagination with the understanding’s conformity to law presupposes a proportion and 
accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about by any observance of rules, 
whether of science or mechanical imitation, but can only be produced by the nature of the 
individual. (Kant 1952, 180-81)[Kant’s italics] 
 
Kant’s four attributes of genius in the above are – “a talent for art – not one for science”, “a definite 
concept as the product”, presentation of a concept free from all rules, and “the free harmonizing of 
the imagination with the understanding’s conformity to law … [which] can only belong to the 
nature of the individual”.  Kant’s first attribute, the distinction between art and science, is from his 
contention that there are no scientific or mathematical geniuses.  This distinction is drawn from his 
argument that scientific and mathematical knowledge is derivative.  That is, all gains in this type of 
knowledge follow in a logical progression from all the knowledge that preceded it.  Hence, for 
Kant, Newton and Einstein cannot be geniuses.  For, although Kant is willing to consider their work 
extraordinary, it is not outside or beyond the rules of mathematics and science.   Accordingly, all 
mathematical and scientific gains are necessarily rule governed.  It is the breaching or exceeding of 
rules that is the talent for art. The excessiveness of Kant’s genius is clarified in the other attributes. 
 
Kant’s second attribute of genius is the conceptualization of the product.  Such a conceptualization 
has two aspects – it must both belong to the understanding and be imaginative.  Hence genial 
conceptualization is both the freedom of the imagination and rule guided understanding.  Rule 
guided understanding belongs to the process of education, the acquisition of taste, that is, 
knowledge. The third attribute relies directly on the second – namely, the ability, not only to 
conceive such and object, but the ability to produce it.  Kant uses the term “presentation” here.  The 
presentation or product of genius shows two things – that the genius is a master of her craft and that 
she exceeds the rule governed imitation required for acknowledgement of such mastery.  Kant 
argues that this product or representation necessarily shows the imagination “in its freedom from all 
the guidance of rules” as well as presenting, representing that is producing the “given concept”.   
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Hence, Kant’s genius is intuitive and imaginative, namely free, while at the same time still having a 
relationship with understanding.  She is at one and the same time governed by the rules of art and 
free from all such guidance. Further, although Kant does not argue this, if art or fine art were 
completely ungoverned the product would no longer be art, that is, the object would be outside the 
realm of art.  Being outside the realm of art also means the object could not even be interpreted as 
art, in Kantian terms the object could not be subject to “taste”.  Kant’s last attribute of genius is that 
it is a “natural endowment”.  This natural endowment is the “unsought and undesigned”.   
 
At the close of his article, “Exemplary originality: Kant on genius and imitation” (1997) Gammon 
argues that Kant “sustains the originality of exemplary originality, through a complex typology of 
the modes of genial influence”. (Gammon 1997, 7)  
 
Out of the ineffable originality of the genius, Kant construes four distinct orders of 
exemplarity for those who produce future works: in the emulations (Nachfolgen) of further 
geniuses, in the imitations (Nachahmungen) of artists, in the replications (Nachmachungen) 
of schools, and in the aping’s  (Nachaffungen) of counterfeiters and plagiarists. While the 
originality of the genius must be ignited as a “spark-scattering flash” of inspiration, the 
proliferating orbits of its subsequent influence firmly establish its permanence in the genial 
firmament. (Gammon 1997, 7)   
 
In the above, Gammon argues that for Kant exemplary originality consists of four modes of 
mimesis – emulation, imitation, replication and aping.  Gammon’s modes certainly align with 
Kant’s in that it seems that Kant is naming four different types of mimesis.  In his introduction 
Gammon argues that in the Third Critique, Kant’s holds a “rigid opposition between genius and 
imitation …”. (Gammon 1997, 2)  However, I argue, Gammon’s distinction is not only misleading 
but false.  In holding such a position Gammon occludes Kant’s argument for mimesis as it applies 
to exemplary originality.  Moreover, Kant is not providing a nuanced notion of imitation.  For 
following is not a different type of mimesis from imitation.  Further, aping, which I suggest for 
Kant is the same thing as replication, is not different from imitation except that it takes mimesis too 
far, or copies too much.  Hence following, imitation, replication and aping are, by and large, 
different names for the same thing – mimesis.   What is at stake in the “exemplarity originality” of 
genius is simply what can be copied by others, what cannot be copied by others and what should not 
be copied by others.   Moreover, the originality of the genius is, I argue, mimetic excess, which both 
exceeds and remains within the bounds of art.    
 
At the conclusion of his letter to Kant, however, Hamann still reserves an alternative sense 
of “imitation” which is actually indispensable to genial inspiration.  In closing, Hamann 
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proclaims: “In my mimicking style (mimischen Styl), a sterner logic prevails and a 
connection more coherent than in the concepts of lively minds. (Gammon 1997, 2)  
 
 
Gammon shows that Hamann’s “mimic style” is a foil to the “law of imitation” or the dictates of the 
“imitative drive” to “unreflectively appropriate [the] views and manners” of the genius.  For 
Hamann “mimic style” imitates “genial enthusiasm” rather than the replication of the imitative 
drive.  However, as Gammon points out, Kant rejects the notion of “mimic style” and holds that the 
“faculty of imitation is directly opposed to the faculty of genius”. (Gammon 1997, 2) Whilst 
holding to the position of mutual exclusivity between genius and imitation, Gammon outlines 
Kant’s development in the subsequent decade of a more “nuanced” notion of imitation.  Influenced 
by Winckelmann’s distinction between diligence, the capacity to learn, talent, the ability to 
‘produce something out of itself, and Nachmachen or mechanical replication and Nachahmung 
“which indicates “following” of a predecessor that is still underscored by an original insight’. 
 
Gammon argues further that Kant was also influenced by Johann Nicolas Tetens’s work in 
empirical psychology.  Tetens, following Aristotle’s position that man is the animal with the 
greatest aptitude for imitation, a position also adopted by Benjamin as discussed in Chapter 5, 
suggests that this imitative behavior implies “that a ‘similar power” of the mind must be employed 
in order to recreate an inner intention that accords with the external side of another’s actions’. 
(Gammon 1997, 3)  Gammon argues that Tetens distinguishes three modes of imitation.   
 
Firstly, it is the following (Nachtun) of a similar sensation, as in the involuntary compulsion 
to follow another person when they yawn.  This arises through the “pliant” (geschmeidige) 
power of the human soul, which “simulates” (nachstimmen) an external impulse.  Secondly, 
it is “a reproduction of a similar idea, which passes over into a complete action.” 
Nachahmung proper marks the appropriation of an internal idea that effectuates an external 
action.  The following of a precept (Vorschrift) by a student in process of learning is 
exemplary here.  Finally, “it is a fiction, where a new representation of an action is built out 
of pregiven materials, according to a demonstrable idea”. (Gammon 1997, 3)  
 
 
Gammon contends that for Tetens all originality is “harnessed” to imitation.  While Tetens’s 
position somewhat aligns with my own, his account does not explain how mimesis works for genius 
other than to say it imitates or follows it.  Moreover, Kant’s notion of “following” in the Third 
Critique is more narrow in that “following” belongs specifically to the genius as exemplar, while 
Gammon’s reading of Tetens describes “following” as imitation not of the genius, but rather, 
“following” of the teacher by the student.  Although clearly influenced by Tetens, as Gammon 
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shows, by the Third Critique Kant argues against imitation of the pedagogy.   For Kant, too close an 
imitation of pedagogy inhibits the possibility of the development of the individual.  Kant argues that 
“learning is nothing but imitation, the greatest ability, or aptness as a pupil (capacity), is still, as 
such, not equivalent to genius”. (Kant 1952, 169)   
 
Kant’s final rejection of imitation, Gammon suggests, is derived from the work of Johan Feder.  
Feder’s approach “reduces the functions of empirical consciousness to a hierarchical set of 
instinctual drives.  Among these, in Feder’s estimation, “the most natural, salutary, and [yet] 
dangerous of the drives of men is the drive to imitation”.’ (Gammon 1997, 5)  The danger of the 
imitative drive, according to Feder, is that ‘it will homogenize human virtue into a single and 
invariable “ideal”’. 
 
Feder’s implicit challenge to Kant’s theory of the ideal of human virtue, then, turns on the 
possibility of determining a universally valid example of that “ideal” without abstracting a 
monochromatic character out of the diversity of empirical life. (Gammon 1997, 5) 
 
 
The difficulty of aligning Gammon’s contentions vis a vis Kantian mimesis is that his article treats 
largely The Critique of Pure Reason whereas Kant’s position on genius and imitation occurs in The 
Critique of Judgement.  Certainly in the Third Critique, Kant has reservations about mimesis, 
however he does recognize its necessity for human development.  Moreover, the paradox of 
canonical succession that concerns Gammon and other scholars reading the Third Critique is not as 
paradoxical as it appears.  If one considers the idea of “exemplary originality” as Kant does 
regarding genius, as a “following” rather than an aping, then what is exemplary in the genius, to be 
followed in genius, is originality as such.  Simply, each student should maintain and develop their 
own individual ideas and not be constrained by the ideas of their predecessors.  Trite as it may 
seem, “be yourself” would be the maxim and the exemplar.  Further, Kant’s genius breaks the rules 
of art such that “for art a new rule is won”.    
 
In breaking the rules of art the genius creates a new presentation.  She makes something that has not 
existed in art before.  Yet the genial creation always remains within the bounds of art for it 
demonstrates taste.  Hence what is followed, to use Kant’s terminology, by other geniuses is a 
tasteful breaking of the rules of her artistic predecessors.  Moreover, there is no difficulty in 
understanding what can be imitated here by clever minds – they imitate the style of the presentation.  
Hence, as Kant points out, a new school is founded – impressionism, cubism, etc.  It is clear then 
that there is no paradox of canonical succession, for the clever mind imitates the style of 
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presentation of the genius while being unable to break the rules tastefully themselves.  The problem 
of aping consists in attempting to copy the genius too closely, even, as Kant points out, down to 
their “deformities” which the genius could not remove “without loss to the force of the idea”.  
Aping, then, copies too much and may constitute forgery or plagiarism.  Therefore, for Kant, 
following is mimesis that can only be copied by other geniuses. Imitation is mimetic of the genial 
presentation without being able to copy the tastefully breaking of the new rule.  Whilst aping is too 
mimetic of genius and should not be done. 
 
Hence, the paradox of “exemplary originality” as the problem of canonical succession is no paradox 
at all.  However, what is paradoxical in the notion of exemplary originality is Kant’s argument that 
genius must be constrained by taste if fine art is to be produced. Further, Gammon argues that for 
Kant the “relationship between geniuses [is] limited to an incommunicable mode of sympathetic 
intelligibility, in which they find common ground for their inspiration, but very different terms for 
its manifestation”. (Gammon 1971, 6)   The genius is inspired by the genial critique, the degree of 
difference of her predecessor’s work.  Furthermore, genial critique as difference never goes beyond 
the mimetic.  For if it were to do so, then the work would be outside the boundaries of art.   
Therefore, genius is mimetic excess through difference as critique – critique of prior works of 
geniuses that redefined their field.   That is, genius as mimetic excess is of the order of the similar.  
At one and the same time it goes beyond its predecessors’ critique, their difference which exceeded 
the existing rules of art, while at the same time genial creation remains within its field, its sameness 
acceding to those rules.  Therefore, genial creation as mimetic excess, whilst extending the rules of 
art to almost breaking, can never breach this boundary.  That mimetic excess as difference and 
critique captures Kant’s distinction between following and imitation can be seen by briefly 
examining his distinction between imitation and aping.  
 
The difference between these two modes of mimesis is one of degree.  Hence, while the genius wins 
a new rule for art, the pupil will eventually belong to a school.  Hence there are schools of art, i.e., 
Impressionism, Cubism, Surrealism, etc.  So, while there is only one Dali, one Mondrian and one 
Monet, their originality, in what I think of as style, is imitable, and founds new schools of art.  
Kant’s distinction, Gammon argues, is not a “contradiction” of her predecessors’ work.  Rather, 
Gammon suggests, Kant’s understanding of the spirit of genial creation is that it “refutes, as it were, 
the dominance of their example, as a pattern for imitation”.  
 
Each genius does not challenge the inherent, archetypal exemplarity of her predecessors, by 
virtue of the fact that her own talent must be ignited by this example, nevertheless, each new 
genial creation proffers a new “pattern” for imitation, or center of influence for an aesthetic 
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school.  Each new work of genius will therefore “refute” the dominance of a predecessor’s 
work as a pattern for future creativity, but cannot “contradict” its archetypal status, due to 
the communal, and yet incommunicable, inspiration they share as “nature’s elect.”  
Consequently, there may be a rivalry between schools, but not within the communal 
“sympathetic intelligibility” of genius. (Gammon 1997, 6) 
 
 
The difficulty that arises here for Gammon’s understanding of Kant’s distinction between following 
and imitation is that while he makes a distinction between archetype and pattern, he suggests that 
the genius “refutes” rather than “contradicts” her predecessors.  However, we need to ask what is 
being “refuted” rather than contradicted in a work of genius, such that the notions of “pattern” and 
“archetype” are distinguishable.  That is, what is the archetype of genius that sets the pattern for 
imitation?  “Sympathetic intelligibility” is hardly an archetype of what Kant has in mind in the 
Third Critique. Moreover, it seems strange to suggest that genial creation is as such a refutation.  
For refutation implies a negation of the predecessor’s work, although not to the same extent as the 
notion of contradicting genial predecessors.  And, to put it as simply as possible, negation of prior 
genial creation does not adequately account for the continued extension of the rules of art by genius.  
For were that the case then in fact all that is required of “genius” is the capacity for negation, 
something that can be quite easily learned.  Moreover, Kant makes it quite clear that imagination 
belongs to genius and imagination is creative. (Kant 1952, 176) Therefore we need to ask what is 
exemplary and inimitable in genius.  Nor is there any need to distinguish between the notions of 
“archetype” or “pattern” discussed by Gammon.  Hence I argue that mimetic excess captures the 
spirit of genius, which can be followed by other geniuses. Discussing the difference between 
method and manner allows Kant to show mimetic practice at its most problematic. 
 
There are, in fact, two modes (modi) in general of arranging one’s thoughts for utterance.  
The one is called a manner (modus aestheticus), the other a method (modus logicus).  The 
distinction between them is this: the former possesses no standard other than the feeling of 
unity in the presentation, whereas the latter follows definite principles. (Kant 1952, 182) 
 
 
Manner, Kant suggests, belongs to genius while method is a mode of copying that belongs to 
schools.  The distinction between manner and method is based on the fact that the latter can be 
learned, that is copied, while the former cannot.  Indeed, throughout his discussion of art and fine 
art, Kant consistently argues that the difference between the genius and everyone else is that one 
cannot learn to be a genius – geniuses are “nature’s elect”.  Further, in the distinction between  
“aping” as an extreme example of copying, and imitation, which belongs to “clever minds”, Kant is 
clearly arguing for a difference in degree of mimesis.  
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Yet, since genius is one of nature’s elect – a type that must be regarded as but a rare 
phenomenon – for other clever minds his example gives rise to a school, that is to say a 
methodical instruction according to rules, collected, so far as the circumstances admit, from 
such products of genius and their peculiarities.  And, to that extent, fine art is for such 
persons a matter of imitation, for which nature, through the medium of a genius, gave the 
rule. (Kant 1952, 181) 
 
Kant, arguing in the above, clearly elucidates his position on the difference between geniuses and 
the rest.  Genius cannot be learned; it is a gift of nature.  For everyone else, from clever mind on 
down, art is mimetic.  What clever minds imitate is method that is institutional instruction on the 
“product” of the genius.  For Kant then, what can be taught is poesis, the capacity to make an object 
similar to objects of the genius.  Kant’s institutional imitation of the products of genius is similar to 
the poesis discussed earlier regarding Plato’s argument about the difference in verisimilitude and 
knowledge between the forms and the particulars, and the particulars and poetry.  
 
Earlier I pointed out that knowledge for Plato derives from poesis – the mastery of the craftsperson 
realized in her product – mastery that can only come from years of repetition.  Hence for Kant 
imitation will found a new school, and in so doing, win a new rule for art.  The new school is 
founded on the imitation of the genius’s product, as Kant argues, not on genius itself.  Genius as 
such can only be exemplary for other geniuses.  And genius is never only methodical, although it is 
mimetically excessive.  Mimetic excess, genius in Kantian terms, is a combination of both manner 
and method.  Exemplarity, for the genius, is the mannerism of her predecessors.   Mannerism 
inspires her to adopt or practice her own mannerism.  And in so doing, she exceeds not only her 
institutional training, which would include a methodological imitation of prior geniuses’ 
mannerisms, but the mannerisms of her predecessors.   
 
We can see then that the “exemplary originality” of genius can be accounted for by understanding 
mannerism as mimetic excess.  Further, the imitability necessary for new schools of art is the 
imitation of the products of geniuses, both their method and manner, not genius as such. Kant 
suggests the idea that the genius is courageous, that it is her courage in exceeding given rules that 
can be followed by subsequent geniuses.  Imitation and aping as such require no courage. They do 
not break any rules but stick strictly to them.  And, Kant argues, genius is imagination “represented 
by it in its freedom from all guidance of rules”. (Kant 1952, 180) Clearly it requires no imagination 
to ape someone else’s creativity. 
 
For Kant then, exemplary originality belongs properly to mimesis as mimetic excess for it is 
creative and imaginative and invariably goes beyond existing rules.  Imitation, however, belongs to 
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institutional mimesis of the product of the genius, namely poesis, a practice that will found a new 
school, while aping is mimesis taken too far.  Therefore, fine art is never outside the mimetic 
process.  The difference for Kant between following and imitation, imitation and aping, is only a 
matter of degree of mimesis, not something conceptually different – what can be copied, what 
cannot be copied and what should not be copied.    
 
Finally, genius is singular for Kant, unique in a similar way to Plato’s forms.  Indeed, Kant’s 
discussion of imitation as learning neatly tracks Plato’s argument of the relationship between the 
forms and the particulars, that is, knowledge as poesis – the difference between the master and the 
apprentice.  
 
 
Inscriptive and calligraphic writing 
 
In the preceding chapter I argued that writing is an embodied mimetic practice and author/ity is a 
matter of inscription within interpolated masculinist discourses.  Working through Foucault’s 
examination of the case of human convenientia highlighted the relationship of similarity between 
male and female bodies.  However, this mimetic relationship is discursively inflected – reproducing 
femininity and masculinity.   Simultaneously there is both the necessity of there being convenientia 
between human corporeality, such that the species can continue, and discursive practice – written 
mimetic practice, that pre- and reproduces, a horror of a body not similar enough to the privileged 
male form.  Hence the male body is both exemplar and example of that privilege.  Masculinity, like 
femininity, is therefore, inscribed through cultural discursive practices, practices that necessarily 
include writing.  Writing then can be seen as an embodied mimetic practice subjected to the 
authority of a process of institutional imitation in precisely the sense discussed above.  Hence 
Kant’s mimesis opens up the possibility of understanding writing as a practice of inscription – an 
inscriptive institutional practice as problematic as the inscription of criminality in Kafka’s In the 
Penal Settlement (1992).      
 
Then he drew out a small leather brief-case and said: ‘Our sentence does not sound severe.  
Whatever commandment the condemned man has disobeyed is written on his body by the 
Harrow.  This condemned man for instance,’ – the officer indicated the man – ‘will have 
written on his body: HONOUR THY SUPERIORS!’ (Kafka 1992, 173-74) 
 
Many questions troubling the explorer, but at the sight of the condemned man he asked 
only: ‘Does he know his sentence?’ ‘No – ’ said the officer, … ‘There would be no point 
telling him.  He’ll learn it corporally, on his person.’ (Kafka 1992, 174) 
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… ‘As you see, the shape of the Harrow corresponds to the human form[.]…’  (Kafka 1992, 
176) 
 
 
The above neatly captures the mechanics of not only the institutional practice of writing as 
inscription but also the cultural practice of inscribing bodies.  In Kantian, as well as Platonic terms, 
the acquisition of knowledge is rule governed.  For Kant, accession to the rules, whilst necessary, 
can be highly problematic if it is taken too far, that is, when imitation as learning becomes copying 
as replication. Further, the criminal is similar to the pupil and the apprentice in that they are 
ignorant, that is, lacking in knowledge of the rules, lacking the ability to produce the object 
required.  Simply, the student and the apprentice must undergo a process of learning that entails 
learning corporeally the knowledge required for her discipline, her art or craft.  This process is 
inscriptive in that, as argued in the preceding chapter, it is written not only on the body as a surface, 
but through the body.  Kafka’s “harrow” with its movement from the surface of the body through 
the body is metaphorically similar to institutional inscriptions in that it starts on the surface of the 
body and continues through to the body’s depths.   What the harrow does not quite capture is that 
the surface and the depth of bodies are not clearly definable when cultural practice is part of this 
process of inscription.  It is not so much that there is a perpetual movement from the outside in to 
the inside out, rather, there is no clearly definable inside or outside.  The indefinability between the 
inside and the outside it is outlined by Grosz in Volatile Bodies.  However, if we understand 
Kafka’s harrow as belonging to a cultural practice of inscription of the criminality of specific 
bodies, then, I suggest, the harrow can be read as writing, not merely from the outside in, but 
writing through the body.  This means that not only is there no outside the text, as Derrida shows, 
but that no text is outside cultural institutional practices.  Further, the harrow’s inscription of 
criminality on certain bodies can be read as a neat metaphor for the cultural inscription of bodies as 
belonging to the dominant masculinist paradigm, while at the same time, being excluded from it.  
For women, as I argued in the preceding chapter, this means being necessary for the continuation of 
the species, while at the same time those bodies are excluded from that paradigm.  This exclusion is 
not a matter of otherness or alterity.  For conceptually constructing sexual difference as a binary, 
where woman is not man, overlooks the complexities of socio-cultural textual practices that inscribe 
both bodies.     
 
The Pillow Book 
 
However, while Kafka’s harrow can be read as a metaphor for inscriptive writing on the body, 
Grosz challenges us to think beyond inscriptive practice.  The challenge then is to undertake a form 
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of writing that moves beyond contemporary cultural and institutional practices.  To think through 
this idea I suggest that Peter Greenaway’s film The Pillow Book (1997) stands as an example of the 
possibilities of a bodily calligraphy, but is also exemplary of calligraphic practice as elaborative 
rather than incisive.  A writing that is ethical. 
 
Greenaway’s tells the story of three pillow books.  The first, is written by Nagiko Sei Shonagon, a 
handmaid to the Japanese Empress and is almost a thousand years old.  The second, written by 
contemporary Nagiko, tries produce a Pillow Book not only similar to that of Sei Shonagon, but so 
that she may become a writer and honour her father, who was her first calligrapher.  The last book 
is made by the publisher of Nagiko’s father’s books – made from the skin of their shared lover 
Jerome.  However, for my purposes I will focus on not the Pillow Books, but on calligraphy as an 
embodied mimetic practice that exceeds inscription – an exemplary writing in the Kantian sense – a 
writing that at one and the same time both breaks the rules of traditional writing as inscription and 
at the same time remains within the bounds of writing.  That is, writing on the body as mimetic 
excess. 
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Greenaway’s film is both example and exemplary of the difference between inscription and 
calligraphy.  The calligraphy on the bodies of Nagiko, by her father and herself, and the calligraphy 
on Jerome’s body are both art, in the Kantian sense argued above as mimetic excess, and ethical in 
a way that highlights Grosz’s challenge sketched in Volatile Bodies.  The publisher symbolizes 
author/ity as discussed in Chapter 6.  For, in producing his own Pillow Book from the skin of the 
dead Jerome, the publisher enacts a gesture that shows writing as an inscriptive practice reminiscent 
of Kafka’s harrow. Moreover, Greenaway’s film shows the possibility of a writing that is not either 
masculine or feminine, for both Nagiko and her father are calligraphers.  This means that writing 
calligraphically can be an ethical practice that exceeds sexual difference.   
 
The first images are of Nagiko’s father as a calligrapher, writing what is her traditional birthday 
message.    
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The textual sequence and the black and white colour of the images above are repeated throughout 
the film.  While the text and colour remain the same we see Nagiko through a series of her 
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birthdays’ into young adulthood.   At the close of the film, this sequence is repeated with Nagiko 
writing on the body of her daughter.   
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Mimesis, then, shifts us across time while at the same time developing the relationship between 
Nagiko, Nagiko’s father, Nagiko’s daughter calligraphy and writing on the body as a familial 
traditional practice learned from birth.  Setting calligraphy in this way reminds us that we are born 
into writing, as argued in the preceding chapter, and come to embody this practice.  Indeed, the 
image of Nagiko’s tattooed body, breast-feeding her daughter, elaborates the notion of the 
permanence of writing as an embodied practice that exceeds inscription.  For, unlike Kafka’s 
harrow, tattooing is not an inscription, rather it is a permanent surface dyeing of the skin.   By 
insetting an image of Nagiko’s father at the top right of the screen Greenaway enables us to see that 
writing calligraphically we can embody this mimetic practice ethically.  For Greenaway’s 
calligraphers exceed notions of gendered writing on the body, while engaging in an act of love, an 
act of writing beyond inscription.  
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Conclusion 
 
Mimesis: mimesis 
 
 
This thesis has argued that the formulation “written on the body” is both literal and metaphorical.  It 
follows that Grosz’s claim in Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism that the body is 
literally written on is more than a post-modern feminist articulation, conflation or confusion of 
bodies and texts.  In making this argument, I answered the two most obvious questions that arise 
from such formulations: what is writing and what is its relation to embodiment such that any 
writing on the body is a literal claim?  
 
To answer the first of these questions, “what is writing?”, I have argued that writing is a mimetic 
practice that not only exceeds all accounts of writing as a mere copy or appurtenance of speech, but 
also any accounts of representation as mimetic resemblance.  It is the idea of writing as a copy, of 
speech or anything else, that is the guiding and unexamined assumption of linguist theories, be they 
philosophical, semiotic, etc.   For any theory that claims that writing is a copy of speech overlooks 
what copying as representative is – it fails to account for or examine the workings of mimesis.   
This thesis has provided such an account. 
 
I began with an examination of Plato in Chapter 1, showing that Book X of the Republic, 
specifically Plato’s theory of the Forms and the exclusion of the poets from the Republic is founded 
on constructing mimesis as visual, that is, resemblance.  This allowed Plato at one and the same 
time to situate poetic representation as at a third remove from the truth of the Forms while 
constructing a theory that can only in itself be a mimetic theory.   
 
The undoing of mimesis as resemblance is carried through to Chapter 2 and Ricoeur’s uptake of 
Aristotle’s argument that metaphor functions via resemblance.  Whilst Ricoeur argues that 
resemblance is the rule of metaphor, reading Aristotle literally, I argued that Aristotle understands 
resemblance metaphorically and that it is non-visual mimesis, not resemblance that is the rule of 
metaphor.  Such a reading is a non-hermeneutic application of Rorty’s account of the tyranny of 
visual metaphors in philosophy. 
 
Adopting a position that mimesis functions more than visually opened up the possibility of not only 
accounting for the particulars as functionally mimetic of the Forms, but also of arguing that writing 
is mimetic in a way that cannot be accounted for by visual metaphors.  Hence I turned in Chapter 3 
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to Mauss and Hubert’s explanation of magical representations as poorly executed ideograms – 
representations. This allowed to two moves to be made.  Firstly, I argued that writing is like a 
poorly executed ideogram in its point for point accuracy as a representation.  This means that 
writing not only makes mimetic objects, but that writing as such is also a mimetic practice.  
Secondly, in making a mimetic representation the magician and, as I argued later, the theoretician 
attempts to gain power over the thing, event or person via that likeness of them.  
 
 While Chapters 5 and 6 dealt specifically with writing as an embodied mimetic practice, it was 
necessary to take a detour via psychoanalytic use of myths of mimesis to theorize human 
subjectivity and a philosophical theorizing of theory that also uses a mimetic myth. Chapter 4 then, 
reads Kristeva’s uptake of narcissism against both the myth of Echo and Narcissus and Freud’s own 
work on the subject.  This chapter notices that Echo and Narcissus is a myth of mimesis and as 
Echo is silenced in the myth so is she elided from psychoanalytic discourse.  Further, the power of 
mimesis begins to become evident as I also read Lacoue-Labarthe’s installation of the myth of 
Perseus, a myth of mimeticians and the power of installing a mimetic object, a mirror, in one’s 
theories.   This turn of the mirror of theory returned us to writing. 
 
Chapter 5, “Mimesis: Writing”, read Derrida’s work on supplementarity and Benjamin’s work on 
language as the archive of non-sensuous mimesis.  While Derrida argues that his work should not 
be read psychoanalytically, one could suggest that Rousseau’s chain of supplements is neatly 
accounted for by Freudian anaclitic love.  However, as I argued in the preceding chapter, anaclitic 
love is in fact not only indebted to mimesis, but Derrida’s dangerous supplement is love as mimetic 
embodiment.  Further, rereading Benjamin’s account of language as non-sensuous mimesis extends 
the notion of mimetic embodiment.  I argued that language is in fact, not non-sensuous mimesis, but 
rather sensuous mimesis.  
 
The argument developed in these five chapters allowed me to finally show in Chapter 6 that the 
body is “literally” written on.  Moreover this means that writing needs to be comprehended as a 
socio-cultural, biologico-medical and philosophical practice.  The issues taken up in this chapter 
include rethinking masculinist discourse(s) not as based on the sexual difference but rather that the 
female body is not similar enough to the male body.  Hence there is an issue of mimetic 
in/adequacy between these bodies.  Further, Chapter 6 also argues that writing is necessarily an 
embodied mimetic practice, a body that both writes and is written.  This means that writing as 
discursive practice is subject to ethics – a matter of not only what is written but also how we write.  
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Therefore, I argued that the notion of writing as inscriptive needs to be challenged and we should 
take up Grosz’s challenge to write calligraphically.  
 
Finally, chapter 7 revisits Plato’s theory of the forms, and takes up Kant’s work on genius and 
exemplarity in the Third Critique, teasing out the curious mimetic relationship between the example 
and the exemplar.  This chapter, whilst perhaps argumentative, hopes to achieve a philosophical 
writing that is elaborative rather than merely argumentative, that is, a writing that is calligraphic 
rather than incisive.  Finally we close with a brief look at Kafka’s In the Penal Colony as an 
example of inscriptive writing and Peter Greenaway’s film The Pillow Book as an example of 
calligraphic writing.  Calligraphy is exemplary of writing as an embodied mimetic practice beyond 
inscription – writing as an embodied mimetic practice that is ethical. 
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